As President-elect Joe Biden begins his term, the Middle East probably is not foremost on his mind. Domestic issues are dominating the agenda in the US, between coronavirus and picking up the pieces of the attempted insurrection in Washington earlier this month, among others.
That means Israelis will likely be in somewhat of a holding position with the US on a wide range of issues, to see how things will change – or remain the same – though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and incoming Ambassador to the US Gilad Erdan and others will immediately jump into building a relationship with the new administration.
But there is one issue that will likely come up very soon, and that is Iran. Netanyahu hasn’t even waited for Biden’s inauguration to address it; he and his associates have repeated many, many times over the past two months that the US must not return to the 2015 Iran deal, which outgoing President Donald Trump left in 2018.
The urgency is not only because Iran’s nuclear ambitions are an issue that is always foremost on Netanyahu’s mind, as being the biggest external threat to Israel, but because Biden himself has said he would like the US to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the world powers’ nuclear agreement with Iran is called.
To be fair, there are caveats to that return. Biden would expect a return to strict Iranian compliance with the JCPOA. He has written and talked about opening negotiations with Iran to strengthen the deal, while others in Biden’s orbit have referred more specifically to limiting the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missile program and its malign behavior throughout the region.
However, at its core, the JCPOA has a major weakness, as far as Israel is concerned. Rather than say Tehran cannot develop a nuclear weapon, it simply delays its ability to do so. At the beginning of the deal, it severely limited Iran’s enrichment capabilities, and a conventional arms embargo remained in place for five years. But as the years go by, the “sunset clauses” lift more and more limitations, so that by 2030, Iran would be able to develop a nuclear weapon under the terms of the agreement.
THE WEAKNESS of the deal was proven last year, when despite Iran using the cash influx from the lifting of sanctions in 2015 to fund terrorism and proxy warfare around the Middle East – and despite stockpiling uranium beyond the permitted amount, among other violations – the UN Security Council lifted the arms embargo on Iran. The other partners to the Iran deal: China, Russia, the EU and the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – were so wedded to their ideal timeline for the deal that they did not have the will to even use the enforcement mechanisms included in the JCPOA, such as “snapping back” the UN sanctions.
At most, the EU and E3 have released messages tsk-tsking at Tehran, while China and Russia have prepared to sell the ayatollahs weapons. Since then, Iran has only escalated its violations, enriching uranium up to 20% and launching research to produce uranium metals.
As such, Israel is opposed to any return to the Iran deal. Contrary to many reports, Israel is not pushing for new clauses related to ballistic missiles and proxy warfare. Israel’s leadership sees the JCPOA as rotten to the core, and that a different deal is necessary.
Netanyahu still believes what he said In 2015, speaking before both houses of Congress: “The alternative to this bad deal is a much better deal: a better deal that doesn’t leave Iran with a vast nuclear infrastructure and such a short breakout time; a better deal that keeps the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in place until Iran’s aggression ends; a better deal that won’t give Iran an easy path to the bomb; a better deal that Israel and its neighbors may not like, but with which we could live, literally.”
As far as Netanyahu is concerned, the developments of the past five years have only proven his point. For example, leaving Iran with its nuclear infrastructure has allowed it to enrich uranium up to 20% just days after a parliamentary decision that it should do so. Not tying restrictions to whether Iran lets up on its aggression allows Moscow and Beijing to sell arms to Tehran while the violations continue to happen.
THE QUESTION remains as to whether the Biden administration will recognize Iran’s recent, increasing violations and change course. Since Biden’s terms for a return to the deal include strict compliance by Iran, that return may not even be possible.
But Biden has appointed so many people from the Obama administration who were instrumental in making the Iran deal happen –such as its top negotiator Wendy Sherman nominated as deputy secretary of state, soon-to-be national security adviser Jake Sullivan, former secretary of state John Kerry in Biden’s cabinet, among others – that it seems inevitable they would want to return to what they see as the deal’s former glory.
But the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions regime on Iran has given the US leverage to try to exact greater concessions. It is possible that Biden could negotiate a different, truly effective deal with Iran, and call it “a return to the Iran deal” to save face.
The way Biden handles Iran will also likely have an impact on the Abraham Accords, the peace and normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco.
The Obama administration’s Iran policies were a major impetus for Israel and moderate Sunni states to build closer relationships based on intelligence sharing and other kinds of security cooperation, in facing their shared Iranian threat. Netanyahu’s outspokenness on the issue attracted leaders in the region to join in a sort of coalition against Iranian aggression. The Trump administration fostered those advances into open, public, official ties between Israel and its friends in the Gulf, and others followed.
It is possible that shared opposition to Biden’s Iran policies could have the same effect. But it seems more likely that, without the US providing incentives, America being party to the JCPOA will do what it did in 2015: bolster secret partnerships.
Biden’s emphasis on Saudi Arabia’s human rights violations, after Trump warmly embraced Riyadh, may also get in the way of further normalizations.
That being said, Biden has spoken out very positively about the Abraham Accords and has said he would like more Arab and Muslim states to recognize Israel.
He may encourage them to do so, though it is still unlikely he will put the same emphasis the Trump administration did on what it viewed as one of its greatest foreign policy achievements. Biden is even less likely to provide the kinds of enticements Trump did, such as recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara.
WHERE BIDEN is highly critical, and has been throughout his nearly-50-year career in Washington, is on the settlement issue.
For the past four years, the Trump administration not only didn’t care where Israel builds homes for its citizens, but encouraged the development of communities in Judea and Samaria by declaring settlements to not be illegal per se, and proposing a peace plan in which Israel would retain them all, allowing Israeli products produced over the Green Line to say “made in Israel.”
Now, it is likely that every announcement related to West Bank settlements will be met with criticism from Washington. Though Biden’s associates have said he prefers direct engagement over making public statements, which is an improvement over Obama, this will still likely be a point of friction that the public will be acutely aware of.
It is important to emphasize that Biden may have been vice president under former president Barack Obama, but he is a different person. The many Obama alumni who Biden has appointed may be different when they follow “the spirit of the commander,” the Hebrew phrase for echoing a leader’s behavior.
Biden and Netanyahu do not have the deep personal antipathy that Netanyahu and Obama felt towards one another, even if Biden has been critical at times.
“Bibi, I don’t agree with a damn thing you say, but I love you,” Biden has said publicly on multiple occasions, and has called Netanyahu his buddy.
Israel, of course, is not just Netanyahu, but when it comes to Biden’s sympathies, the Jewish state will be fine in that regard no matter who wins our election in March. Biden has called himself a Zionist, and has a strong record of positive statements and votes in Israel’s favor.
Furthermore, defense cooperation between Israel and the US is not in question. US military aid will likely continue under the terms of the 10-year Memorandum of Understanding negotiated by Obama’s administration, giving Israel more aid than ever, but requiring all of it to be spent in the US.
But that issue, along with settlements, the Abraham Accords and others, will likely be put on hold for now, while the Biden administration gets its footing and tries to bring a deeply divided America back from the brink.
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