The Mossad on Thursday for the first time initiated its own declassification of history process, this one relating to before, during, and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
As part of a ceremony conducted by current Mossad Director David Barnea, and with a number of former Mossad chiefs and senior officials in attendance, the spy agency put out a book called “Some day, when it can be revealed.”
Among many reveals, the book, whose name comes from a statement made by then prime minister Golda Meir to then Mossad chief Zvi Zamir, presents original official internal Mossad cables, summaries, photos, and other material that have never been revealed before, even if aspects of the content inside them have come out over the years.
According to Zamir’s real-time notes from fall 1971, after he revealed to Meir aspects of then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s strategy as leaked by the Mossad’s top spy, “the Angel,” Meir said to him “some day, when it can be revealed, you and your team will get a prize.”
‘The Angel’: Mossad’s agent in Egypt
“The Angel’s” true identity, Ashraf Marwan, was revealed decades ago. Books have been written to try to decode when he was helping the Mossad when Egypt, and when he had mixed intentions, including his multiple warnings to Israel that Cairo was going to initiate a war – warnings which were dismissed by a good deal of the Israeli defense establishment. The Mossad concluded unequivocally that Marwan was only working for the Mossad and that there were no mixed intentions.
Marwan held top intelligence positions in Egypt both during Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat’s reigns as president, and was married to one of Nasser’s daughters, giving him unique access to the intentions of Egypt’s rulers.
According to the Mossad, the book reveals new information from protocols of discussions Sadat had with Russian officials in Moscow in 1971.
In the protocols, Sadat’s intentions to seek to regain all, and not just part, of the Sinai, by either diplomatic negotiations or by a war with Israel are set out.
The Mossad says that this is the first time that it has been revealed that Sadat was open to the idea of a more limited war for the purpose of helping move negotiations forward.
Further, the Mossad said that the book discloses for the first time a change in the Egyptian national security strategy regarding the minimal necessary force build up that it would need to go to war with Israel.
Before the end of 1972, the Egyptian assumption was that they could not even try to go to war with Israel without certain advanced attack aircraft and long-range surface-to-surface missiles.
According to the Mossad materials, as of the end of 1972, Marwan provided “a sensitive and unique update regarding an Egyptian strategic conceptual change in which they were leaning toward going to war even without the weapons” which until then had been viewed as a prerequisite.
”The Angel” is seen with his operator Dubi (credit: THE MOSSAD)Speaking at the book launch ceremony on Thursday, Barnea warned, “We cannot fail to confront existential threats to the State of Israel. We must not underestimate the enemy and its capabilities. We must not exaggerate the support we will get from allies in our hour of crisis.”
“We must establish our deterrence power, we must drive forward to normalization. A state that does not take the aspiration for peace seriously will be left stuck in war,” said Barnea.
Appearing to address the split in the nation over the judicial overhaul, he stated, “We cannot downplay the significance of unity for our survival. Our power is in our internal unity.”
How the Yom Kippur War changed the Mossad
At the time, the Mossad was mainly a spy agency for conducting special operations and gathering intelligence toward carrying out those operations.
However, it was not until after the Yom Kippur War that the Mossad gained a more significant and parallel foothold to IDF intelligence regarding bigger picture and long-term strategic questions of war and peace – especially regarding warning of potential war.
Inside the Mossad materials, one gains a substantial view into Egyptian and Syrian presidential and high command strategy on an ongoing basis regarding military purchases.
In addition, the materials discuss in concrete detail what the Egyptian and Syrian operational war plans would be in the event of war.
Based on the materials, Mossad presents a picture of Zamir trying to raise alarms about impending war both through cables and through presenting aspects of raw intelligence to Meir and the other political decision-makers at the time.
According to the materials, on the evening between October 4-5, Dovi, the case officer managing Marwan, notified Mossad headquarters that Marwan had demanded an immediate meeting with him “to give information of great importance…which was connected to the ‘chemicals’ in his possession.”
“Chemicals” was a code phrase between Dovi and Marwan for warning about potential impending war.
Within hours, Zamir flew to London to personally meet with Marwan in order to get the message directly.
The new book provides the full transcript of the meeting between Zamir and Marwan, as summarized by Dovi, including the conclusion, “there is a 99% probability that the war will start tomorrow on Saturday…and it will start simultaneously from both the Egyptians and the Syrians.”
The Mossad said Zamir immediately called his senior aide Freddy Eini in Tel Aviv with a coded message which Eini decoded and provided to Meir.
The new materials include the actual original cable sent by Freddy Eini, including his handwritten notes, to Meir’s military secretary.
Marwan had also told Zamir that Syria’s goal was to conquer the Golan Heights, that Jordan would stay out of the war, and went over specific plans of what the Egyptian air force would attack, including air bases, as well as what it would not attack, civilian areas within the 1967 Green Line.
After the war started at 2:00 p.m. the next day, the Mossad materials said that Zamir played a central role in properly managing it.
Critically, Zamir gave a “golden” piece of intelligence to the cabinet on October 12, with the original appearing for the first time, that Israeli forces had succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal, a report which dramatically shifted Israel’s war and peace aims.
Freddy Eini and Dovi also received honors at Thursday’s ceremony for their work with Marwan and Zamir.
At earlier times Zamir and his team were blamed for not properly emphasizing the warning, but over time they have been given more credit for delivering the warning to the political echelons.
Instead, more blame has been put on portions of IDF intelligence for ignoring the warnings as not based on sufficient evidence, or for viewing Marwan as unreliable.
IDF intelligence remained sore at the time for two previous instances in 1972 and earlier 1973 when Marwan had warned of imminent war, and they had taken the warning seriously including once calling up the reserves – as it turned out needlessly.
Barnea presented a final conclusion that Marwan had been loyal to Israel and not playing games back and forth between the sides as some in IDF intelligence contended at the time, citing Marwan regularly giving incredibly sensitive information about Egypt-related security issues.
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