Netanyahu fights a 4-dimensional war with the IDF over judicial reform – analysis

There is a dramatic battle of titans taking place which could determine the fate of the nation.

But it is not a “clean” battle of one side versus another, but a highly complex four-dimensional war where each actor is playing multiple sides of the ongoing conflict over framing the IDF reservists’ protests of the judicial reform.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the late winter and early spring simply did not see the IDF reservists’ protests coming. The mix of the protests and of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant publicly demanding that he halt the judicial overhaul caught him off guard and led to a tactical retreat from late March until late July.

However, Netanyahu laid sturdier groundwork for his judicial overhaul in round two.

First, he watered down and delayed the judicial reform, moving ahead with the least significant of four major initiatives first, dropping two major initiatives, and holding the most important off until October-November.

Through those moves and after firing and un-firing Gallant, Netanyahu convinced the defense minister that his watered-down position and the time he gave the opposition to negotiate compromises was enough to move forward unilaterally on repealing the judiciary’s reasonableness standard power.

When Gallant moved on the issue and started to attack reservists quitting, IDF Chief of Staff (Lt.-Gen.) Herzi Halevi came along and also started hitting back at reservists who were skipping their callups.

From April until sometime in June, the tone had shifted and it almost sounded like Gallant and Halevi were in lockstep with Netanyahu.

Halevi even told some close to him that he felt some of the reservists had “played” him and the other top official during round one, partially because after all of the letters about quitting, almost all of the reservists kept showing up.

Somewhere during this time period, former top security chiefs and officials, decades-long friends and comrades of Halevi and of Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) Director Ronen Bar and Mossad Director David Barnea, started to attack them as well.

The “formers” said that they understood that the current chiefs were not allowed to go against government policy in general, but also argued that the oath all security officials swear is ultimately to the State of Israel and its citizens, and not to any one government.

They said that if Netanyahu’s policies led to a point where the IDF would not be ready for war, Halevi and the other chiefs must bang their hands on the desk to get the prime minister to halt his judicial overhaul.

Up until the repeal passed, Gallant believed that Netanyahu would unilaterally soften the repeal as a nod to the reservists threatening to quit, to message to them that even if some changes were being made that they did not like, their worst fears of destroying the judicial branch’s independence would not come to pass.  

Next, Netanyahu refused to water down the repeal and continued to loudly trumpet altering the appointment of judges around October-November. This was instead of giving another year to negotiate with the opposition, and led to Gallant, Halevi, and the other security chiefs shifting again.

Suddenly, the reservists were not bluffing. Over 700 air force reservists, including key positions, stopped showing up, along with around 10,000 reservists in other areas.

Halevi was not willing to be a “sucker” to reservists who would threaten to quit, but not actually cross the line. And he and the other security chiefs would campaign hard to convince reservists not to quit, even if they disagreed with the government. Their core argument to reservists was that Hezbollah would want to destroy Israel no matter who sits on the Israeli Supreme Court.

This argument held until the repeal vote, and then the reservists had had enough. They no longer believed Netanyahu would shift gears unless he was forced.

But once he could see the IDF’s readiness was taking a major hit, he was also not going to be willing to remain silent to assist Netanyahu politically.

Halevi made up his mind: he would not exaggerate some of the IDF readiness issues like some of his “formers” friends were doing, but once the IDF’s readiness really took a hit, he would be loud and clear.

This meant that in July the “formers” and reservist protesters were saying the IDF was no longer ready for war, while Halevi and the other current chiefs said this was an exaggeration.

When the IDF starts to cross the line

However, as of this past weekend, the IDF in fact started to cross certain lines.

Halevi made that clear and it enraged Netanyahu who viewed any departure from his political narrative as a betrayal.

Meanwhile, Gallant has been leaking and helping Halevi make his case behind the scenes, but has not gone head-to-head with Netanyahu like he did in March.

One of the biggest uncertainties is whether Gallant will at any point give another ultimatum to Netanyahu or whether his first firing left him so wounded that he will stick to the line that no matter what the government passes, it is better that he remain defense minister than Miri Regev or some other Likudnik with less sympathy for the security chiefs.

This means that Gallant is currently pressuring both Halevi to alternately heed Netanyahu or combat Netanyahu on his behalf, while pressuring the prime minister to be worried about a state commission of inquiry into how he left the country vulnerable to attack.

It also means that both sides of the political spectrum are frustrated with both Gallant and Halevi (and the other current security chiefs) for not clearly choosing a side.

One day the Likud or the protesting reservists might be attacking Halevi, with the other defending, and the next day, they might switch, depending on whether the issue at hand is opposing reservists quitting or publicly discussing the reduced readiness of the IDF.  

Netanyahu might also shift at some point, which would reshuffle the cards.

In normal times, Halevi’s announcement a week ago of his new multi-year signature budget plan and strategy for handling Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and others as IDF chief would have been in the headlines everywhere.

But in the current four-dimensional crisis, no one even knows what kind of army there will be in September and how each major actor will maneuver, let alone think about a multi-year plan.

JPost