On June 19, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened that if Israel starts an all-out war against it, Hezbollah will conquer the Galilee, flatten the rest of Israel, and attack Cyprus. On June 29, Iran threatened that if Israel escalates the situation, “a war of extermination will begin.”
These threats do not indicate self-confidence but rather hysteria. Even nine months after the start of the war, Tehran still estimates that in an all-out war, Israel will deal a fatal blow to Hezbollah, its most important ally. But no less important than that, in several months, there has been a dramatic change in Iran’s position towards the war, and in order to understand where Iran and Hezbollah stand today, it is necessary to return to the beginning.
The massacre on October 7 was initiated by Yahya Sinwar without coordination with Beirut and Tehran. Khamenei and Nasrallah financed, trained, and armed Hamas, but that morning, they were as surprised as Israel. Sinwar decided to attack without coordination because he knew they would forbid him. First, because Israel was still too strong, and it could eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah. Second, as long as Israel did not attack the Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran was not eager to endanger Hezbollah.
Sinwar nevertheless ordered the attack based on the assumption that the promise of public support his men received in Beirut in March 2023 would force Nasrallah to enter the conflict. Khamenei and Nasrallah were embarrassed, and the latter joined out of lack of choice.
Tehran praised the middle path chosen by Nasrallah: aid to Hamas by attacking Israeli forces and driving Israeli civilians out of their homes in the upper Galilee, but without getting involved in an all-out war. While in his speeches, Nasrallah pledged to be engaged in attacks on Israel as long as the war in Gaza continues, Hezbollah’s restraint has raised criticism in the Muslim world of Iran and Hezbollah and made the whole event extremely embarrassing.
That is why Tehran made repeated desperate requests from the world to pressure the United States to force an end to the war.
Nasrallah longs for ceasefire agreement
In recent months, Tehran no longer demands this. Instead, Iran proudly notes the contribution of Hezbollah and the Houthis to the depletion of Israel, and I understand that they want the continuation of the war. They believe that Israel is losing the support of the West, that the IDF is exhausted, that Israeli society is crumbling, the port of Eilat is paralyzed, and the economy is crashing.
On the other hand, for Nasrallah, every additional day of fighting is a tremendous burden. He longs for a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, even if Israel alone announces the end of the massive war and stays in Gaza. But Iran will try to force him to continue.
If there is a general ceasefire agreement, Nasrallah will comply. There is even a chance that he will agree to retreat 15 kilometers and possibly to the Litani River to avoid a war.
This, however, could only materialize if a joint Israeli-American position is reached. Israel would announce that if Hezbollah does not withdraw, it will start an all-out war, and the United States will undertake to support it with weapons, intelligence, and support in the Security Council. Israel will have to concentrate very large forces in the North in order to convince Nasrallah of the sincerity of its intentions.
If Nasrallah and Tehran are convinced, he will likely withdraw on the assumption that his people will be able to infiltrate back as soon as possible, just as they did in 2006. Therefore, Israel and the United States must reach an early agreement allowing Israel to be the executor of Security Council Resolution 1701.
Displaced Israeli civilians will be allowed to return to the North, this time with large numbers of IDF troops permanently on the border. But every Israeli prime minister will be personally and legally responsible for preventing Hezbollah from returning to the border, even if this leads to war. Only in this way will the feeling of security in the North be renewed.
The author of the article, Amatzia Baram, is Professor Emeritus at the University of Haifa.
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