“Over not through” is the strongest, most unifying culture in the U.S Air Force’s history. It’s a mindset that inspires airmen to attack the toughest operational problems with grit and innovation. And it’s a mindset that urgently needs renewing.
This culture arose during World War I, when airplanes turned the battlefield into a three-dimensional space; operational problems required new, somewhat risky solutions. It reached its apogee during World War II, when Army Air Forces commanders tackled an array of unprecedented challenges by harnessing technology, geography, and the talents of their airmen, even at high risk. By the time the war ended, AAF personnel knew they belonged to a service that could prevail against any adversary under any circumstances, and the newly independent Air Force built itself around this culture.
But recent decades have brought a shift, fostered by the long, land-focused operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of defining themselves as innovative, confident war-winners, service leaders adopted the more passive frame of “critical enablers.” And as the Air Force and U.S. military refocus on great power conflict, three symptoms suggest that the service’s culture is growing more passive yet.
Passivity in a military is dangerous; it can give way to apathy and even defeatism. As Marc Bloch—historian, combat veteran, and resistance fighter—wrote of France’s “strange defeat” in 1940, “Our soldiers were defeated and, to some extent, let themselves be too easily defeated, principally because their minds functioned far too sluggishly.”
Three symptoms
The Air Force’s growing mindset might be called a “participatory culture”—one that relies on others to identify, offer, and pursue solutions to vexing operational problems. This approach encourages airmen to await direction from outside the Air Force, and discourages the taking of reasonable risk. More specifically, in a peer-on-peer fight, operators understand their role to be predominantly one of participation. Due to improving adversary defenses, operators expect to employ weapons, but not in pursuit of air superiority.
The first symptom reflects many conversations the authors had with Combat Air Force operators over the last year. Most seem to have little faith in the USAF’s ability to prevail in a major conflict and have adopted a passive mindset to fulfilling their responsibilities. They believe that general officers have assumed some fights are unwinnable via traditional theories of victory, so the best the USAF can do is participate in operations, rather than train to defeat an adversary. Years of emphasis on pacing threats may have disillusioned operators accustomed to enabling joint forces, not leading them.
The second symptom is the USAF’s focus on standoff weapons. These lower the risk of attack, but also feed a participatory mindset. Leaders come to rely on them, then to conclude that “stand-in” attacks are too dangerous, then to conclude that the force cannot “stand-in” and prevail as it has historically done. To be sure, standoff weapons and associated tactics are vital—but to give up on stand-in attacks, as many operators believe their leaders have done, stifles tactical creativity and cedes the initiative to the adversary.
Finally, a robust organizational culture requires a shared history. However, conversations at the unit level and in professional military classrooms highlight a profound lack of knowledge, much less critical understanding, of Air Force history. Names such as Schweinfurt, Rolling Thunder, or even Desert Storm no longer evoke a shared memory and common narrative, and, more importantly, no longer spark debate. To most operators, their service’s cultural narrative starts with the “critical enablers” of the post-9/11 era.
If, as these conversations suggest, the Air Force is moving toward a participatory culture, there are at least three implications. First, it reinforces the USAF’s enabling role rather than revitalizing an innovative, empowered mindset—and just when the demands of operating in the Pacific mean all services should prepare to lead at varying levels of risk.
Second, it suggests an Air Force shift from risk management to risk aversion. Senior airmen have historically managed risk effectively. At times, such as during the Schweinfurt missions, leaders made wrong calls. But, even then, they tried to balance risk and effectiveness. A more risk-averse culture leads commanders to pursue dubious theories of victory.
Finally, it suggests that the service may be tipping from an enabling culture to a passive one. In the latter, airmen wait to be told what to do rather than seeking to lead and win. Culturally, as Bloch highlighted, this is a dangerous place for any military organization.
Reinvigorating a culture
Bloch reminds us that even the best leaders must constantly nurture their organization’s culture in peace and war. Air Force leaders can take three steps. First, open a frank dialogue between general officers and the company and field-grade officers they lead. This communication is always tricky in a hierarchy, but the disconnect between what generals say and what those in lower ranks think seems even greater than usual.
Second, leaders should challenge operators to think of improved adversary defenses as challenges to overcome rather than avoid. For example, drawing on the recent use of 4th-generation fighters to fend off Iranian standoff attacks, the Combat Air Forces could embrace creating overlapping anti-access area denial zones around critical bases in Europe and the Pacific. These efforts could help evolve from pulsed operations into methodical integrated air defense takedowns or, at the least, interdiction efforts that adversaries fear.
Finally, airmen should learn about their service’s rich history in nuance and complexity. This includes understanding different theories of victory, and how airmen pursued effective tactics even in dire circumstances. Without this historical foundation, there is little hope for a shared, dynamic organizational culture.
Air Force leaders know they face new threats, as recent reorganization efforts and doctrinal changes like Agile Combat Employment demonstrate. However, emphasis on pulsed operations and standoff weapons and tactics suggest that leaders believe the threat can only be managed, not defeated.
This attitude feeds a passive, participatory culture, especially at tactical levels. Hopefully, the nation will never have to fight another great power war. But it needs a healthy USAF ready for any contingency. This starts with reinvigorating an “over not through” culture that pushes airmen to identify and solve complex operational problems, and reaffirms they hold an essential key to victory.
Paula Thornhill is a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Lt. Col. Shane Praiswater, USAF, PhD, is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University Strategic Thinkers Program and is the director of operations, 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron, B-21 Initial Cadre, at Edwards AFB, California.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
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