When Admiral Michael Gilday, chief of U.S. naval operations, gave an interview in 2022, he made a point of saying he believed China could invade Taiwan in 2022 or 2023. As of the last week of April 2024, China has not invaded Taiwan. Does this mean that Taiwan and the international community can breathe a collective sigh of relief? Maybe. A compelling case can be made that if China does intend to take Taiwan, then the period between now and January 2025 is as favorable a time as it is likely to have over the near term.
There is an array of measures China could employ in a runup to an invasion of Taiwan. These include disrupting the U.S. military’s ability to intervene by destroying command and control satellites as well as severing key undersea fiber optics cables. Wouldn’t these actions demand a vigorous U.S. response? This is exactly what China must avoid if it’s to take Taiwan. Experts have been wargaming various scenarios for years and the consensus seems to be that if the U.S. intervenes quickly it will thwart China’s invasion, but there would be heavy casualties on both sides.
Xi Jing Ping and his regime must be weighing the probabilities of a Biden versus a Trump victory in November because the outcome would be a significant variable in their calculus.
China’s best opportunity to invade Taiwan in the short term without meaningful U.S. intervention seems to be between now and January 2025 might be a valid conclusion. However, China likes to play the long game so its timetable might not match up at all with conventional wisdom. China’s true intentions remain opaque.
Perhaps Xi has decided that an invasion of Taiwan is too risky — at least in the short term. It is also possible that the regime has reached the conclusion that invading its island neighbor is simply a bridge too far — for now. “Now” can be defined in different ways. In the U.S. we’re largely thinking in terms of the next eight months because of the November election. Xi might not be in power for life, but he has years to work with instead of months.
Even if Xi and his military advisers are thinking in terms of years instead of months it feels like the longer they wait the less likely it is an invasion will happen. The window of opportunity may be closing because the U.S. commitment to its Pacific Pivot will likely only grow stronger in the next few years. Also, Americans might be starting to wake up to the serious threat posed by China. For example, bipartisan legislation aimed at hamstringing the Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok has slowly been working its way through Congress.
It is an open question whether the Biden administration is prepared to come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacks. Like his predecessors, President Biden has maintained a state of strategic ambiguity regarding his administration’s intentions. Even a short, limited war between China and the United States in and around the Taiwan Strait would be a nasty, brutal event with the potential for several thousand casualties on both sides. Within this relatively confined waterway there would be at the very least dozens of ships, hundreds of fighter planes and thousands of missiles of all types grinding up this little patch of the Pacific.
corrupt dealings with Chinese businessmen and government officials. What the rest of 2024 holds for American politics is uncertain and this is why the Chinese have a decision to make. Do they go now with the perceived low possibility of U.S. intervention, or do they wait a year or more and risk a greater chance of intervention with a Trump administration? Do the Chinese really see it this way? Perhaps they fear a flailing Biden administration would react aggressively to an attack on Taiwan in hopes of bolstering its standing in the short term.
It’s possible that Communist China has already calculated, despite its bellicose rhetoric and aggressive actions in the Taiwan Strait, that the cost of an invasion of its island neighbor is not worth the benefits of “reunification.” Perhaps the regime believes it can sufficiently pressure and isolate Taiwan to the point that a shooting war can be avoided. For example, Taiwan could be weakened by embargoes or blockades to the point that the embattled nation eventually chooses to reunify with the mainland to avoid further damage.
The point is the U.S. intelligence services likely can’t agree on what the Chinese are going to do or when they would do it. Like previous administrations, the Biden administration is hoping deterrence will do the trick. In addition to arms sales and Navy patrols the administration has deployed Army Special Forces units to at least two of Taiwan’s outer island chains Penghu and Kinmen. The Kinmen Islands are less than six miles off the coast of mainland China. It’s debatable if this military assistance registers in China more as an attempt at deterrence or provocation. If Xi has made the decision to move against Taiwan, then the presence of a few hundred U.S. advisors won’t change his mind. What happens if some of the U.S. soldiers get killed or captured in the event of an invasion?
The situation boils down to a few key points: Does the Biden administration intend to intervene in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? If it does, then have the Pentagon’s planners delivered contingency plans on how it will get it done? Prudence dictates the U.S. assumes China hasn’t rethought its invasion of Taiwan and that deterrence has failed. If the U.S. intends to act it must be prepared to go immediately or the whole thing would likely be over before it can prevent a Chinese victory.
Mike is the author of the book A Short History of the Long War: The Global Struggle Against Militant Islamism. He can be reached at mcpthx1138@aol.com
Image: National Archives
Comments are closed.