The People’s Liberation Army is often described as “the largest military in the world.” But depending on who you ask and what you count, the details are murky and confusing. The deeper one dives into the numbers, the more complicated the picture gets, and the greater the differences between the Chinese and U.S. systems become. Though many recent reforms have surface aspects that appear to reflect U.S. structures, the new-look People’s Liberation Army does not mirror-image its American (or Russian) counterpart. Nor have its new organizations been tempered by combat.
It is critical for defense planners, military researchers, intelligence analysts, and policymakers to take the basics of the Chinese armed forces seriously. The types of people who work for the Chinese armed forces are fundamental to understanding how their systems function. Their force structure and organizational culture determine how they plan to fight and win wars. Misunderstanding the known or misinterpreting the unknown and unknowable can have adverse effects on long-range U.S. strategic planning. Little-understood forces may contribute unexpectedly to Chinese campaigns. Or, the inertia of such a large armed force may inhibit its flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.
But how big is this force?
Different Estimates of the Size of the Force
Since 2019, the government of the People’s Republic of China has provided only the bottom line number: after a 300,000-personnel reduction, the total active force is 2 million. The army was “significantly” reduced, the air force “maintained” in size, while the navy and rocket force “moderately increased,” but no specific numbers were given. The sizes of the newly formed Strategic Support Force (reorganized to become the Information Support force, Military Aerospace Force, and Cyberspace Force in April 2024) and Joint Logistic Support Force were not announced. Concurrently, the reserve force (not active-duty troops) was restructured, but no details were provided. In 2017, the Army was reported to be less than 50 percent of total military personnel. Left unsaid, however, was that the majority of personnel assigned to the new joint forces wear army uniforms but are not counted as Army personnel. In comparison, the U.S. Department of Defense personnel reporting system supplies similar and more information updated quarterly. The paucity of official Chinese data can result in misunderstanding and misinterpretations.
An objective, long-running source of statistics on the People’s Liberation Army (and all the world’s militaries) is the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance. It filled in the gaps in Chinese numbers with the following educated guesses (as of 2024): total active-duty personnel, 2,035,000; Army, 965,000; Navy, 252,000; Air Force, 403,000; Rocket Force, 120,000; Strategic Support Force, 145,000; Joint Logistic Support Force, 150,000; paramilitary People’s Armed Police, 500,000; and People’s Liberation Army reserves, estimated 510,000. Because of the institute’s longtime attention to the subject, and lacking specifics from Beijing, many foreign observers use these estimates when addressing the size of the Chinese military. Fun fact number one: The estimated number of personnel in the world’s “largest navy” (by overall battle force, including its Marine Corps) is about 52 percent of the active-duty U.S. Navy and Marine Corps total.
The Department of Defense used the Chinese number for the People’s Liberation Army’s active-duty component in the 2020 and 2021 editions of its annual report to Congress, the Chinese Military Power Report, actually improving its accuracy by adding the word “approximately” in front of the two million figure. (The specific number of personnel in any force fluctuates slightly over time according to how and when new officers and enlisted personnel are inducted and separated and other factors such as deaths and unforeseen discharges.) However, the 2022 report said China had “approximately 2.2 million active duty military service members” — a 10 percent increase in China’s figures of active-duty numbers in one year’s time, when recruiting was difficult for most militaries. The report did not explain why this significant surge allegedly occurred.
A year later, the 2023 report modified the numbers again: “The [People’s Liberation Army] is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 million.” No explanation was specified for the 15,000-person reduction in active-duty personnel from the previous year. At the same time, the Pentagon’s website carried a graphic that depicted U.S. total numbers as “3.4 million Service Members & Civilians.” Those figures include U.S. active-duty and reserve components plus Defense Department civilians, a distant second to the People’s Liberation Army. Another section of the 2023 report stated: “As of 2020, [People’s Liberation Army] officers and civilian personnel probably numbered approximately 450,000 personnel (23 percent), [noncommissioned officers] roughly 850,000 (42 percent), and conscripted recruits about 700,000 (35 percent).” There’s a lot to unpack in these numbers.
The Chinese Armed Forces
Article 22 of the 1997 People’s Republic of China National Defense Law says the Chinese armed forces consist of the active-duty and reserve forces of the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Armed Police, and the militia. Article 27 of the 2020 revision to the law added that the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police “shall implement the civilian personnel (文职人员) system for prescribed positions.” The law codified a new category of non-active-duty, uniformed civilian personnel. This contingent had been created in 2005 to work on contract to the Chinese armed forces. For the first decade of its existence, their numbers were reported to be about 20,000 personnel. They augmented active-duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts in non-combatant jobs in education, medical, research, engineering, and other fields — and often performed tasks assigned to active-duty, uniformed People’s Liberation Army civil (or civilian) cadre (文职干部), who held the status of officers. For many years, China’s Madame Peng Liyuan (Mrs. Xi Jinping) was the most famous civil cadre. We assess she likely has retired from her military duties to perform her full-time role of first lady.
Simultaneous with the 300,000-man active-duty reduction, the non-active-duty civilian force was professionalized, greatly expanded, and issued their own “peacock blue” (孔雀蓝) uniforms and insignia to differentiate them from other elements of the Chinese armed forces. In recent years, the civilian personnel system has also been used as a recruitment vehicle to attract Western-educated young people with advanced degrees to join the service. While the exact number of People’s Liberation Army civilians has not been revealed, their total numbers apparently are many multiples of the 20,000 reported earlier. Their expansion somewhat offsets the impact of the active-duty cuts. These civilians have been assigned to augment undermanned headquarters staffs at all levels in the force, throughout the professional military education system as instructors and researchers, and in many operational units. At the same time, the unknown number of active-duty civil cadre has been nearly totally (if not completely) retired, transformed to officers, or transformed to civilian status.
A separate, minor category of non-active-duty, non-uniformed civilian personnel, called workers and staff (职工), provides administrative and custodian services in shops and canteens on military facilities and existed long before the introduction of uniformed civilians.
The growth of the number of civilian personnel has at least two major implications. First, these non-active-duty uniformed personnel are the Chinese military equivalent to the much larger 780,000-plus cadre of non-active-duty Department of Defense civilians found on every U.S. military installation throughout the world. (That number does not include the tens of thousands of civilian commercial contractors who work for the Pentagon throughout the world, including in combat zones, whose contribution is measured in contract “full-time equivalents.”) But, they are not comparable to the network of Defense Department political appointees who change with every administration.
Second, as active-duty People’s Liberation Army civil cadre have disappeared, the percentage of officers on the rolls has diminished an unknown amount, down from about 23 percent (what we estimated on these pages in 2020) to what is now likely under 20 percent. This would allow for the continued enlargement of the noncommissioned officer corps above our previous guess of 42 percent. Furthermore, it is possible the percentage of conscripts has dropped a few points below our previous assessment of 35 percent.
The Pentagon’s 2023 report accounting for active-duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts mentioned above reflected the exact same numbers we did in 2020, but in the category of officers, it also included “civilian personnel.” However, our classification listed “officers and civil cadres.” This mistake — unlike officers and civil cadres, civilian personnel are non-active-duty — might have led to the report’s 2.185 million number for total personnel, if active-duty and projections for non-active civilians inadvertently were mixed together.
In addition to the active-duty People’s Liberation Army, the first category of the Chinese armed forces also includes the reserve force. As seen earlier, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates 510,000 reserve personnel. As best we know, that number comes from official Chinese sources in 2009 and hasn’t been updated since. The 2019 white paper, China’s National Defense in New Era, acknowledged this element was being reformed. Indeed, over the past 15 years, the reserve unit structure changed drastically. The number of Army reserve units was reduced, with some of their personnel/units being transferred to the Air Force reserve. At the same time, reserve units in the other services and forces were expanded to some degree. The 2023 Pentagon report notes that Army reserve units have begun restructuring into a “reserve base system.” At least five such bases have been identified, one per theater, numbered 1 through 5 — for example, the Eastern Theater’s Army Reserve 1st Base (陆军预备役第一基地). Details of these changes remain unclear. A new Reserve Law has been issued. Reserve ranks have been adjusted to parallel the active-duty rank structure from private to senior colonel. Unfortunately, the 2023 Pentagon report confused the issue of reserve numbers by reporting both the 510,000 number on one page and 1.17 million on an earlier page.
With all the changes under way, the best that can be said is that the current number of personnel in the reserve force has not been announced publicly by the Chinese government. We assess Chinese reserve units likely remain significantly smaller than the active force. Though they share a similar name, the level of operational readiness of many People’s Liberation Army reserve units and their interoperability/inter-changeability with active forces likely does not match their U.S. counterpart organizations. Fun fact number two: Today, the end-strength of the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard surpasses the active force by nearly 60,000 personnel.
Similar uncertainty exists about the size of the active-duty, paramilitary People’s Armed Police.
Its primary mission is to work with the civilian police force to maintain domestic security by assisting in law enforcement operations. It also provides the country’s primary antiterrorist reaction forces, though both the police and the People’s Liberation Army also have antiterrorist capabilities. The People’s Armed Police has a secondary mission of assisting the People’s Liberation Army in external defense, similar to the military’s secondary mission of assisting in domestic security operations, when authorized. The People’s Armed Police also has undergone a major reorganization since 2015. This includes the addition of the Chinese Coast Guard into its structure and the transfer of its former gold mine, forest, and hydroelectric units to the control of other government organizations. The 660,000 personnel number cited by the Pentagon report comes from the 2006 Chinese defense white paper and is unlikely to reflect the current force strength. The People’s Armed Police has no analogue in the U.S. military.
The third component of the Chinese armed forces, the militia, has been reported as being reduced to, or at, eight million personnel since the 2008 white paper. The 2019 white paper stated, “China is streamlining the number of primary militia (基干民兵) nationwide,” but added no details. The most infamous element of the militia is the maritime militia. This component’s exact size is unknown but is only a small fraction of a much larger force that has units in every county in China. With no equivalent in the U.S. armed forces, the Chinese militia probably numbers in the multiple millions (on paper) and has varying degrees of training and effectiveness. New units frequently are added to its roster to take advantage of maturing commercial technologies.
An important element of the militia is its leadership: the large body of full-time, non-active-duty, uniformed local government workers known as People’s Armed Forces Department cadre (人民武装干部). These personnel work in grassroots government offices below county level, in neighborhoods, state-owned and commercial enterprises, and universities and colleges. People’s Armed Forces Department cadre have many responsibilities including commanding militia units (battalions and companies). Both they and the militia received similar new uniforms last year, indicating their close relationship. They also perform national defense mobilization duties, such as inventorying civilian assets that may be marshalled in times of emergency.
Moreover, People’s Armed Forces Department cadre serve as frontline recruiters to perform conscription and demobilization tasks for the active-duty force. They are the equivalent of active-duty U.S. military recruiters. The total number of People’s Armed Forces Department cadre has never been disclosed by the Chinese government, but could amount to a few hundred thousand. Recently, People’s Liberation Army civilians have been assigned to grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments to assist their over-worked cadre with their duties. Innovative measures have also been introduced to raise the profile of these cadre to help improve the overall quality of the recruiters and smooth over civil-military relationships throughout the conscription processes.
Efforts Under Way to Maintain the Size of the Force
With such a large enlisted force, the Chinese military is undertaking several methods to attract and retain qualified young citizens. In 2021 (after a year delay due to COVID-19), twice-a-year conscription and demobilization (两征两退) were implemented, replacing the once-a-year process of previous decades. Recruitment in both the spring and fall is aimed at making service for college students and graduates more convenient and includes incentives for tuition compensation and loan repayment.
Demobilized soldiers are encouraged to reenlist on a second enlistment (二次入伍) as a conscript or noncommissioned officer, if qualified. They also may become a People’s Liberation Army civilian or People’s Armed Forces Department cadre. Otherwise, they may join the reserves or militia for part-time service. Operational units frequently communicate directly with the recruiting system to identify personnel requirements needed in their unit. Qualified conscripts are now authorized to be promoted to junior noncommissioned officers after serving only one year. Intermediate and senior noncommissioned officers who were not selected for promotion in the allotted time period have been allowed to extend their periods of service. If required to complete important unit training or operational missions, soldiers may have their demobilization dates extended to complete these tasks with the units.
Why Does This Matter?
The Chinese military system has been adapted to suit its own unique and changing national circumstances. As the United States and its friends and allies seek to compete militarily with China, it is critical for U.S. policymakers and planners to reduce mirror-imaging and misunderstanding. In order to fill in the many gaps in our knowledge about the Chinese armed forces, Western analysts and planners should not assume that Chinese solutions to personnel, organizational, and doctrinal challenges are the same that Western (or other) nations have adopted. The deeper one digs, the less the People’s Liberation Army looks like other militaries — opening the door for the Chinese to leverage these differences to their advantage and surprise us with their actions. For example, some relatively unexplored components of the Chinese armed forces could contribute unanticipated capabilities in a crisis or, at a minimum, add confusion to the situation.
For the Chinese side, it has been five years since the last defense white paper was issued, the longest gap since the Chinese government published its first white paper in 1998. Nonetheless, many changes continue, such as the break-up of the strategic support force into three smaller forces. White papers can provide data that reduces the need for foreign speculation and misunderstandings about basic information such as the sizes of individual services and forces or the types and distribution of personnel in all the elements of the Chinese armed forces.
The Chinese saying “Towering buildings are built from the ground up” (万丈高楼平地起) applies to both the American and Chinese sides. As the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities expand their capabilities to craft effective competitive strategies directed at China and its armed forces, the U.S. side requires a solid foundational knowledge of Chinese force structure and organizational culture, beyond weapons systems and maximum capabilities. Getting the basic software issues right has direct implications on how we assess the capabilities and training quality of the Chinese armed forces. Modifications to People’s Liberation Army personnel policies deserve analytical attention similar to that afforded equipment and technological developments, as it will be those people who operate and maintain new weapons and plan for their employment to maximize effectiveness.
Shanshan Mei, known by the pen name Marcus Clay, is a political scientist at RAND. She previously served as the special assistant to the 22nd chief of staff of the Air Force for China and Indo-Pacific issues.
Dennis J. Blasko is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. From 1992 to 1996, he was an Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military, along with the book The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century.
The views in this article are those of the authors alone and not those of any institution they are or have been affiliated with.
Image: People’s Liberation Army
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