As the war in Gaza rages on and the Strip continues to be degraded, Hamas’s once-firm grip on power is visibly slipping. Despite some success in maintaining wealth to fund its activities, its ability to maintain control may be on the clock, even if a hostage deal is implemented and the war is concluded.
Al-Shuhada Al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah, one of the five hospitals in the Gaza Strip managed by Hamas’s Health Ministry, has become a refuge for displaced Palestinians seeking shelter and protection from attacks since the start of the war.
Over four days last week, Hamas operatives from southern Gaza, including Khan Yunis, who received partial salaries, gathered around it. Indeed, Hamas is making efforts to maintain basic governance in the Palestinian street in Gaza and, against all odds, is managing to evade the security apparatus and get its hands on millions.
According to IDF sources, Hamas has robbed banks across the Gaza Strip. The largest sum, however, hundreds of millions of shekels, was stolen from the safes of the “Palestine” bank in the Rimal neighborhood, which is considered the affluent area of Gaza City.
The safe in Yahya Sinwar’s hideout, which IDF soldiers reached, was left wide open, as were the hideouts of other senior Hamas officials and their families. This provided a glimpse into the vast sums of money circulating in the hands of Hamas’s leadership.
Security officials report that Hamas’s ability to govern in the Gaza Strip has been severely compromised. This is evident in the widespread destruction of authority symbols, buildings, and infrastructure, as well as the targeted pursuit of senior Hamas leaders, including high-ranking bureaucrats. Among them was Dr. Osama Nofal, the recently assassinated Director-General of the Palestinian Economy Ministry, who was killed in an attack in Khan Yunis and was regarded as a key figure within the organization.
The targeting of Hamas’s internal security heads and police officers, as well as any activity aimed at preserving Hamas’s rule in Gaza and implementing the organization’s policies on the ground, has also affected the terror organization.
Sinwar’s financial resources remain substantial, largely due to several strategies pushed by Hamas’s field commanders. These tactics go beyond the well-known bank robberies, which Palestinians estimate at around 600 million shekels.
According to military sources, Hamas imposes taxes on the private sector and international organizations, both directly and indirectly, on all goods entering the Gaza Strip. This taxation scheme is a significant source of revenue for the organization.
Military sources also report that this week, UNRWA representatives in southern Gaza received threatening calls from Hamas operatives. They were told that if they did not route the trucks carrying goods through Deir al-Balah—where Hamas seizes control of the shipments and distributes them to those with influence on the street—the trucks, along with the drivers and goods, would be set on fire.
According to estimates from Southern Command sources, over 30,000 trucks have entered Gaza from Israel since the start of the war, with Hamas taxing each one. To enforce this new order, the organization cannot rely on uniformed police officers. Instead, they have turned to urban guerrilla tactics, organizing temporary operatives—some armed with firearms and melee weapons—as well as teenagers and children who attack the convoys.
“Hamas has become increasingly violent towards its own people, often to the point of losing control,” a source familiar with the situation on the Palestinian street in Gaza explained. “The level of violence comes from their fear of losing power. Hamas doesn’t hesitate to kill civilians, and later, they blame the deaths on alleged cooperation with Israel, as seen in the incident last week in the Bani Suheila area. The public, terrified, just watches and doesn’t intervene.”
In one case, a clan did take revenge on Hamas, but it was an isolated incident that ended quickly. The source added, “It’s no coincidence that a message was sent out warning that anyone who crosses Sinwar is doomed. To Hamas, the people are nothing more than merchandise, from top to bottom. The population is so desperate that they keep their heads down.”
The second layer of tax collection and order enforcement through violence is managed by old gangs and criminal organizations that have struck deals with Hamas. These agreements allow them to collect taxes and distribute loot, although, at times, things spiral out of control.
In the Kerem Shalom area, several Bedouin gangs operate based on clan ties, including the Al-Ghamour, Abu-Khdeid, and Sha’ar families. According to military sources, these gangs loot goods and collect taxes using violence and terror.
“In the past, a sack of flour cost $1,000, but today it’s $5 due to the increased supply. So, what is everyone after now? Cigarettes smuggled into the Strip have become a highly sought-after commodity,” the sources explained. “Two and a half packs of cigarettes are now worth as much as the average salary of a junior Hamas operative.”
In recent months, dozens of trucks attempting to smuggle cigarettes have been intercepted at the last moment, highlighting the ongoing struggle for control over these lucrative goods.
Another method for transferring funds in Gaza is known as “Hawala,” or in Hebrew, the offset method. This system is typically managed by Gazan money changers who serve as intermediaries between those with goods and those with money.
For example, when a Palestinian trader in China sells goods, money is transferred to him and his family in Gaza, and the process works in reverse as well. This method ensures that funds and goods continue to move despite the challenging circumstances.
As a result, security officials dismiss the notion that Gaza operates as a closed economy. The longstanding practice of “Hawala” enables business leaders to stay afloat and maintain basic trade in certain areas of Gaza, even under difficult conditions.
What drives Hamas mad?
Hamas leaders are aware that the Palestinian issue has been pushed out of the international spotlight due to events like the upcoming US presidential elections, the Olympic Games, the Ukraine-Russia war, and global economic concerns such as the recession.
In response, Hamas’s Information Ministry, one of the most powerful bodies in Gaza, is making efforts to keep the issue relevant. They are issuing daily statements about the humanitarian situation, while also highlighting the routine activities of various ministries.
For example, the Economy Ministry focuses on monitoring the prices of basic goods and enforcing the distribution of cooking gas cylinders, especially in central camps. The Interior Ministry is trying to coordinate the exit of patients from Gaza for medical treatment abroad, using the Kerem Shalom crossing after the IDF took control of the Rafah crossing.
The Health Ministry is actively disseminating data on the sick, wounded, and dead, as well as the activities of medical institutions. The Agriculture Ministry oversees the entry of agricultural goods from Israel. The Welfare Ministry manages food distribution centers, while the Finance Ministry handles the payment of salaries to officials. Lastly, the Religious Affairs Ministry operates several Sharia courts, mainly in Khan Yunis.
The Information Ministry operates several official and unofficial Telegram channels, where one can receive notifications about garbage collection and humanitarian activities, but also venomous propaganda, false messages about Hamas’s activities against the IDF, and efforts to delegitimize Israel.
Local Telegram groups within the Gaza Strip, organized by geographic regions, are buzzing with discussions on urgent issues. One of the most heated topics is the “corridor” that the IDF is creating, effectively splitting the Strip into two parts.
According to security sources, this issue is particularly troubling for Hamas. “It’s driving them crazy because the corridor expands every day. Every 24 hours, there are reports of the IDF destroying more buildings and infrastructure, expanding its control over Palestinian territory from the Israeli border to the sea. This forces more of the population to move from north to south, thinning out the Palestinian presence in the northern part of the Strip,” the sources explained.
Hamas is especially concerned that Israel might soon announce the re-establishment of settlements like Elei Sinai, Nisanit, and Dugit in the Strip. “This is driving them mad, particularly the Hamas members. The sight of Israeli flags is deeply unsettling for them,” the security sources added.
Another hot topic in the Telegram groups is the killing of Palestinian “raiders” who participated in the October 7 raid on Israeli territory. These individuals include Hamas Nukhba operatives, Hamas activists, members of other organizations, and civilians who looted, murdered, raped, and kidnapped during the attack.
The Shin Bet has created an “open account list” targeting all those involved in the events of October 7. In addition, an “invisible hand” is circulating weekly reports on social media, naming those involved.
For example, in the past week, 17 “raiders” were eliminated from the air by the IDF and the Shin Bet, which is responsible for maintaining the list and locating these individuals within the Gaza Strip. These targeted eliminations highlight the Shin Bet’s deep operational capabilities in the area, supported by a network of agents who provide precise intelligence. This intelligence not only identifies those who participated in the massacre but also those currently forming new cells to join Hamas’s military wing.
Intelligence sources monitoring the situation in Gaza report that the traditional clan structure has largely disintegrated and lost its significance, as families have scattered among various shelters. The breakdown of the family unit is evident, with teenagers often sleeping in one location while parents and daughters are in another.
Family authority has weakened, as Hamas has been able to recruit individuals for civil and military activities against the IDF by offering money, food, or cigarettes in return.
Families that have managed to maintain some level of stability despite the ongoing security and civil challenges are keeping their expenses to a minimum. Most of them lack employment and rely heavily on donations to survive.
The good neighborly relations that existed before October 7 are now in question. With the collapse of Hamas governance, law, and order in many areas, the environment has become one where it’s every person for themselves, and only the strong manage to survive.
“Unlike in the past, there are far fewer checkpoints because the IDF attacks them from the ground and the air, not allowing armed men to move through the streets or secure routes,” a security source explained, adding, “There are quite a few new social phenomena. Fewer weddings. Education? Only if there are very limited local initiatives, at most classes of 10 students in open areas, and they are usually religious lessons. Mass prayers no longer take place, except in rare cases on Fridays. There are almost no mourning tents because they can’t keep up with the pace of the deaths. They settle for central burial sites.”
Despite Hamas using terror and urban guerrilla tactics by recruiting new activists, including teenagers and even children, security officials believe that a long ceasefire, especially if tied to an agreement for the release of hostages, could spark a violent uprising among the Palestinian population against Hamas leadership.
“The buildup of criticism, frustration, and anger could lead the Palestinian public to rise up strongly against Hamas and hold them accountable,” one official noted. “As long as the fighting continues and the IDF is attacking, Hamas can blame the ‘Israeli enemy.’ But if a ceasefire lasts for an extended period, people will return to their destroyed homes, be in shock, and won’t be satisfied with just tears and hard questions—they will demand accountability.”
The official further explained, “The last large protests were in February, but they were violently suppressed by Hamas. The longer this situation drags on, the less control Hamas will have over the street.”
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