Strengthening the United Nations Command in Korea to Counter Authoritarian Collusion

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol stated at the recent NATO summit that “North Atlantic security is inseparable from East Asian security.” His words highlight the growing realization among Asian and European states that both regions are increasingly interconnected, particularly as North Korea deepens its strategic ties with Russia. There is now a growing risk of Pyongyang receiving technological support for its weapons programs in exchange for sending conventional weapons to Moscow.

One often-overlooked actor that can help confront this threat is the United Nations Command. Many European nations remain members of the command, which has played a critical role in maintaining the armistice on the Korean Peninsula. Since Russia’s possible provision of arms or missile technology to North Korea poses a potential threat to the armistice agreement, strengthening the United Nations Command not only can contribute to the stability on the Korean Peninsula but also aligns with the interests of policymakers in both Europe and Asia.

There are three steps that could bolster the United Nations Command’s capabilities: strengthening the organization’s information-sharing capability, increasing the frequency and range of military exercises, and augmenting the organization’s staffing to allow for more representation. Reinforcing the United Nations Command’s information-sharing capability would enhance situational awareness among member states from Asia and Europe and provide members with actionable opportunities for coordination. Raising the number and types of exercises conducted together would build experience and expertise for a wider range of combined operations. Finally, diversifying the command from a mostly American-staffed organization to include more personnel from other member states would help ensure continued investment and participation from other Asian and European states.

Background

On June 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang and signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. This agreement raised alarm in South Korea, the United States, and their partners in Europe. The biggest concern remains possible arms deals, with Pyongyang supplying munitions to Moscow in exchange for economic aid and technology transfers that could bolster the Kim regime’s nuclear and missile programs.

This situation has spurred European nations to strengthen their ties with Seoul, recognizing the intertwined nature of European and Asian security. The last three NATO summits were attended by South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, also known as the Indo-Pacific Four. The declaration from the most recent summit explicitly expressed concerns about North Korea supplying Russia with military support, including munitions and drones. Ongoing discussions continue to deepen mutual understanding of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions, linking Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the North Korean-Russian strategic partnership, and security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula into a cohesive picture.

These developments coincide with a newfound interest from both regions in the often neglected United Nations Command, the body tasked with maintaining the armistice on the Korean Peninsula. The United Nations Command was established in 1950 following North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. U.N. Security Council resolutions 83 and 84, which mandated its creation, called on U.N. member states to come to the defense of South Korea and designated the United States as standard-bearer of the unified command. From 1950 to 1953, 22 countries contributed to South Korea’s defense either by sending combat forces or providing medical assistance. However, with the signing of the armistice in 1953 and the activation of the Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command in 1978, the United Nations Command’s role on the peninsula significantly decreased. These changes led the United Nations Command to evolve from a warfighting command into an organization primarily responsible for enforcing the armistice agreement and coordinating international contributions in response to crises or conflicts on the peninsula.

In 2021, a British three-star general served as the command’s deputy commander, the first time the position had been filled by a European general or flag officer. On Aug. 2, Germany joined the command as the 18th member state. Yoon’s administration hosted the first meeting of defense representatives of the United Nations Command member states and South Korea in November of last year. He has also sought to expand his country’s participation within the multilateral body, of which it is not an official member.

As the Kim regime has failed to relent in its threats toward its southern neighbor, Russia’s provision of arms and technical support to North Korea can be construed as threats to the armistice agreement. Given that the United Nations Command is tasked with maintaining that armistice, augmenting its capabilities and enabling it to maintain proper situational awareness of such transactions would allow the military command to carry out its mandate with more haste and flexibility.

Bolstering United Nations Command Capability

There is now a valuable window of opportunity to significantly bolster the capabilities of the United Nations Command while it enjoys the interest of policymakers in both regions. To seize it, we suggest a three-part action plan.

Enhance Operational Capability in Information-Sharing

The first part of the plan focuses on immediately enhancing the United Nations Command’s operational capability. The United States Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command should start by strengthening interoperability in their information-sharing system. This will help ensure timely and accurate situational awareness and improved multinational coordination.

In December 2023, South Korea and the United States announced the activation of a trilateral data-sharing system with Japan to detect and assess North Korea’s missile launches in real time. Similarly, the United Nations Command can enhance its existing data-sharing systems to streamline real-time information reception.

This should be supported by establishing clear guidelines on the types of intelligence to be shared and the appropriate dissemination channels. These guidelines should be negotiated by relevant stakeholders through formal military channels, ambassador roundtables, or the Republic of Korea–United Nations Command Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting. Clear guidelines will provide the United Nations Command with greater legitimacy. This will also help it navigate the information-sharing restrictions that currently exist between the U.S.-Korean bilateral alliance and the multilateral United Nations Command for real-time operations, which will enhance the multinational military command’s operational capability.

Once established, the Multinational Coordination Center within the United Nations Command operations directorate can take a leading role in implementation. The center acts as a bridge for coordination requirements between liaison groups (which communicate with United Nations Command sending state national representatives) and United Nations command operations and intelligence directorates (which communicate with their counterparts from the Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea). Having the Multinational Coordination Center take on this role will contribute to instant communication between the United Nations Command and other relevant partners on the Korean Peninsula, thereby strengthening the presence and operational capability of the military command.

Expand Training Initiatives

The next part of the action plan focuses on enhancing the United Nations Command’s capability in the intermediate term by improving training initiatives in the region. To strengthen the capability of the military command, it is crucial to incorporate their personnel into relevant U.S.-Korean military exercises, fostering a better understanding of the Korean theater of operations and improving overall readiness.

Under the Yoon administration, the United Nations Command’s participation in U.S.-Korean bilateral exercises has increased significantly. For example, in March 2024, 12 United Nations Command member states dispatched personnel to join the Freedom Shield exercise, which featured a multi-domain, interagency operating environment. These joint exercises included live, virtual, constructive, and field-based training aimed at improving interoperability among the participating forces.

The United Nations Command can focus on familiarizing member state forces with the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process within the Korean theater of operations. This will ensure quick and efficient deployment of forces with the necessary supplies and support, which is critical for responding to conflicts in the region. Given that one of the United Nations Command’s priorities is establishing efficient procedures to coordinate member states’ force flow and generation, simulating this procedure will ensure seamless coordination and enhance overall effectiveness.

Expanding joint training between the United Nations Command and the U.S.-Korean alliance will not only enhance command-level operational capabilities but also foster stronger personal connections between members of the multinational military command and the relevant parties on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, this training will also demonstrate United Nations Command’s role in integrating multinational forces during crisis or conflict, thereby sending a strong message about its commitment to peace and stability on the peninsula.

Strengthen Organization Structure

Finally, the sustainability of the multinational military command’s capabilities depends on strengthening its organizational structure and increasing personnel from member states. To ensure that the United Nations Command benefits from a broad range of international support in the long term, it is essential to diversify its staff by including more military personnel from members beyond the United States. For example, in June 2024, New Zealand’s defense minister and foreign minister announced plans to increase the size of their contribution to the command from 12 to 53 personnel. If other countries took this step, it would help the command gain stronger international support. As the United Nations Command has seen significant changes since the late 2010s — most notably with Canadian, Australian, and British officers serving as deputy commanders — filling key positions within the core staff with military personnel from more countries will foster greater involvement and diversify the organizational structure. This will ultimately render the United Nations Command more effective and sustainable in leading international efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

Including South Korean military personnel in the United Nations Command staff is also vital. This would not only strengthen the command’s connection with its host nation, but also promote Seoul from a mere host nation to an active member state. In late 2020, the United Nations Command requested the South Korean government staff some positions within the multinational military command. At that time, the command aimed to increase its core staff positions from under 50 to around 80, with about 10 of these additional positions intended for South Korean military personnel. Years later, in July 2024, it was reported that a South Korean general would be assigned to the United Nations Command’s core operations staff for the first time. A South Korean government official has stated that preparations were completed to assign its general officer to the role of deputy assistant chief of staff U3 (operations), along with about ten other South Korean military personnel in various positions.

This will help insulate the United Nations Command and its role from potential changes in South Korea’s political landscape. For instance, during the Moon Jae-in administration, there was significant tension between the administration and the command over increased international contributions. Germany expressed interest in becoming the 18th member state, but this request was rejected by South Korea’s defense ministry. Similarly, Denmark sought to expand its role from providing medical assistance to contributing combat troops in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, but the Moon administration also turned down this proposal.

The Moon administration cited concerns over potential infringements on South Korea’s sovereignty as the reason for this. However, there were discussions within the military suggesting that the real issue might have been “discomfort” over the fear that the command “could become an obstacle to improving relations with North Korea.” Given that North Korea is a pivotal issue in South Korea’s foreign policy, similar challenges may continue to emerge depending on the future government’s stance toward Pyongyang. Including South Korean military personnel in the United Nations Command and elevating Seoul’s role from a host nation to an active member state could serve to mitigate future concerns.

Conclusion

The deepening partnership between North Korea and Russia should be met with a timely response from South Korea’s partners in both Asia and Europe. This three-part plan would put the United Nations Command at the center of this response. By enhancing the command’s capabilities, it can better help address new threats, maintain regional stability, and advance the shared interests of member states from across the world.

Chan Mo Ku is a former military officer at the strategic planning directorate of the Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command. 

Joo Young Kim is a former Navy officer and writes about foreign policy issues. He also worked as a civilian specialist for the U.S. Army in Korea.

Image: Chad McNeeley

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