Israel is facing its first real test for the invasion of Gaza.
Overnight, two Israeli combat fighters, an officer and a junior soldier were seriously wounded as the invasion widened.
On its face, this incident was small and has happened many times over the last few weeks.
In fact, given that 1,400 Israelis have been killed, the vast majority in the initial Hamas attacks on October 7, and IDF soldiers have been killed or wounded in cross-border ambushes by Hamas or Hezbollah nearly every day, these new losses, while tragic, would not appear to register as particularly significant in the greater strategic calculus.
Why then are they significant?
Because all of the losses to date were essentially about restoration of sovereignty and maintaining border security, while these new losses are about a counter invasion of choice.
Hundreds of Israeli soldiers died to kill or expel Hamas’s legions of invaders from the South.
Dozens have died or been wounded since October 7 to prevent Hamas or Hezbollah from new intrusions or in ambushes while defensively protecting the border.
Yes, close to 100% of Israeli Jews are in favor of the counter invasion.
Yes, for the moment, the US and some EU allies support the general idea of a counter invasion.
But everything about that counter invasion – what it looks like, how long it will go for, and how much risk IDF soldiers will encounter in order to try to defeat Hamas – are all variables which are under debate and can be altered.
Israel could lapse into past policies concerning handling of Hamas
This is a moment when the government or the IDF could lapse into an Israeli version of “Vietnam syndrome” which prevented the country from comprehensively dealing with Hamas in every “round” of war since 2008-09.
After the US lost the war in Vietnam, including a massive number of soldiers, Washington refused for over 15 years to use ground troops in any significant quantity until the Gulf War of 1991.
Since the 1982 First Lebanon War, Israel has generally refrained from any substantial invasions.
The 2006 Second Lebanon War, the 2008-09 Gaza War, and the 2014 Gaza War were the only times that Israel really dabbled with invading territories which it had completely withdrawn from in order to restore deterrence or otherwise create the conditions for quieter borders – and each of those invasions was very limited.
With world pressure against a broader invasion – and with the government clearly so worried about IDF casualties during an invasion that they delayed the invasion for around two weeks from when it could have first started logistically – will decision-makers have the fortitude and determination to accomplish their stated goal of truly toppling Hamas?
Or will growing Israeli soldier losses during the invasion lead to making the invasion strategy even more careful about force protection, something which at some point will make it harder to fully accomplish hunting down Hamas forces in whatever tunnel, mosque, or hospital they might be hiding in.
Airpower is the IDF’s huge advantage, but has limits in urban settings.
This is only the beginning of ambushes Hamas will use against IDF forces from tunnels, booytrapped doors, kamikaze drones, and all kinds of other guerilla warfare.
If Israel is to accomplish the stated goal of toppling Hamas, it will need to be ready to finally absorb some of the losses in IDF soldiers which it has avoided for so long, an avoidance which contributed significantly to leaving the door open for Hamas to perpetrate its crimes against humanity on October 7.
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