This column has been written while the political scene in the US is turbulent due to Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race. We can assume that the political drama will continue for many weeks and will also impact the prime minister’s visit to the US
However, in an attempt to focus on what is important to Israeli interests, it is still too early to assess what the implications will be for the remainder of Biden’s term until January 2025, and whether this term (which will likely see a president free of political constraints) will be negative for Israel or whether it will actually present an opportunity to shape reality in line with Israeli interests.
Nine months have passed since October 7, and we are at a strategic crossroads where many of the issues at hand have come to fruition. It is already a fairly open secret that the hostage deal on the table is not just about hostages and their return home but will actually be a comprehensive deal to end the war in its current form. As such, right now, some of the most critical strategic issues for the Israeli and regional reality in the coming years are at stake.
Everyone already understands that the main discussion table is in the US, not in Doha or Cairo. In this context, the prime minister’s visit to the US and the agreements made during it are very significant for our reality going forward.
This of course is assuming there is someone to talk to in the politically turbulent US and if the Israeli side chooses to engage with the current administration on the important issues at hand. It is clear that Israel should not treat this visit as a publicity and advocacy campaign for global media representation of its position, but as a platform for in-depth discussion with the US on some of the most strategic issues on the table.
Seven primary points that are essential to discuss with the US in a deep dialogue at the strategic crossroads we are at.
1. Stopping Iran
Everyone already understands (and simply refuses to call it by its name) that Iran has exploited the war for a “nuclear rush.” How does the US intend to act immediately to stop Iran, and is it essential and feasible to carry out active action (Israeli/American/jointly)?
Aside from frequent statements by the International Atomic Energy Agency updating the international arena on Iranian steps, nothing active has been done so far to stop Iran in its race to nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Blinken went so far as to declare on July 20 that Iran is a week or two away from the breakout point of producing nuclear material for nuclear weapons.
2. Clarifying the status of an independent Palestinian state
It is no secret that the US and Israel do not see eye to eye on the “day after” the Iron Swords war. The US is pushing toward an independent Palestinian state. On the other hand, almost in direct contradiction after October 7, there is no Israeli public legitimacy for an independent Palestinian state, which was reinforced this week by a Knesset vote against such a state (involving both coalition and opposition). Moreover, several polls conducted by Khalil Shikaki’s institute during the war show overwhelming Palestinian public support for Hamas, even in the West Bank, where there is full civilian control by the Palestinians.
Why is the Palestinian Authority a “failed state”? How does it resemble the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Yemen? How did the American experiment in democracy in Gaza and the American experiment in establishing a police force and state institutions in the West Bank fail? Why should there be a long interim stage where there is a clear separation between civilian issues (managed by the Palestinians – this time with Israeli veto power over textbooks in the education system) and security issues (which will be under IDF control)?
3. Isolating and outlawing the Hamas ideology in international law
From the American perspective, as long as Hamas is not the official ruler in the Gaza Strip, any solution agreed upon is good. For Israel, however, it is quite clear that if Hamas remains a legitimate power factor, even if it does not lead the leadership in Gaza, sooner or later, Gaza will reach the Hezbollah model in Lebanon. To clarify, this means that Hamas is the actual ruler of the Strip, and sooner or later, we will see a day of its military capabilities as well as its actual control over the population.
How do we denounce the terrorist organization for its crimes against humanity and war crimes and outlaw it worldwide, including the associated symbolism, such as the Nuremberg Trials, for the organization’s terrorists?
4. Security control in the Gaza Strip
The Philadelphi Corridor focuses on issues that cannot be dealt with by technological means alone while focusing on the proven problematic reliance on Egypt, whose interests differ from those of Israel.
What does Israeli security control mean? Are there means other than the physical security control of the IDF on the ground that will allow the protection of the Israeli interest, and how do we prevent misuse of the Palestinian-Egyptian border again? What type of Israeli control is required on the route, at least in the interim stage?
5. Permanently removing UN and UNRWA entities from involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
This must mean that Israel emphasizes their presence on the ground. The UN has shown throughout the war a biased, one-sided approach with biased and false reports that caused tremendous damage to the State of Israel. The UN aid organization UNRWA, operating on its behalf, served as a platform for Hamas terrorist elements to establish, disguise, and use UN infrastructure for terrorism. This is besides the fact that UNRWA essentially perpetuates the conflict rather than helps resolve it.
How do we remove the UN and UNRWA from the “day after” equation? Can the American aid organization USAID step into UNRWA’s shoes, and what assistance can the US provide to Israel in re-freezing donor country contributions to UNRWA?
6. Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip
This is an imperative process. Unlike in the past, when Israel buried its head in the sand after every operation, this time it is appropriate for Israel, together with the US, to lead the process according to its interests and with contributions from the international community and regional countries.
7. Joint Israeli-American arrangement of the reality in northern Israel
This focuses on the northern Philadelphi Corridor, which constitutes Hezbollah’s oxygen supply line in Lebanon and Iran’s foothold in the region and the State of Lebanon. This is the factor enabling Hezbollah’s armament and Iran’s foothold close to Israel’s borders.
Have we reached a common understanding that the disadvantages of the Assad regime outweigh its advantages, and if so, what can be done against it? What are the alternatives? Is the US willing to help Israel shape the area before the end of the war according to jointly defined common interests?
Despite the difficulty, the political drama may actually be an opportunity to shape reality in line with Israeli interests with an administration that is no longer in an election campaign, will not have to deal with the consequences later, and may show greater flexibility than before to Israeli ideas.
Lt. Col. (Res.) Amit Yagur is the former Deputy Head of the Palestinian Arena in the IDF Planning Directorate and a former senior intelligence officer in the Navy
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