Gaza has fired hundreds of rockets on Israel – what didn’t happen? – analysis

At press time, around 300 rockets had been fired from Gaza against Israel in a matter of hours over Wednesday, coming only a week after over 100 rockers were fired on Israel over May 2-3.

In addition, over the course of Wednesday, two rockets were fired from Gaza against Tel Aviv and some other rockets were fired against the critical Gush Dan region – in contrast to the “usual” practice of firing “only” on Israel’s Gaza corridor villages.

All of this could suggest the beginnings of a much larger conflict, such as in 2014 or May 2021. If so, then why did all the talk by early evening switch to a likely ceasefire by around 9:00 p.m.?

There have been at least two major categories of signs since this all started on Tuesday (or even last Tuesday if you want to go farther back) that this would not be a huge conflict, but more of a hot and quick one – like the August 2022 conflict with Gaza.

Both categories are about what did not happen, since often what does not happen is as important as what did.

First, there was the lapse of time for firing rockets and who did not basically participate at all.

Islamic Jihad did not fire a single rocket at Israel all day Tuesday despite the IDF killing three of its top leaders early Tuesday morning. In fact, the terror group did not fire rockets on Israel until early afternoon Wednesday. This was a stunning extended time lapse that showed that Islamic Jihad was not ready for a long conflict.

Why didn’t they shoot until Wednesday and why might they want a quick end now?

It could be because they are not sure yet who is in charge in place of the three eliminated leaders. It could be that the new leaders are afraid they will be killed next if there is a long conflict.

It could also be the absence of Hamas from this conflict.

This week, last week and in August 2022, Hamas issued statements that it was involved and supported Islamic Jihad, but Israeli intelligence said that this was public relations trying to cover up that the true rulers of Gaza stayed out of things.

According to IDF intelligence, Hamas has not been a major factor even on Wednesday with 300 rockets fired, though they may have participated symbolically.

The second category of what didn’t happen has to do with volume. 300 rockets in a few hours is a ton of rockets.

At press time, that number of rockets might have been on the way to increasing by several dozen more at least. But in longer conflicts, Israel has faced over 4,000 rockets. Meaning what we have seen so far has been very limited compared to some past rounds.

Likewise, two rockets at Tel Aviv and possibly some more around press time, is a major escalation.

But in 2021, over 160 rockets were fired at Tel Aviv, at one point around 130 rockets in one day.

Large volume of rockets sent to Tel Aviv

This is not just a much smaller volume this round. Any rocket fired at Tel Aviv is part of Hamas or Islamic Jihad’s much more limited number of long range rockets. Using up such rockets which are not easily replaced is a strategic issue for the terror groups.

This means that in 2021 Hamas and Islamic Jihad were strategically committed to use up large amounts of their “best shots” against Israel.

The same simply cannot be said this time.

Finally, some of this goes back to how this all started.

If in 2014, Gaza was in a deep economic squeeze, and if in 2021, the Strip’s rulers wanted to identify their cause with Jerusalem for broader global propaganda purposes – neither of those conditions is present this time.

Gaza is not doing well economically, but it is also not doing much worse lately than in recent months or years. There has even been a period of allowing more Gaza workers into Israel.

Jerusalem also has not been part of this round of fighting (though it might have been for the very short round of rockets around Passover.) This round of fighting in some ways came from an Israeli mistake of letting a top Islamic Jihad official in prison die while on hunger strike.

Islamic Jihad felt it needed to respond to defend his honor. Israel felt it needed to restore deterrence or defend its honor and one thing has led to another – but neither side was even close to wanting a long battle now.

Gaza is still licking its wounds from May 2021 and August 2022 and the current coalition has its hands full with crisis over the judicial overhaul and food and gas prices.

In short, both sides are likely reading the signs of restraint that each has shown in certain ways (Israel has barely touched Hamas) and trying to find a quick way to end this unwanted accident and distraction of a fight.

JPost