Fourteen days into the war with Hamas, and following President Joe Biden’s solidarity trip to Israel, there is nothing left that is holding back the IDF from launching the long-anticipated counter-ground offensive, except for the Israeli cabinet.
Many Israelis would have already liked to see Israel on the ground in Gaza, but the truth is that the government and the military used the last two weeks wisely. On the diplomatic front, Israel built an amazing foundation of support, culminating in the historic wartime visit by Biden. On the military front, it had the opportunity to gather intelligence – something missing on October 7 – to train troops, enlist reservists, and evacuate part of the South. The challenge that Israel will find itself in soon after the offensive begins is clearly defining – in practical terms – what victory looks like and what the exit strategy will be for ending the offensive.
This is always complicated, all the more so when fighting an enemy when the conflict is not about territory. If in conflicts of the past, wars were decided by which side killed more of its adversary and won more territory, today that is obviously not the case. The Second Lebanon War in 2006, for example, ended with a United Nations Security Council resolution that saw the expansion of UNIFIL.
Operation Cast Lead in 2009 in the Gaza Strip, ended with an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, similar to the way almost all the other operations have been concluded since then in the Gaza Strip. This time around, there is no question that the war will need to end differently, since if it doesn’t, what was the point of all of this? Hamas cannot be standing at the end of this conflict, definitely not in a way that it can ever threaten Israel again. The same will be true if there is a war with Hezbollah, which for now Israel is trying hard to avoid.
So the question remains – how can that be achieved?
While the IDF can operate on the ground in Gaza for weeks and even months, during which it will try to destroy as much Hamas infrastructure as possible and kill as many terrorists and their leaders as possible, even if only a few are left, they will simply try to rebuild themselves the day after Israel pulls out. Which is why Israel needs to come up with a few other options for the day after. While it will be hard to topple a regime or destroy a movement without a long-term takeover of Gaza – something Israel does not want – what the country can do in the aftermath of this fight is institute a complete change to its national security doctrine.
The basic idea is the following: Throughout Israel’s history, the country has never launched a preemptive war. The one time that it might have – this remains in dispute – was the Six Day War. Either way, this was not Israeli policy. Instead, partly as a way to not be seen as the instigator, Israel almost always waited exclusively to first be attacked and then defended itself.
THIS WAS the case in large conflicts but also when it came to its enemy’s military buildup. Israel, for example, watched as Syria amassed incredible quantities of chemical weapons throughout the 1980s and ‘90s but it never took preemptive action, even though the chemical weapons were being obtained to be used against it. Israel watched after the 2006 Lebanon war, as Hezbollah slowly went from 20,000 rockets and missiles to over 150,000, some with precision and large warheads and ranges, but it never did anything. Historically speaking, there have been two exceptions – nuclear arms and the recent situation in Syria. When it came to nuclear weapons, Israel instituted a clear policy of preemption, implemented in 1981 against the Osirak nuclear facility in Iraq and in 2007 against Syria’s nuclear reactor. The second category has been the last 10 years in Syria, where Israel launched what has become known as the “war between wars.”
Under this decade-long campaign, Israel has attacked Syria thousands of times to prevent Iranian entrenchment and transfer of weapons. The reason it was able to do this though was because of the breakdown in the Syrian government due to the civil war.
Israel could attack and be confident that there would not be a response and that the attack would not lead to a wider conflict. That is why, while Israel would attack a weapons-laden truck in Syria, the moment it crossed into Lebanon it held its fire. Syria, yes; Lebanon, no. The reason was, again, because of the fear of retaliation and that an attack – even against a single truck – could lead to a wider conflict. In other words, Israel was basically deterred. While it knew that Hezbollah was amassing weapons and that Hamas was doing the same in Gaza it never initiated it. It would see Hamas fighters digging tunnels and watch as their commando fighters drilled attacks on IDF bases but it assumed it was all for show.
After October 7, we know differently. Which is why, no matter the end mechanism and what leads to the end of the offensive – a new government in Gaza, a UNSC resolution, or an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire – what needs to happen after is for Israel to change the rules of the game. The next time the IDF sees a truck of rockets driving in Gaza City, it will need to attack; the next time Hamas fighters are drilling assaults on Israel, the IDF will need to attack; and the next time it sees people digging a tunnel, it will need to destroy it.
Obviously, the hope is that the war will prevent this from being needed. But assuming, realistically, that terrorist groups will continue to exist and grow, Israel can no longer sit silently. Preemptive action will need to become Israel’s new pillar of defense.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute and the immediate past editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.
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