It now seems clear that on October 7, Hamas – no doubt urged on by Iran – bit off a good deal more than it could chew.
Its leaders in Gaza (Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif), together with its leaders-in-exile living in luxury in Qatar (Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal), may have been led by Iran to expect a widespread uprising of the Arab world in support of their massive killing spree in Israel.
They may have envisaged their invasion advancing into the country supported by uprisings in the West Bank, an invasion by Hezbollah in the north, perhaps joined by Syrian troops in the Golan, irregular Jordanian fighters in the east, and even Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood militias from the west.
Perhaps Iran already had in mind, and promised them, a crushing blow on Israel by launching a direct aerial attack, reversing its long-standing policy of using only proxies in its anti-Israel operations.
This scenario, mouth-wateringly tempting for Hamas, simply failed to materialize. Action did occur, but on nothing like the scale or with the coordination that would have been politically or militarily meaningful.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, informed of Hamas’s plans only half an hour before the attack began on October 7, soon dissociated himself from the assault. However, since October 7 Hezbollah’s continuous skirmishes over the Israel-Lebanon border have been stepped up, and the 80,000 Israelis evacuated from their homes are still unable to return.
On June 4, Reuters reported that large swaths of northern Israel were engulfed by wildfires set off by rockets launched by Hezbollah. It’s far from an invasion, but it needs to be quelled.
Immediately after October 7, Houthi rebels, ensconced in areas of west Yemen, declared war on Israel. This was scarcely surprising, since the Houthi flag has “death to Israel” and “a curse on the Jews” emblazoned across it. Then, responding to a call from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, they initiated a program of harassing international shipping in the Red Sea.
On May 29, the official Iranian news agency confirmed that Iran had supplied the Houthis with Ghadr rockets, described as Iran’s first anti-ship ballistic missiles.
In response, American and British fighter jets and US ships have hit a wide range of underground facilities, missile launchers, command and control sites, a Houthi vessel, and other facilities. The Houthis, however, have 10 years of battle experience behind them, are riding high in Arab public opinion, and will likely maintain their effort against the combined US-UK forces for some time.
Iran’s aerial assault on Israel
MEANWHILE, ON April 13, Iran decided to ratchet up Hamas’s flagging effort by launching a first-ever direct aerial assault on Israel. At around midnight, it sent some 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and more than 120 ballistic missiles towards Israel.
The Iranian leadership no doubt expected a massive military and propaganda triumph. But the attack was a miserable failure. To supplement Israel’s Iron Dome defense, America and Britain sent jet fighters to help shoot down the missiles.
At the same time, surprisingly, Jordan refused to allow Iran to use its air space for the operation, while several Gulf states, among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, passed on intelligence about Iran’s plans. As a result, about 99% of the aerial armada never reached Israel.
By June 1, reality must surely have dawned on Iran and its proxies that they had no chance of being successful. Like the sorcerer’s apprentice, Hamas had conjured up a situation way beyond what it had expected or could control. All but four of its 24 battalions had been dismantled, and the four remaining operational battalions are in the southern city of Rafah and are now in the IDF’s sights.
So the announcement by US President Joe Biden on June 1 of a ceasefire proposal that could lead to the end of the war must – whatever the public posturings may indicate – be under serious consideration by Hamas. The four-and-a-half page plan had been sent to Hamas for review the previous day.
Biden said the plan encompassed three phases. The first, which would last for six weeks, would include a “full and complete” ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from “all populated areas” of Gaza, and the “release of a number of hostages including women, the elderly, the wounded in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.”
Palestinian civilians will return to their homes, while humanitarian assistance will increase to 600 trucks carrying aid into Gaza daily.
For Hamas, a guaranteed breathing space of six weeks would come as a welcome relief, especially since Israel would be withdrawing from populated areas at the same time. However, also built into the first phase is the obligation for Israel and Hamas to undertake talks designed to get to the next stage of the proposal.
The possibility of the talks stalling has been built into the plan.
“The proposal,” said Biden, “says…the ceasefire will still continue for as long as negotiations continue,” adding that the US, Qatar, and Egypt will ensure that talks continue during this period until “all agreements are reached” to start the second phase.
Of course, Hamas could decide to stick with the “temporary” ceasefire indefinitely. But if they did, they would forgo the second phase, which would see Israeli forces withdraw completely from Gaza, accompanied by the release of all remaining hostages who are alive.
In the third phase, said Biden, “a major reconstruction plan for Gaza would commence,” and the remains of hostages who have been killed would be returned to their families.
In the deal to rebuild Gaza, Arab nations and the international community will participate “without Hamas in power,” as he put it earlier. That suits Biden as much as it does Israel, for he knows that Hamas will have no part of the two-state solution that he espouses so fervently.
Hamas initially said that it viewed the proposal “positively,” but by June 4 the media reported that Hamas was apparently stalling. It would not enhance its public image to be seen to be grasping too eagerly at the proposal.
Doubtless, Hamas leaders have their own “day after” aspirations. They may reconcile themselves to losing the governance of Gaza but probably envisage basing themselves elsewhere and continuing the fight from there.
Certainly, they have no intention of abandoning their core objective of overthrowing Israel and eliminating the Jewish presence from the Middle East.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.
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