Notwithstanding the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, and perhaps even because of it, diplomatic contacts aimed at advancing a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia have continued. The fundamental motivation of the United States and Saudi Arabia in this context has not changed since before October 7.
Normalization will lead to the establishment of a regional security alliance and the reversal of the negative strategic trends for Israel since October 7. The moderate alliance will stand up against Iran and the resistance camp and open the door to Palestinian Authority participation, while establishing a governing alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and renewing a political process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict arena.
The United States wants to forge a new regional order, which will make it easier for itself and for Middle Eastern nations to deal with Iran – and also to indicate that it is not abandoning the region. Riyadh wants to cement its regional standing and bolster its status and security, particularly vis-à-vis Iran, by strengthening its ties and a defense alliance with Washington.
Moreover, the war that has been raging since October 7 on several fronts has made it clear to the Saudi royal family that the Palestinian problem is not secondary, cannot be contained, and cannot be ignored. Therefore, Saudi Arabia wants to distance itself from being identified with Israel as long as the war in Gaza continues and it is showing solidarity with the Palestinians. Accordingly, the kingdom has increased the price that it is demanding from Israel in terms of commitment, accompanied by practical measures, to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the framework of the two-state reality.
One consequence of the conflict is that the “price of normalization” for Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue has increased, and the Israeli government is refusing to pay it. Saudi Arabia is now expected to be involved in the Palestinian arena and also to support the stabilization and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, as well as deal with the increasingly hostile public opinion toward Israel in the Arab street since the outbreak of the war. More than 90% of its citizens object to normalization with Israel. The result is that the gaps between the policies of the regimes and the views of their people are widening.
Even if the Arab states’ motivation for peace with Israel remains unchanged, the cost-benefit considerations of these regimes are shifting. From their perspective, Israel has not been able to crush Hamas, whom they despise, and the scenes of death and destruction from the Gaza Strip are a threat to public order in their own countries. They also fear that the conflict could escalate into a larger regional war involving Iran and its proxies.
Tainted by Gaza war
However, Saudi Arabia – like other pragmatic countries – is hesitant to get directly involved in promoting an arrangement that would end the war in Gaza and potentially require active participation, such as being part of a pan-Arab task force there.
Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia are growing closer to the extent that they may be able to strengthen their partnership while reducing the focus on Saudi-Israeli normalization. Dropping the “burden” of normalization from the kingdom would be the ideal scenario for Riyadh, allowing the Saudis to benefit from America without facing the public opinion backlash that comes with normalization with Israel.
However, it does seem that Saudi Arabia is coordinating with the United States and will keep the door open to normalization, as senior members of the Saudi royal family have publicly stated.
If Washington and Riyadh strengthen their relations without including an element of normalization, this would be the worst of all worlds for Israel’s interests. Jerusalem would miss a possible opportunity for normalization with the Arab-Muslim world, establishing a regional security alliance, and the potential strategic advantage that comes with them while paying a heavy price due to Saudi Arabia’s strategic benefits from the United States.
Israeli leaders should recognize the strategic cost of not engaging with US and Saudi proposals, including the Palestinian package and opening a window to the Israeli-Palestinian political process.
On the other hand, participating in normalization and being part of a regional security alliance would be a powerful response to Hamas and Iran, both of which have attempted to undermine the process of reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world. Furthermore, normalization would facilitate an agreement to end the conflict with active Arab involvement in stabilizing and rebuilding the Gaza Strip, even if the renewed Palestinian Authority was involved.
A normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would bring economic benefits, enhance Israel’s legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds, strengthen America’s position in the region, and bolster Saudi Arabia’s political and military strength as a counterweight to Iran.
The bottom line is that Israel needs to answer Saudi concerns and seize this golden – and possibly unique – opportunity by pursuing an end-state to the war. This includes striking a deal to release the hostages, taking the veto power from Hamas so that it cannot torpedo a positive process in the Palestinian arena, establishing a “renewed” and moderate Palestinian regime to control a demilitarized Gaza Strip while maintaining military freedom for the IDF, and defining a diplomatic horizon for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The writers are senior fellows at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University.
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