The IDF publicized its first probe into Israel’s October 7 failure to prevent Hamas’s invasion, focusing in on the invasion of Be’eri in the south of Israel, parallel to central Gaza, and which was largely destroyed.
During the invasion, 101 Be’eri residents were killed, 30 hostages were taken, of which 11 are still being held by Hamas in Gaza, 150 houses were destroyed, and several complete security breakdowns took place.
From when Hamas broke through the Be’eri security gate at 6:55 a.m., until 2:30 p.m., between 80 and 220 Hamas terrorists massively outnumbered Israeli defenders, who had only between 13-26 fighters at any given moment.
Most of the around 1,000 Be’eri residents were in grave danger, but tried to wait out the invasion in their home’s safe rooms until around 6:00 p.m., when the first large evacuations started.
IDF Maj, Gen. (res.) Mickey Edelstein, who is outside the mandatory service officers chain of command, directed the probe.
A Hamas Nuseirat commander in central Gaza started maneuvering his forces to be ready for the invasion around 5:30 a.m.
Under cover of thousands of rockets being fired and using drones and hang gliders to destroy Israeli sensors and lookout towers, at around 6:30 a.m., Hamas started penetrating the border into Israel in multiple locations.
Between 6:55 a.m. and 2:30 p.m., a huge number of things went wrong for the IDF beyond the lack of IDF or Shin Bet warnings and the lack of forces preventing the Hamas invaders from arriving to Be’eri in the first place.
Around 7:30 a.m., Hamas was already attacking and overwhelming the IDF’s forward headquarters for Gaza at Re’im which would have otherwise been the main party to coordinate reinforcements.
Gaza Division Commander Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld eventually fled and there was no one left nearby to coordinate a broad reinforcements operation or defense.
Rosenfeld recently resigned from the IDF.
Around 20 Hamas forces had penetrated the village from two different vectors in a short time.
First hostages taken to Gaza
By 8:00 a.m., Hamas was transporting the first two hostages to Gaza, with another seven being taken by 9:00 a.m., and another 12 by 10:00 a.m.
Around 9:45 a.m., the first reinforcements, the Shaldag special forces unit, engaged Hamas forces in Be’eri to try to save the residents.
However, by that time, Hamas had 80 fighters in the area and overwhelmed the small Shaldag forces, many of which retreated.
The probe called the Shaldag forces’ retreat a grave error, while complimenting the Shaldag forces for their fighting during the rest of October 7-8 as well as in general throughout the Gaza war.
In mid-November, Shaldag was critical in successfully taking over Shifa Hospital in Gaza City from Hamas without killing a single patient or medical staff member.
Around 10:45 a.m., the Sayeret Matkal special forces were on their way to help in Be’eri, but were ambushed at the 232 junction, which other Hamas forces had taken over.
This delayed Sayeret Matkal from entering Be’eri until around 1:30 p.m.
By 12:00 noon, Hamas had taken 11 more hostages to Gaza, the last group it would succeed in kidnapping.
A number of other forces at various times in the afternoon and evening were nearby and failed to enter Be’eri earlier, either because they were waiting for additional commanders to show up or because they viewed their role as evacuating Be’eri residents only once Hamas was defeated.
The IDF probe harshly criticized these forces for passivity and emphasized the need for the willingness to risk one’s own life to confront enemy forces to protect civilians.
Major developments
By 1:00 p.m., two major developments occurred.
The IDF high command had started to get a handle on the situation only around 11:00 a.m., but by 1:00 p.m., it had assigned a number of commanders zones on the Gaza border to retake.
Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram was assigned to direct retaking Be’eri and surrounding areas.
Also, by 1:00 p.m., the IDF had retaken the 232 junction which Hamas had been using all morning to ambush and block Israeli attempts to reinforce Gaza border towns.
Around 1:30 p.m., Hiram had directed the gathering of significant forces to reinforce Israelis in Be’eri and turn the tide.
Sayeret Matkal finally joined the fight at that point, along with portions of Shaldag, fighting in different sections of Be’eri, though still not properly coordinated.
By 2:30 p.m., with 230 fighters against 219 for Hamas, the IDF finally had its first military advantage, and started to rout and isolate the remaining Hamas forces.
Around 4:15 p.m., the IDF forces had ballooned to 350 and around 10:00 p.m., they would reach a climax point of 730.
The probe noted the contributions of two tanks to ousting Hamas from Be’eri, though they only arrived in the late afternoon.
The role of the IAF
Although the probe does not mention the air force, previous leaks have slammed air force fighter jets for not participating in the defense of the Gaza border.
In contrast, IDF helicopters did make some contributions, though it was hard for them to fully optimize their power since they only arrived after Hamas was already mixed in with Israeli civilians whose villages they were invading.
By around 8:30 a.m. on Oct 7., helicopter units were providing support gunfire and missile fire to residents at Be’eri.
From Be’eri, around five helicopters in the early hours were hopping from scene to scene, including: Nahal Oz, back to Be’eri. Hulit, Nir Oz, Kerem Shalom, and a variety of areas right on the border fence.
Countless Hamas terrorists, both in vehicles and on foot, were picked off by these helicopters as they swooped through the region.
However, in the first few minutes that they arrived, some helicopters had no idea what was going on and thought that they were helping with a minor incident where a border protest had gotten out of hand.
Even after providing initial support at Be’eri, they did not all realize the scale of the invasion or the threat. In fact, when they left Be’eri the first time, they thought they had successfully scared away a small group of invaders, who they had just fired warning shots at to scatter them.
Only when they arrived at Nahal Oz and saw large numbers of Hamas invaders streaming across the border, did they “remove the gloves” and permit free open fire rules within the squadron on anyone who seemed to be associated with Hamas.
Even after that point, it was not easy for many hours, as Hamas terrorists’ were not a common sight on the Israeli side of the border and helicopter pilots’ were not always sure who was Israeli and who was Hamas.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi said, “although this is only the first and a unique probe which does not represent the full picture regarding what happened that day, it does clearly demonstrate the enormity of the failure and the multiple dimensions to the disaster which befell the residents of the South who defended their families with their bodies for long hours when the IDF was not there to protect them.”
Further he stated that the probe provides “the global answer that the immense number of simultaneous attacks on the villages and military positions as well as on cutting off the critical transportation junctions, made it harder for us to accomplish our mission” of defending or at least reinforcing the South.”
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