Hamas may be holding hostages in central Gaza, IDF sources have said, as the military raises its campaign in the lower profile area.
If the focus of the war from late October until early December was in northern Gaza, and most of the focus shifted for this whole month to southern Gaza, central Gaza is not thought of as having as critical a role for Hamas.
Gaza City in northern Gaza was Hamas’s most important place for its rule, and Khan Yunis in southern Gaza was the second most important, but few Israelis are fluent with central Gaza areas, which IDF Division 36 has only started to work on clearing in recent days.
Rescuing the remaining hostages
While the general IDF view is still that the vast majority of the hostages are in southern Gaza, possibly in Khan Yunis along with Hamas’s leadership, there is also a view that some smaller number may remain in central Gaza, just as there were a few groups of hostages remaining in northern Gaza through mid-December.
In light of the December 15 incident when IDF soldiers accidentally killed three Israeli hostages who had escaped their Hamas captors (who themselves had been killed by the IDF five days earlier), the IDF is working very carefully in central Gaza anytime there is any hint of potential hostages.
The IDF would also say that this could slow down aspects of progress, but that trying to bring back the remaining approximately 130 hostages is a top priority, and that going slower does not mean they will let Hamas escape.
Deir al-Balah, Maghazi, and Bureij are three central Gaza areas where the IDF will focus initially in central Gaza, and where Hamas has four full battalions of around 1,000 terrorist fighters.
Why did the IDF focus on northern Gaza first?
In terms of whether the IDF and the government made the right decision to attack northern Gaza first and only later to move on southern Gaza and, even later, central Gaza, IDF sources supported the decision.
Two explanations supporting the decision were that: 1) it was important to show Hamas in southern Gaza what could happen to it, as in northern Gaza, if it failed to surrender, and 2) tactically, the IDF was much more successful and faster in northern Gaza by attacking with three divisions at once than if it had used fewer forces, due to having to send significant forces to southern Gaza at the same time.
In turn, now that northern Gaza is more stable, Division 36 has contributed aspects of its forces to Division 98, which is fighting Hamas in Khan Yunis.
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