The clashes along the Euphrates River valley between local tribes and clans with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces have expanded now to other areas of Syria.
The clashes now threaten to enflame other areas of Syria and bring in Turkish-backed groups, as well as possibly Iranian-backed militias, the Syrian regime and Russia.
This is an incredibly complex situation and in order to understand it, it is worth looking back at how the various forces involved got to this point.
The heart of Syria’s story
At the heart of the story are the challenges facing the SDF. The SDF was formed in 2015 with US backing to defeat ISIS in Syria. The SDF grew out of Kurdish groups linked to the YPG, a Kurdish self-protection force that was active in a small area of eastern Syria and in Afrin, two areas where Kurds live.
Through the SDF, and with the US backing, the Kurds and an increasing number of partners from the Arab community rolled back ISIS and liberated Raqqa in 2017. However, their massive gains gave them control over a large area with limited forces and even more limited resources. This set up the current troubles.
A Turkish army tank is positioned at a military post by the Euphrates river on the Turkish-Syrian border town of Karkamis in Gaziantep province, Turkey, November 29, 2022 (credit: REUTERS/UMIT BEKTAS)Let’s start with what has happened in the last week.
The Syrian Democratic Forces, which control a swath of eastern Syria, are backed by the US and were created to defeat ISIS. On Saturday the US-led coalition put out a statement. “Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve calls for an immediate end to the continued clashes in the Deir ez-Zor region.” The US backs the SDF and calls for all forces to immediately cease fighting. The US blames malign actors.
Ostensibly the current crisis was set off by the arrest by the SDF of Abu Khawla, a leader of the SDF’s own Deir Ezzor Military Council. Abu Khawla has supporters within his own Bakir clan, but the fighting quickly spread to other areas. An article at Al-Monitor by Jared Szuba provides an explanation of the complexities involved and shows how the fighting is not really about the arrest itself. The article also quotes Nicholas Heras of the Newlines Institute. “Abu Khawla is intensely controversial…A significant part of his influence relies on support from the US through the SDF. He is not really an iconic figure to inspire a multi-tribal insurgency in Deir Ezzor.”
Some argue that the reason for the clashes is mostly local: the tribes are chaffing under the rule of the SDF, which some depict as oppressive or ignoring local demands. That explanation doesn’t explain why the fighting has spread to other areas of Syria and why Turkey, the Syrian regime and Russia are all involved, and why anti-Kurdish sentiment among other Arab groups in Syria has been part of the fighting. For instance, Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups, styled the Syrian National Army, have attacked villages near Manbij, 270km northwest of the clashes near Deir Ezzor. Turkish forces reportedly shelled Syrian regime forces near Ma’arat Na’aman, 390km east of Deir Ezzor. Russia has also carried out airstrikes near Aleppo.
The role of the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran is important here. Iran supports the Syrian regime and has sent forces to Syria since 2012 to back the regime. Russia backs the Syrian regime and intervened in Syria in 2015. The US backs the SDF and intervened in Syria both to back the rebels initially and then the SDF against ISIS in 2015.
Turkey has occupied areas of northern Syria after attacking Kurdish forces in three operations beginning in 2016. Ankara calls the SDF “terrorists” and has encouraged some of the groups it supports to attack the SDF and also to persecute Kurds in places like Afrin. Kurds are a minority in Syria and have historically been deprived of their rights.
During the first year of operations the SDF set about defeating ISIS in key areas in eastern Syria. In many cases these areas were Kurdish or close to the Kurdish heartland. However, as the SDF moved into areas like Tel Abyad it was clear that Ankara began to view the SDF as a growing threat. When the SDF crossed the Euphrates to strike at Manbij in 2016 this set Turkey in motion to back a Syrian rebel attack on the SDF. Turkey had just gone through elections aimed at weakening far-left Kurdish parties in Turkey, and Turkey accused the SDF of being linked to the PKK and its conflict with Turkey. Ankara then mobilized Arab fighters who were fighting the Syrian regime, to fight the SDF. This shifted the Syrian war from one between rebel groups and Assad, to one where the rebels would fight the SDF while Russia and Iran backed the Assad regime to retake most of the Syria. The day the first Turkish soldiers poured over the border with Syrian rebels in tow, the Syrian rebellion declined to eventual ruin; and the SDF was put on a collision course with tribes in the Euphrates.
This happened in phases. The Russian decision to try to broker the future of Syria via talks with Iran and Turkey at Astana was one factor. This sidelined the Americans and meant that the SDF would begin to be seen by Russia and Iran as a problematic force. Turkey already viewed the SDF as “terrorists” and continued to carry out increasing operations against them, including drone strikes. During the Trump administration, the US pursued a double-edged strategy in Syria.
On the one hand, officials wanted to use the US presence to check the Iranian trafficking of weapons through Albukamal and the Euphrates Valley. The idea was to slow down the Iranian corridor through Syria to Lebanon. On the other hand, US diplomats and those involved with Syria wanted to keep the SDF at arm’s length, calling it a temporary, transactional, and tactic relationship.
US forces in Syria pursued a narrow anti-ISIS policy
Meanwhile, US forces in Syria pursued a narrow anti-ISIS policy, which meant fighting ISIS by, with, and through the SDF. This narrow policy didn’t allow for political investment, meaning that eastern Syria remained cut off from the rest of the world and the US cared mostly about security, not strategy. This lack of diplomatic investment in eastern Syria and the SDF meant that it was hard to head off the Turkish threats and also the Russian-Iranian-regime threats. This means any mediation with the tribes today is almost impossible. The US military that works with the SDF tried in the past to do meetings with groups like “tribes” and village leaders in places like Afghanistan during the global war on terror, but the end result of a lot of that was that it didn’t work well. The US is also out of the “national building” and “global policeman” activities it did in the 1990s and early 2000s.
For this reason, the coalition prefers to work through the SDF. However, without diplomats and others to work to empower eastern Syria and broker deals with the tribes and others, this leaves the SDF as the low-hanging fruit that makes it a target for Turkey, the Iranian-backed militias, extremists and local groups that can be exploited.
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