Shadow shake-up: Zelensky’s pointless purge of his ministers reveals Kiev’s despair

Ukraine’s government has undergone a major shake-up. Seven out of 22 holders of cabinet positions have resigned, as well as a deputy head of the presidential administration. Nine new appointments have been announced by the head of Vladimir Zelensky’s Servant of the People party, David Arakhamia. As Ukraine under the Zelensky regime is a de facto one-party state, Arakhamia’s word, reflecting the will of the president and his powerful administration, was always likely to be the last one on this matter. Never mind that the process was so bumpy that even The Economist, usually blindly pro-Zelensky, detected hints of “increasing dysfunction.” 

The “cull” is, according to Ukrainian media, a “mass” event. Yet the reshuffle is not only big but also especially remarkable as it has taken place against the backdrop of a war that is going very badly for Ukraine. The bizarrely self-destructive Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk Region has become a bloody fiasco, while Moscow’s forces are speeding up their advances, especially in Donbass, and are increasing their attacks from the air everywhere in Ukraine.

It would be tempting to draw a straight line from these severe problems with the war to the government overhaul in Kiev. But things are more complicated. There is no doubt that the conflict as a whole plays an important role in this crisis. Yet we don’t have to take the word of Zelensky regime lawmakers to believe that this specific government shake-up has been in the making for some time. It is not simply the direct result of the sharp deterioration on the already crumbling front lines that started with Ukraine’s kamikaze incursion into Russia at the beginning of last month.

One explanation we can safely disregard as misleading is the one given by Zelensky. Ukraine’s erratic leader, who has “missed” his last election, has announced that the reshuffle is meant to “give new strength” to his country’s institutions. In particular with a view to the challenges of the autumn which has just begun, he feels that “state institutions must be set up in such a way that Ukraine will achieve all the results we need.” It’s puzzling to hear a modern head of state declare that effective government is a matter of the seasons, but let’s not dwell on that.

The more important point here has to do with where actual power lies with the Zelensky regime. Hint: not with the cabinet of ministers. And don’t even think of the parliament which formally appoints its ministers. While the cabinet is often called Ukraine’s “government” and on paper represents the peak of the executive branch of state power, in reality, the country is run from the administration – or as Ukrainians now say, office – of the president. Only an advisory body, if things went by the letter of the constitution, in reality, “Bankova” (as the administration is commonly known after the street on which it resides) is Ukraine’s actual – and authoritarian – government. Add a few key cadres and enforcers of Zelensky’s personalized and streamlined party, such as Arakhamia or the speaker of the parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, and you have the real grandees of the Zelensky regime.

It is this small group of (mostly) men around Zelensky who make the decisions that count – and no decision that counts can be made without or against them. Currently, the most important among them – apart from Zelensky, of course – is Andrey Yermak, a former film producer now serving as Bankova’s boss and Zelensky’s main enforcer. And if you think all of the above doesn’t sound like that tale of flourishing “democracy” and “vibrant civil society” dished out by Western mainstream media and professional Ukraine boosters – Bingo! You are on to something.

The upshot of this real set-up of the Ukrainian regime is that changing around ministers simply does not make much of a difference, as even the New York Times acknowledges. And, more importantly, if Zelensky genuinely wanted to mend the state on the institutional level, the first thing he would have to do is kick out Yermak and friends and reverse the power grab of his own presidential administration because that is, literally, the single worst institutional pathology his country is suffering from. But then, Bankova is also the core of his own power.

If Zelensky is spewing hot air, as so often, what is this whole thing about in reality? Here we need to take a closer look at both the context and the individuals involved. The most prominent case is that of former foreign minister Dmitry Kuleba, who has been replaced by his deputy, Andrey Sybiha. Kuleba, oddly enough, has been a favorite with Ukraine’s Western sponsors. As Bloomberg notes, his departure has surprised and “rattled” them.

Solidly pro-Ukrainian Western media have speculated about the reasons. The British Telegraph believes Kuleba’s failure to secure even more weapons or permission to launch missiles even deeper into Russia is behind his firing. The Economist, ironically, guesses that perhaps Kuleba was too polite for his president, who wants his chief diplomat to strike a nastier tone, especially with Ukraine’s Western supporters: Please bite the hand that feeds us harder, will you? 

“Ironically” because if there is one thing that stands out about Kuleba, it is his ham-fisted obliviousness and rude manners. This is the “diplomat” who publicly told the Germans – in Berlin – they might as well hand over their Taurus missiles right away to Kiev because they would do so anyhow in the end. (Spoiler: They still haven’t.) Or the Chinese – a power Kiev may need very much in the near future when the terms of its defeat have to be settled – that they had finally “matured” enough to receive him in China (by the way, not in Beijing.) If Zelensky really wants someone even more offensive and tactless than Kuleba, I recommend the Hulk.

Others who have had to vacate their positions are Denis Maliuska, minister of justice, Ruslan Strelets, responsible for environmental protection and natural resources, Aleksandr Kamyshin, the minister of strategic industries, that is, arms production, Irina Vereshchuk, minister for the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories, and Vitaly Koval, head of the state property fund.

Not all of the above have been demoted. Kamyshin, for instance, has been, in effect, promoted by joining Bankova. Likewise, Vereshchuk is leaving the cabinet of ministers only to become a new deputy to Yermak, the Bankova boss. Olga Stefanishyna, who also tendered her resignation from her prior position, has been reappointed as deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and moved laterally to become the new minister of justice. 

One pattern that emerges all too clearly is that the cabinet of ministers suffers not only from being overshadowed by the president’s men (and some women) on Bankova, but that it is treated as a holding pen for cadres that can either fail and leave or succeed, at least in Zelensky’s eyes, and move out and up to his administration. Add to that the persistent and very public rumors that even Prime Minister Denis Shmigal’s head is on the chopping block, too, and that his political demise is being delayed (for now) only because Arakhamia disagrees with Yermak over when exactly to get rid of him. Or the fact, noted by Ukrainian media, that Maliuska, the former minister of justice, was the last one appointed before the era of Yermak the Boss. All of that must leave an incredibly motivating sense of self-worth in the cabinet. And if there are any ministers who don’t even notice how they are being publicly slighted and humiliated, then they clearly cannot be very bright.

So much damage and, again, for what? Speculation abounds because the Zelensky regime does not communicate beyond hollow phrases. Many theories are about the fate of individual cadres. For instance, the dismissal of a Yermak deputy, Rostislav Shurma, the only major figure from Bankova to fall victim to this cull, has been interpreted as a complicated move to assuage pro-Western activists furious about the recent firing of top energy bureaucrat Vladimir Kudritsky. Moreover, rumor also has it that Shurma himself wanted out. Sinking ships and all that. 

But instead of getting lost in the weeds of Zelensky regime turf struggles, cynicism, and backstabbing, let’s refocus on the larger picture: During an especially acute crisis within the broader, deeper crisis of losing the war against Russia, Kiev has executed a major cadre overhaul – and no one really knows why or for what purpose. That would be bad enough because it’s yet another clear sign of a regime and a leader losing their bearings.

Yet what makes this even worse is the one hypothesis that seems to make sense of it all: namely that this is simply Zelensky’s way of trying to deflect responsibility from himself. His government’s polls have been going down massively, as even his staunchest Western friends acknowledge. And there is really nothing he can do about it because he has maneuvered his country into a bloody proxy war dead end of total dependency on a West that is exploitative and unreliable, while causing a self-inflicted breakdown of negotiating options with Russia. So, heads are rolling and yet nothing will change for the better.