As Israel signals that it is beginning a limited operation in eastern Rafah, Hamas will weigh its next moves. The terrorist group attacked Kerem Shalom on May 5, targeting IDF soldiers. Hamas put out a statement claiming it attacked with 114mm rockets. Hamas is, therefore, very aware of an attempt to provoke an Israeli response. Hamas is aware that Israel has withdrawn from most of Gaza and that Hamas has achieved many of its war aims, basically getting an Israeli withdrawal from most areas and a kind of de facto ceasefire in some areas.
Therefore, Hamas was gambling on May 5 on attacking Israel even as it had put out messaging about its “flexibility” in the ongoing ceasefire and hostage talks. Hamas has generally believed it is kind of “playing” Israel in this respect. Its backers in Doha and Ankara give Hamas the cover to feel it is winning. This is because military pressure on Hamas generally ended back in March.
Initially, Israel had waged a campaign that had brought pressure on the terror group, and Hamas was surprised by Israel’s response and surprised the international community was not able to prevent the war from continuing.
However, Hamas regrouped quickly in northern Gaza in February and March. It also has regrouped in other areas. It has re-established some capabilities to fire rockets, often working with other terror groups in Gaza. This is not to say it has the extensive capabilities to manufacture long-range rockets and fire large barrages. However, it continued reference to the 114mm rocket, which is relatively short range, is a reference to a continued capability to position its munitions and projectiles around Gaza. It has also used these munitions to target the Netzarim corridor in central Gaza.
Impatiently awaiting the IDF’s response
Now Hamas will likely look closely at the IDF response. A limited and gradual incursion into an area along the border will leave Hamas intact in Rafah and enable it to move its battalions back to Khan Younis. One area of Khan Younis, the western side of Salah al-Din road, is now part of the “humanitarian area” and therefore Hamas can likely shift forces up this road, which is the main north-south road in Gaza. Hamas leaders are more familiar and comfortable with Khan Younis as a base of operations. Yahya Sinwar is from there.
Also it gives them easy access to the “central camps” area of Gaza, such as Deir al-Balah, Bureij and Maghazi and Nuseirat. These areas have largely been left untouched by the IDF, similar to Rafah. Hamas enjoys the continued control of humanitarian routes in these areas as well, giving it a unique control over much of Gaza seven months into the war. Hamas also uses the central camps as a staging area to attack the Netzarim corridor. The corridor is the one area still controlled by the IDF.
Hamas has shown in other places that it refuses to stand and fight. It disperses its battalions and turns them into small squads of just a few men. It then seeks to survive what it expects to be an IDF onslaught and then return to control areas using men in civilian clothes. It stashes weapons that its men can easily access later. This is how Hamas is similar to a cartel or drug gang, keeping weapons in safe houses and other locations, but behaving like civilians by day. This is how Hamas built itself up from a gang in the 1980s to control Gaza in 2007.
It knows this method and it is used to Israeli campaigns that use limited and gradual incursions as a tactic. Hamas easily survived this same tactic in 2009 and 2014 during the ground wars in those years. Hamas is therefore ready for another round. If the Rafah offensive does not take into account Hamas tactics, and only focuses on “terrorist infrastructure,” then Hamas is likely to come out mostly unscathed again or simply de-camp and move back to Khan Younis or the central camps.
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