Major or minor
You don’t want yourself
An incident
Don’t ever invade China
Mark Knopfler, Don’t Crash the Ambulance (2004)
Just as the U.S. National Defense Strategy lists homeland defense as the first priority of the Department of Defense, China’s national defense policy states that the top mission of China’s armed forces is to “safeguard national territorial sovereignty (领土主权) and maritime rights and interests (海洋权益).” Other “major security domains” have been added to China’s National Defense Law — specifically space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyberspace in 2020 — but protecting the borders of the homeland has always been the prime directive.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping underscored mainland defense on July 30 with a speech to the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo standing committee group study session on China’s border, coastal, and air defense (边海空防). This meeting addressed the duties of a significant portion of the active-duty People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Armed Police, and the reserves and militia, which operate on the frontlines with neighboring militaries and civilian entities. Xi praised their efforts as central to China’s national security and strategic interests since he took power in 2012. The study session became the banner front page article of the Aug. 1 edition of the Chinese-language Liberation Army Daily newspaper. Xi’s speech gained symbolic heft by coming on the date celebrated for the 97th anniversary of the founding of People’s Liberation Army.
What does Beijing’s carefully crafted, high-profile political signaling tell us? First, the timing of this session suggests the Chinese leadership seeks to deter the United States, its allies, and partners (including Taiwan) by highlighting its commitment to defending China’s sovereignty and territorial claims.
Though no foreign military might actually be contemplating action against the Chinese mainland in the near term, Mark Knopfler’s musical warning resonates with the paranoia of Chinese leaders. Fear of invasion goes back long before the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the foreign occupation extending through the war with Japan in the 1930s. In the 1950s, China was threatened with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and the Taiwan Straits crisis. Beginning in 1964, a tremendously expensive program known as the Third Line (三线 or Third Front) moved strategic industries deep into the interior for protection from attack. A decade later, the military and militia practiced the “three attacks, three defenses” (三打三防, “attack tanks, aircraft, and airborne troops, defend against air, chemical, and nuclear attack”). In the 1990s, a “new” was added before the three attacks, three defenses and to keep up with technology, the targets were changed to “attacking enemy stealth, cruise missiles, and helicopters and defending against precision strikes, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance.”
The threat to China’s sovereignty was further highlighted by the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Despite U.S. explanations and apologies, many Chinese leaders and people still consider the action a deliberate strike. We may never know for certain, but it is plausible that the Chinese Communist Party worries about another “October surprise” during the fall 2024 election season or early in a new U.S. administration. This is amplified by increasing friction in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait. As of summer 2024, Chinese government continues to assess that a “certain major power [the U.S.] has resorted to power politics and bullying, and willful containment and suppression of emerging forces.” And Xi’s “explainer” for the recently concluded Third Plenum continued to warn against the dangers of “black swans” and “gray rhinos” — both are Chinese codewords for unforeseen risks and uncertainties, foreign and domestic.
Second, prioritizing China’s border, coastal, and air defense reflects Xi’s continuing belief in “People’s War,” China’s “magic weapon” (法宝), in its strategic deterrence posture and “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” (一体化国家战略体系和能力). He is determined to mobilize manpower, resources, and technical know-how embedded in Chinese society and civilian sectors to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s security interests first at home and gradually beyond China’s borders.
Third, Xi’s statement raises the possibility of more “major” Chinese activities along the country’s land borders (e.g., India, Burma) and coastal regions (e.g., Taiwan Strait, South and East China seas), potentially employing new and innovative measures. The fact that the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department provided the briefer for the study session may portend a significant change in the responsibilities of the Chinese military chain of command regarding border operations. Expect the unexpected.
Who’s Leading the State Border and Coastal Defense Commission? Unclear.
China’s border, coastal, and air defense system is roughly equivalent to the U.S. homeland defense functions. It coordinates the enforcement of the country’s claimed territorial boundaries and integrates the party, government, military, law enforcement, and civilian assets (党政军警民) under a unified central authority. Its leaders will play a central role in any potential crisis along China’s land or sea borders. Chinese homeland defense is led by the Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission, with responsibilities shared among the armed forces, civilian law enforcement, and local governments. But who exactly is in charge seems to be in flux.
The 2006 defense white paper reported that the State Border and Coastal Defense Commission (国家边海防委员会), created in 1994, was composed of “the relevant departments of the State Council and the [People’s Liberation Army].” Many of its responsibilities include infrastructure development projects to improve the transportation and communications in border regions and to upgrade the standard of living for military personnel. However, the 2020 National Defense Law removed the State Council from that commission, implying changes to come.
Today, it is unclear who leads the State Border and Coastal Defense Commission. Previously, the minister of national defense held the position. The deputy director of the Party Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (changed into a commission in 2018) has served as one of the deputy directors of the commission. Current Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun, however, has not been associated with the commission, nor has he become a member of the Central Military Commission or a state councilor. We don’t know who oversees the commission’s foreign affairs portfolio, either.
The director of the Central Military Commission National Defense Mobilization Department (军委国防动员部) has served as deputy director of the State Border and Coastal Defense Commission since the military reform started in 2016. Within that department is a Border Defense Bureau (边防局), which coordinates with smaller border and coastal defense bureaus/divisions in the five theater armies’ joint staff departments (战区陆军参谋部边海防处) and in the army staff department (陆军参谋部边海防局). So far, we have found no similar staff organizations in the navy or air force, although those services contribute units to conduct missions along China’s borders.
Chinese Armed Forces Units Responsible for Border, Coastal, and Air Defense
The People’s Liberation Army’s Army, Navy, and Air Force all provide units and personnel to conduct daily border, coastal, and air defense operations (but not Rocket Force units except in their general nuclear and conventional deterrence role). These units are supported by elements of the People’s Armed Police, particularly the China Coast Guard, and reserve and militia units. The newly formed Military Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force provide capabilities with global reach to China’s strategic deterrence posture in support of the four services and five theaters.
The army contributes the largest force dedicated to this mission. Though the army may participate in a few exercises outside of China with foreign militaries each year and provides about 2,000 personnel annually to United Nation Peacekeeping Operations, the vast majority of its troops have never left the country.
Army units, in general, are categorized into three groups. “Maneuver operation (机动作战部队)” units are organized mostly into 13 group armies and a handful of divisions that may move from one part of the country to another as required. “Garrison forces (警卫警备部队)” comprise the system of provincial military districts, military subdistricts, and people’s armed forces departments that provide mobilization support, perform conscription functions, and command militia units.
The army’s “border and coastal defense (边海防部队)” units were mostly reorganized after 2015 into brigades (except for the western theater, where the former structure of regiments was retained). The International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance counts about 50 border and coastal defense brigades and regiments, which we estimate could number well over 100,000 personnel. The forces are widely dispersed in small units across the country. They primarily are responsible for patrolling and monitoring the borders for military activity. These units have been equipped with some new weapons and equipment, but remain in a defensive posture.
In hot spots, the border defense units are reinforced by “maneuver operation” combat units. For instance, the line of actual control with India has been reinforced as part of the 506 Special Mission for nearly a decade. This mission has been amplified in the years since the 2020 skirmishes in the Galwan Valley. Along the east coast, in August 2022, new army modular long-range multiple rocket launcher systems were employed in the large joint exercise in response to U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
The navy is in a period of transition, moving from “defense on the near seas (近海防御) to protection missions on the far seas (远海防卫).” The Military Balance counts more than 100 patrol craft and corvettes that are optimized for operations along China’s coast, along with many of its conventionally powered submarines. Meanwhile, roughly the same number of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and nuclear subs can perform operations within the first island chain as well as in distant waters. The navy’s land-based coastal defense force (岸防部队) maintains multiple anti-ship cruise missile regiments and air defense, electronic countermeasures, and radar brigades, plus a significant land-based aviation force.
The air force, meantime, is “accelerating the transition of its tasks from territorial air defense (国土防空) to both offensive and defensive operations (攻防兼备).” It has “one of the largest forces of advanced long-range [surface-to-air] missile systems in the world” augmented by a large fleet of fighter aircraft to provide integrated air defense of the mainland and adjacent seas.
The “air defense” Xi referred to in his speech actually applies to civil or people’s air defense (人民防空, or 人防) and not active-duty air defenses (防空). China Civil Air Defense offices are found in local civilian governments to manage construction of facilities, such as bomb shelters and command posts, and cooperate with other government agencies in emergency management.
The China Coast Guard has “over 150 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels,” including over 20 former navy corvettes modified for coast guard operations. In May 2024, several coast guard vessels participated in the Joint Sword-2024A exercise after Taiwan’s presidential election. In addition, hundreds of maritime militia vessels operate daily in the South China Sea alone and will complicate foreign operations in time of crisis or war.
Finally, People’s Liberation Army reserve units, currently being restructured, also contribute to border and coastal defense operations, particularly in air defense and support tasks. Militia units also have been assigned air defense, rescue and recovery, and other technical and logistics tasks including operating multiple types of unmanned vehicles.
Conclusion
Prioritizing border, coastal, and air defense aligns with the party’s resolution to “strengthen traditional combat forces” in Xi’s speech to the recent party Third Plenum (see section XIV). In Chinese military parlance, “traditional combat forces” refer to conscript-heavy units that make up the border and coastal defense forces and other ground combat units. Xi’s emphasis on homeland defense will almost certainly help elevate the stature of such (mainly) army elements. To give them higher profile in society, border troops have a webpage dedicated to their stories for internal consumption on the Chinese-language China military website.
Inside China, local officials and bureaucrats may read something else into Xi’s speech: that central funding is available for dual-use infrastructure construction in border regions for projects that contribute to defense readiness. This may encourage local leaders to volunteer to participate in this development as part of nationwide “military-civilian integration/fusion” (军民融合) activities. A likely example of this thinking is demonstrated in the construction of over 50 new villages and expansion of 100 others in remote regions along China’s periphery since 2016.
Xi’s speech noted that it is “important to foster neighborly relations and pragmatic cooperation with neighboring countries to create a favorable surrounding environment.” Military relations with several adjacent southeast Asian countries seem relatively stable. However, given the friction caused by China’s actions over disputed ocean territories, any call to foster neighborly relations with its offshore neighbors appears mostly empty. But maybe Xi’s emphasis of “pragmatic cooperation” signals Beijing’s willingness to adopt a more flexible approach in the coming years.
Finally, Xi stressed the need to “optimize the leadership management system.” Xi may be considering placing border operations under the Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department. Such a move would take it away from the National Defense Mobilization Department Border Defense Bureau and might ripple down to the theater commands’ Joint Staff Departments. Perhaps the navy and air force may create border operations staff offices. Such changes could lead to greater integration of operations along China’s periphery. In the long run, more unified control of front-line units could also reduce miscommunications and accidental encounters with foreign military and civilian entities operating in proximity to Chinese borders.
Shanshan Mei, known by the pen name Marcus Clay, is a political scientist at RAND. She previously served as the special assistant to the 22nd chief of staff of the Air Force for China and Indo-Pacific issues.
Dennis J. Blasko is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. From 1992 to 1996, he was an Army attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military, along with the book The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century.
The views in this article are those of the authors alone and not those of any institution they are or have been affiliated with.
Image: U.S. Department of Defense via Wikimedia Commons
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