Even when he commanded the evacuation of Gush Katif, retired Major-General Gershon Hacohen felt it was a mistake. But even in his darkest predictions, he could not have imagined the massacre on October 7. In a recent interview, Hacohen claimed that October 7 was made possible because it evacuated the Jewish communities in the Gaza Strip.
Nineteen years after Israel’s departure from the Strip, he reflects on the mindset that led to the disaster, the failure of military commanders, the responsibility of the political echelon, the increasing Iranian threat, and the future.
In the days following the massacre, amidst the horror and cries, while the army remained uncertain about when the ground invasion of Gaza would occur, Hacohen publicly supported the offensive. It wasn’t a simple or popular stance. While many soldiers and commanders called for an all-out assault, senior military officers and former generals urged caution, advocating patience or even abandoning the ground operation. Retired Major-General Yitzhak Brick, who had foreseen the events of October 7, gained public favor by arguing that a ground invasion would entangle the army, lead to significant losses, and destabilize the country. Hacohen thought the opposite and voiced his opinion openly. “Then I received messages from women who admired Brick,” he recalls. “They told me, ‘Why are you in favor of a ground invasion? You’re going to kill our children.'”
That’s a serious accusation.
“Yes, but it’s also legitimate. After all, these are mothers of soldiers, deeply anxious about their children’s fate. But despite understanding their concerns, there comes a time when you must stand and say, ‘Do not fear, my servant Jacob,’ and take action.”
To ensure that action was taken, Hacohen went straight to the top. Together with senior members of the security movement, where he serves as the chairman of the board, he met with Prime Minister Netanyahu to encourage him to initiate a ground operation in Gaza. “I did this because there was considerable hesitation at the political level,” he recalls. “The Chief of Staff was receiving calls from retired generals and former Chiefs of Staff, who weren’t aware of the situation on the ground, warning him against a ground invasion. Eventually, someone had to bang on the table and say, ‘Give it to me, and I’ll handle it.'”
Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi pushed for a ground invasion.
“True, and that’s to his credit. But it wasn’t enough. A political decision was required, and the government hesitated.”
Even Prime Minister Netanyahu hesitated
“Yes. He was very practical but still unsure whether to proceed or wait. When I left the meeting, I was interviewed on TV, and they wanted me to say that I saw a Prime Minister in shock, out of focus. But I said that I saw a clear-headed Prime Minister, fully aware of the situation.”
So where was the hesitation?
“In the entire planning process for the offensive move. No military or security event comes without hesitation. Every operation or campaign requires it. I want a leader who hesitates before going to war because war is an unprecedented event that spins out of control and demands the creation of a new path. You can’t simply take a previous event off the shelf and repeat it. Every war comes with great responsibility and monumental decisions, so I want a leader who shows hesitation before taking every step. Hesitation is part of responsibility. Even Ben-Gurion became physically ill before the Sinai War because he understood the gravity of the decision he was making for the people of Israel.”
Hacohen doesn’t just advocate action—he leads by example. At 68, during the Swords of Iron War, he donned his uniform and returned to reserve duty. He was active in both the Northern and Southern Commands, contributing to planning and implementation. “From the moment Simchat Torah morning began, I knew we were at war, because I had shaped these scenarios in previous exercises. I was sure that what happened in the southern communities would happen in the north as well, so I went to the Northern Command to offer my help. After a few days, I realized major events were unfolding in the south, so I moved south, joining one of the brigade commanders. There, I witnessed the organization of forces, the immense bravery of the young soldiers, and came to understand that October 7th was both a tragic day and a day of remarkable sacrifice.”
Serving in the reserves at 68 is unusual
“I wish I could serve in the reserves for the rest of my life, in any capacity. I have a truck license—I’d even drive. But it takes a lot of humility. That’s key because as a person ages, it becomes harder to stay involved. Young people struggle with the condescending attitudes of older generations.”
Hacohen’s humility stems from his religious beliefs. In the past, he referred to himself as “religious with an invisible yarmulke.” But when asked about the positions of right-wing rabbis, he distances himself. “I’m not an intermediary between God and people through rabbis,” he says. “That’s why I define myself as God-fearing.”
Hacohen held several senior positions in the military, including Commander of the Golan Division, Commander of the Military Colleges, Commander of the Northern Corps, and Commander of the General Staff Corps. During the disengagement, he commanded Division 36, which participated in the evacuation of Gush Katif. Nineteen years later, he remains convinced that the disengagement was a mistake. “I believed it was a mistake back then, and everyone knew it,” he says. “Unfortunately, the outcome was even worse than I predicted. A senior journalist recently told me, ‘It’s a good thing you evacuated Gush Katif, or else 8,000 more Jews would have been massacred on October 7.’ I told him, quite the opposite—if Gush Katif had remained, October 7 wouldn’t have happened.”
“After the disengagement, Hamas rose to power. Before they forcibly took control of Gaza, Hamas won the elections, partly due to the disengagement, which they credited to what they called ‘armed resistance.’ There’s still a debate between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas over the correct way to fight the occupation—Mahmoud Abbas supports a political path, while Hamas insists only armed struggle will remove the occupation. The disengagement convinced the Palestinian public that armed struggle was the right path. Immediately after, Hamas focused on building a powerful military force, developing platoons, battalions, brigades, and command-and-control systems. Smuggling, once minimal, became a flood after disengagement, as Egypt didn’t stop it. Without the disengagement, there wouldn’t have been October 7, because Hamas couldn’t have prepared the way they did. They spent years preparing for October 7. Gush Katif became a training ground—models of tanks, fences, and settlements were all set up. If we’d stayed in Gush Katif, they wouldn’t have had a place to train.”
The division involved in the evacuation
“I acted against my personal views but carried out the mission with skill, creativity, and faith. Not just because one must obey the law and orders, but because I believed that if I did it, it would save the settlements and prevent bloodshed. My assessment was that Sharon intended to evacuate all of Judea and Samaria eventually. So I told the settlers that the main struggle was for Judea and Samaria. Had I resigned, the disengagement would have continued without me, and the result would have been worse. Someone else would have done the job without my ability to reach understanding with the settler leadership.”
Do you regret participating in a mission you fundamentally opposed?
“No, because as a man of faith, I understood that I was placed in the right time and place by divine will. In practice, the evacuation was a success—it was planned for a month, but it only took two weeks, including six days of real struggle. For a complex operation like this, it was a phenomenal success.”
Today, Hacohen is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and serves as chairman of the board for the Israel Defense and Security Forum. “We offer opinions, substantiate them professionally, and aim to influence public opinion and provide inspiration for decision-makers,” he explained. “Our biggest problem isn’t just how much ammunition or how many soldiers the IDF has but the ideological perception and the question of what this war is about. War is an event driven by unresolved tensions, where balance points must be found, like the tension from the outset of this war: Are we here to dismantle Hamas, or are we here to return the hostages?”
Before balance points, there were failures.
“October 7 was a fine line between success and failure. If different decisions had been made that morning—if the air force had been ready and the limited forces in the south had been aware and prepared—we could have turned the event into a great victory with minimal casualties. We would have been congratulating ourselves, saying, ‘What excellent intelligence, what an incredible Shin Bet, what military ingenuity.’ The fact that this didn’t happen feels like the ‘wrath of the gods,’ as they called it in ancient Greece. The convergence of decision-making points all malfunctioned simultaneously.”
So you’re saying all systems failed at once?
“Exactly. Even if only the air force had been on alert and understood what was happening on the ground, things would have looked entirely different. But on the morning of October 7, the stars didn’t align. I don’t look at it through a religious lens of synagogue faith, but more through mythology. As a child, I learned about the Trojan Wars, and what the ancient Greeks and the heroes of Israel in the Bible understood is that ultimately, not everything is under human control. In the Trojan War, for example, even though the Trojans were inferior to the Greeks, there was a day when they won a battle, almost burned the Greek fleet, and Hector killed Patroclus, Achilles’ friend. This event on October 7 is just as illogical—like Israel’s soccer team defeating Brazil. Mythology teaches us that on the night before the battle, Zeus wanted the goddess Hera. She refused him, and when he realized she supported the Trojans, while he backed the Greeks, he struck a deal: if she agreed to his advances, the Trojans would win the next day. And so it was. The key lesson isn’t about Zeus or Hera—it’s about understanding that sometimes the battlefield is unpredictable.”
But on October 7, it wasn’t mythology or fate—it was human error.
“What led to October 7 was what I call the normalization of irresponsibility. The Gaza Division commander is an excellent officer, but for years the system he operated in normalized the reduced alertness and didn’t account for reserves. That said, it’s important to remember that emergencies, by their nature, throw everything into chaos. Even if systems function and are well-prepared, parameters often spiral out of control. That’s why the main message, in war or any disaster zone, is that response must come from the ground up. It’s the people on the ground who begin solving the problems until leadership recovers and starts functioning. It’s not the bureaucratic system that acts first—it’s the citizens themselves. This is difficult for people to accept because they believe the state protects them and allows them to live in peace. That’s why the shock was so profound—the over-promise shattered, and people were forced to confront the harsh reality.”
Did you, too, become disillusioned?
“No, because I never bought into that over-promise. In my worldview, the idea that the state was established and now everyone can rest is false. I see the world as temporary, stability as transient, and the fundamental state of human existence as constant upheaval. For me, even if today is peaceful, there’s no guarantee it will be the same tomorrow because tomorrow is a new day. It’s exactly like a relationship. Anyone who thinks their relationship is safe and happy, and so they can relax and go about their business, is mistaken. Even in the best relationships, there are new problems and unexpected challenges, and you have to reinvent yourself every day. The same is true for the state. That’s why every citizen has responsibility and must remain alert. Look at countries that were once considered safe and peaceful—Marine Le Pen is rising in France, the UK is divided, and even Stockholm is experiencing shifts. The most peaceful systems can still be thrown into turmoil, partly due to the mistake of citizens thinking they’re living in paradise. There is no paradise—that’s the starting point.”
Who, in your opinion, is responsible for the failures of October 7?
“Professionally, the responsibility lies entirely with the military. Anyone blaming the government for moving battalions around is mistaken. In all my life, I’ve never seen a government give the IDF so much freedom in how to deploy its forces. Fundamentally, the political echelon doesn’t even know the deployment of battalions. No Prime Minister receives the military’s deployment map on a Friday. These are the military’s decisions, and the military was deployed in Judea and Samaria during Simchat Torah to protect Tel Aviv as well.”
But the government pursued a policy of containing Hamas and buying quiet with Qatari money, insisting Hamas was deterred.
“That’s why the political echelon shares responsibility. Ben-Gurion always made sure to study events personally. He would find out where the army was operating and what lay behind security decisions. He initiated meetings with senior commanders to understand how they saw things. He also ensured he appointed people he trusted. Prime Minister Netanyahu hasn’t been involved in appointing generals and senior commanders, even formally. I supported the strategy of separating Hamas in Gaza from Hamas in the West Bank, but after the Abraham Accords and other changes, that strategy needed to be reassessed. Netanyahu should have made a strategic decision, especially after Operation Guardian of the Walls. That didn’t happen, partly because neither the military nor the political echelon properly studied Guardian of the Walls, and the government didn’t focus on it.”
Is this political failure connected to October 7?
“Yes, but the primary responsibility lies with the military. Rafool and Yanush wouldn’t have allowed this to happen. If they had received the ‘Jericho Walls’ document, which described the October 7 attack in detail and circulated through the intelligence leadership and Southern Command, they would have fortified the borders. But the military leadership didn’t take the threats seriously. A division commander’s job isn’t just to count their forces but also to act as a strategic sensor. That’s why they’re generals, not junior officers. If a division commander sees something wrong in the force structure, they can go directly to the Prime Minister. I’ve seen commanders do that in the past. The failure lies with the military system, which didn’t take the possibility of a surprise attack seriously or build defensive systems accordingly.”
And what about the Prime Minister, who hasn’t taken responsibility for the massive failure that occurred on his watch?
“I don’t know. I haven’t spoken to him about it. I assume lawyers told him that if he takes responsibility, he’ll be blamed. This is why I have a problem with lawyers—the reality is much bigger than the law. But of course, as the leader of the country, when something of this magnitude happens, the Prime Minister is responsible. There’s no way around it.”
Hacohen has a clear, uncompromising security perspective, but he’s also fair and consistent. “Ben-Gurion had strategic superiority over the security system,” he says. “But for years, we haven’t had a leader with superior knowledge in security. This must change because the political system should be the one shaping our military strength. The IDF has been irresponsibly downsized for years—where was the political echelon? The IDF decided this, and the political echelon agreed.”
And the result is the current war?
“The current war is existential, about our very ability to live here. Our enemies want to erode the possibility of maintaining a sovereign, thriving Jewish state. The enemy simply wants to destroy us. Nasrallah is smart enough to sell Western audiences a narrative that appeals to them. His latest speech was directed at Kamala Harris, portraying himself as a freedom fighter, liberating Lebanon. This gives the illusion that if we withdraw from Lebanon, he’ll lay down his arms because he got what he wanted. But the moment we withdraw, he’ll find a new pretext. When he talks about the Shebaa Farms, the Western world imagines something pastoral—a house with a red roof, a cow with a trough, a girl with braids—but to his people, he speaks in the language of religious war, in the language of jihad.”
What’s new about this? Previous wars also involved jihad.
“The difference is huge. In the past, soldiers, like those from Egypt during the War of Independence, were taken from their villages to fight in wars they didn’t understand, and they had no interest in winning. When their commanders signed surrender documents, they went home. But since the Six-Day War, the war has become religious. It’s no coincidence that Sadat chose Yom Kippur and used religious language to attack Israel. When jihad is involved, there’s unity among believers, and everyone fighting us is motivated by a religious idea.”
So what makes “Operation Swords of Iron” different? Even the Lebanon War had a religious backdrop.
“In the Lebanon War, we were fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon, and no one else intervened in the conflict. We could focus on a single-front campaign. The current war surrounds Israel from all sides because the unifying force is religious. During the Second Lebanon War, there was no unity between the Sunnis and Shiites. But Iran, through Jerusalem, created a bridge across a gap of hundreds of years, forging a blood alliance between the Sunnis and Shiites to act together for Jerusalem, their common goal. So there is also a religious shift here. In the new reality of jihad fighters, Jerusalem today holds more importance than even Mecca.”
Is that why the Israeli public is more frightened now?
“The public has noticed a shift in the nature of warfare. Today, the weak can defeat the strong more easily than in the past because the era of exclusive technology being in the hands of the West is over. The phone that a shepherd in Afghanistan holds is just as advanced as an Israeli phone. Drone systems are widely available, and mass-produced. Warfare has changed—now weapons are accessible to all. Even the Americans face threats today that they didn’t before. The Russians can no longer dominate the Black Sea because they are facing swarms of drones, cheap technology that could sink them. Even the Houthis in Yemen, who might not be able to solve advanced math problems, are producing remote-controlled drones. Technology is available to everyone, and artificial intelligence capabilities exist in even the simplest computers.”
And the public recognizes this?
“Yes, the public realizes that the threat is more real, and the ring of fire around us is closing in. When Ehud Barak was Chief of Staff, he led a project for a small, smart army built on technological superiority. Prime Minister Olmert embraced this idea and didn’t understand that you also need mass, not just advanced, remote-strike capabilities. How did Barak put it back then? ‘Kahalani stood in the Valley of Tears with a 1:10 force ratio and won with courage, sacrifice, and tactical excellence. We will change the force ratio by destroying them from afar before they even get close.’ So for years, we were told that sacrifice wasn’t necessary because we would win, and soldiers were no longer needed because drones would do the work. They didn’t understand that war requires mass, reserves, and forces—you can’t succeed without it.”
“Meanwhile, two things happened on the enemy’s side: First, they couldn’t confront our superiority without making sacrifices, so they developed the spirit of jihad. Second, technology became so accessible that even the most inferior enemy had significant operational capabilities. This leads to a kind of anxiety, because in the past, a war would last two or three days, and then it would be over. Suddenly, we’ve been entangled in conflict for ten months, and the war is still ongoing. But that’s not because the IDF has weakened—it’s because the enemy’s combat systems have evolved entirely.”
In light of all this, is the war being managed correctly?
“I think there have been many successes, but there are also a lot of questions about the future, like what will happen on the northern border, or how we bring residents back. I hope things will develop further because we are still approaching the decisive crossroads.”
What are the objectives?
“War objectives must be reassessed as the conflict evolves. Putin changed his objectives mid-campaign. During the War of Independence, Ben-Gurion didn’t set final objectives; instead, he led a series of campaigns where each operation had its own beginning, middle, and end, each with its own goal. This is a more realistic way to manage a war because military struggles are not engineering projects with a clear destination. The military system evolves as it moves forward—that’s its nature. What may have seemed like a secondary theater can suddenly become central to our future. The goals of this war were correctly defined at the start, but now they need to be revised. Columbus set out for a specific purpose, but along the way, he discovered America. Maybe he didn’t achieve his initial goal, but he got to America. The goals of Operation Swords of Iron were initially set correctly, but many other things have happened since. It’s time to sit down and redefine the war’s objectives.”
It doesn’t seem like that’s happening.
“That’s because the leadership doesn’t think in a ‘Russian way.’ Ben-Gurion thought like that. I think like that. War is a developing event—it can’t be fully controlled. Even when you can see the end, new elements emerge that need consideration.”
What happens if the objectives aren’t refreshed?
“It means we’re losing touch with the evolving reality. We may have many tactical successes, but we need to turn them into a strategic outcome. What the enemy has done, with great sophistication, is create a war concept that denies us international legitimacy. This started during Operation Cast Lead with the Goldstone Report and continues today in a planned manner. Gaza is a new kind of military entity, and when we have to fight Hamas embedded in civilian populations—schools, playgrounds, hospitals—we achieve extraordinary results in minimizing harm to civilians by any objective standard, more so than what the Americans have achieved in minimizing civilian casualties in their operations. Yet, what concerns people like Kamala Harris is that we are harming civilians.”
How do you explain that?
“Hamas and Hezbollah’s tactics are based on not caring about their civilians. They create a situation where we are forced to kill civilians, knowing that the more civilians who die, the more condemnation Israel receives and the more international legitimacy they gain. Civilian casualties are a huge strategic asset for them, allowing them to undermine the moral and ideological support for us. They’re willing to pay that price deliberately. In response, we do everything we can to avoid harming civilians—both for moral reasons and because we lose international support when civilians are killed. But then there’s internal tension, which was discussed after Operation Cast Lead. Parents of soldiers won’t accept their children being put at risk just because we want to avoid harming civilians. If we lose soldiers because we restrained ourselves too much, we might gain international legitimacy, but we lose internal legitimacy.”
How do you reconcile the gap between internal and international legitimacy?
“By being aware that we are in a constant state of unresolved tension. Benny Gantz once said something that, had he been aware of this tension, he wouldn’t have said. After Operation Cast Lead, he mentioned that he prevented an airstrike in Shuja’iyya because he didn’t want too many uninvolved civilians to be harmed. If he had been fully conscious of the internal tension, he would have phrased it differently.”
When you have that awareness, how do you satisfy both internal and international public opinion?
“Through balance. For example, when the IDF evacuated civilians from Rafah in an unprecedented preemptive action to reduce the number of civilians in a war zone. In Khan Younis, they managed to send messages urging the residents to leave, and they did because the IDF’s messages are credible. There was a comprehensive effort to minimize harm to uninvolved civilians. At the same time, commanders must be the first to account for their soldiers and convince them not to hold back if their safety is at risk. Soldiers gain confidence when they see how dedicated their commanders are to ensuring their security.”
Does this tension explain Netanyahu’s actions—appeasing the Americans on one side and trying to placate Ben Gvir on the other?
“I believe the Prime Minister is demonstrating balanced management of these tensions. On the one hand, he complied with the American demand to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza. If he hadn’t, the war would have ended because we wouldn’t have received heavy ammunition, which we can’t produce ourselves. On the other hand, after much deliberation and despite American and international opposition, the army entered Rafah and achieved significant results, all while maintaining balance with the Egyptians.”
Ben Gvir and others argue against providing humanitarian aid to the enemy, claiming that we’re fueling our adversary in the middle of a war.
“We had no choice; we had to provide aid, but only in areas we determine. We need to define specific zones and distribute the aid ourselves, creating spaces that are less under Hamas’s control. As long as Hamas controls food distribution, they hold significant power and governance. We could have managed this differently, and there were proposals to do so, but for various reasons, the IDF chose not to go that route. It’s worth noting that military governance is not a dirty word. It’s not permanent—it’s a tool in the military commander’s toolbox.”
What’s your position on the hostages and the price Israel may need to pay for their release?
“This is an incredibly sensitive issue. We must never reach a point where it seems the hostages are not important and we’re moving on without them. Putin might be able to say, ‘I have a war to fight, and the hostage issue is small to me.’ That’s not a position I recommend—God forbid. On the other hand, when the families of the hostages cite the religious commandment of redeeming captives, someone needs to explain that even in Jewish law, there are limits to the price. It’s stated that a slave should not be redeemed at any cost and that captives are not ransomed for more than they are worth. Even the Maharam of Rothenburg instructed his community not to ransom him at an extortionate price, and he died in prison.”
Who decides what is “more than they are worth” when it comes to hostages? How can you quantify the value of a person suffering in Hamas tunnels?
“The real question is who decides whether the price is reasonable or extortionate. Jewish law doesn’t determine this—it’s a matter of leadership, of who can press the right balance between paying a just price for freeing captives and not succumbing to an unsustainable, extortionate demand. The extortion exists in every case, but how we respond is a test of leadership.”
In your opinion, does the state have an obligation to bring them back?
“Yes, but not at any cost. Within that space of ‘not at any cost,’ there are many options, and that’s where a leadership decision must be made.”
What do you think Israel should do the day after?
“I reject the concept of ‘the day after.’ Moshe Dayan once said, ‘Gentlemen, the long term begins here and now.’ It’s not that we’ll fight and fight, and then suddenly the day after will arrive like a happy ending in a cartoon. Things change in war, and throughout, we must remain in control and aware of the evolving situations. War isn’t an engineering project. Netanyahu has said some important things that could shape the day after, like the fact that we won’t govern Gaza. But what Gaza’s future will look like remains an open question.”
Ben Gvir and Smotrich often talk about the day after.
“It’s unacceptable for a position like whether to stay in the Philadelphi Corridor to be a sectarian right-wing stance. You don’t go to war with a sectoral view—you need a broad consensus. I expect Smotrich and Ben Gvir, even if they’re speaking the truth, not to color it with sectarian tones because that undermines the ability to turn their truths into something that leads the entire nation. Especially on matters as significant as war and its consequences.”
And what about the day after in Israel?
“A new song, with a new story, needs to emerge. We need to internalize that even if residents return to the north, and even if there is a ceasefire in the south and some kind of agreement with the enemy, Hezbollah will still exist, the Iranian threat will remain, and anyone seeking absolute security won’t find such guarantees. People will need to return with a collective consciousness. It’s like people moving to Kiryat Shmona not just because there’s a financial grant for doctors but because there’s a pioneering spirit. A whole system needs to tell a story that gives meaning beyond the individual life because only a collective of people in distress creates priorities and builds national resilience.”
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