Did the Iron Dome become less effective? – analysis

There is a dispute between reports that the IDF is probing why the Iron Dome performed less well on Tuesday afternoon versus the statement by IDF Chief Spokesman Brig. Gen,. Daniel Hagari Wednesday morning that all is well with Israel’s prized rocket defense system.

The background is that until last month, there was a general progression of improved Iron Dome effectiveness against Gaza rockets.

In November 2012, Iron Dome was found to be 85% effective, a number which jumped to 90% in 2014.

There was a drop in May 2019 back to 85%, but in May 2021 the effectiveness was back up to 90% and in August 2022, the missile defense system hit a record 96%.

Hagari said Wednesday morning that the effectiveness against the more than 100 rockets between Tuesday and Wednesday was still around 90%.

However, during the Tuesday afternoon volley of around 26 rockets from Gaza, the effectiveness of shooting down the rockets which were actually threats was closer to 60%.

That was also the time period when some of the worst hits and casualties on the Israeli side occurred.

How can the discrepancy be explained?

First of all, Hagari appeared to be referring to the full 100 rockets over the 30-hour period, whereas criticism and the internal probe seemed focused on specifically the afternoon volley of rockets from Gaza.

Why might the afternoon rockets have caught Israel more off guard?

It is possible that the IDF had not moved all of its Iron Dome batteries into place or did not have those batteries fully staffed in the afternoon and may have even been slightly fooled to let its guard down after only a few rockets were fired Tuesday morning.

In contrast, by Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning, the IDF had most of the day to prepare and also was expecting more rockets from Gaza because the Israeli air force had plans to strike the terror groups’ assets.

This same readiness issue could explain why the IDF hit a record level of effectiveness in August 2022. That operation, more than many others in the last decade or so, was pre-planned carefully by Jerusalem as opposed to falling into an unwanted war by accident in some other instances.

However, sources indicate that general readiness was not the reason for the lower performance of Iron Dome Tuesday afternoon.

There could also have been technical defects which may not be made public. Sources said that the IDF will likely put out a report on the issue in the coming days.

Finally, the “drop” in effectiveness was still not terribly significant, and might not have been noticed at all except that in some of the rocket fire episodes against Israel in the North in early April, there was also a drop in effectiveness.

The reason though that all of this is debatable is still only a small number of rockets got through the missile shield and no Israelis died.

In fact, the greater concerns are more about the future: if there is a new flaw that Gaza has learned to exploit, would more Israelis be in danger if there was a longer conflict with thousands of rockets fired?

Moreover, at a strategic level, having an Iron Dome at 85-96% effectiveness gives the Israeli government more flexibility in extending a conflict by hours or days to achieve certain goals than if the government is more worried about Gaza’s rockets succeeding in killing substantial numbers of civilians.

At the same time as there are questions about Iron Dome, Hamas unveiled, for the second time in a month, certain anti aircraft missile capabilities.

The IDF has never fully confirmed what Hamas’ capabilities are, but prior reports have indicated that they may vary from the SA-7 shoulder held anti aircraft missile to the SA-14 and SA-18 antiaircraft missile systems, which are slightly more advanced.

However, these capabilities are not expected to impact the IDF’s operations the way that the S-300 anti aircraft missile system did in Syria when Russia brought that far more advanced system there.

For one, even the most advanced, the SA-18 only has a range of five kilometers and most Israeli aircraft striking Gaza do so from above 10 kilometers.

In addition, there have been reports of some of these anti aircraft systems in Gaza in 2022 and even earlier with not only no hits to date, but not even any close calls.

Even more advanced anti aircraft systems would need to beat Israel’s advanced aircraft maneuvers and proactive defensive and decoy capabilities.

The one area where some of these anti aircraft systems could make a difference could be against Israeli helicopters, which are less often the weapon of choice during standard rounds of airstrikes.

In 2006, Hezbollah did succeed in shooting down an Israeli helicopter.

But as long as helicopters are used strategically, and taking into account that Israeli helicopters now boast some new proactive defensive systems, it seems that Hamas’ anti aircraft defenses will be mostly for show.   

Overall, despite some hiccups in these areas, Israel still is in the driver’s seat from a strategic perspective, should it choose to undergo a longer operation in the future.

JPost