There is a reason that incoming Northern Corps and Multi-Domain Joint Maneuver Array Maj.-Gen. Dan Goldfus is considered one of the rising stars of the IDF.
Israel Defense Forces Brig.-Gen. Itzik Cohen of Division 162, along with Brig.-Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa of Division 36 (also becoming a major general but in a less upwardly mobile position), Brig.-Gen. Barak Hiram of Division 99, and Brig.-Gen. Moran Omer of Division 252 have all played important roles in the invasion of northern Gaza. So what is so special about Goldfus?
One of the reasons that South African-Israeli Goldfus – promoted from brigadier general to major general in May – is joining the high command (others to hold his next post have gone on to become IDF chief, IDF deputy chief, and IDF intelligence chief) is that he is both the hero of Hamas’s defeat in Khan Yunis and the general who broke up the terrorist group’s network of tunnels.
How did Dan Goldfus overcome Hamas’s tunnel networks and defeat them in Khan Yunis?
The Magazine has learned that Goldfus considers that his breakthrough in overcoming Hamas’s tunnel warfare is not about a single moment in which he had an epiphany but the result of hard, exhaustive, and continuous work.
If, at first, the soldiers in his Division 98 – considered almost a special forces unit – had to slowly and clumsily feel their way around in the dark of the Hamas tunnels, they eventually became, in his view, the first army in modern history to carry out large-scale, full-unit invasions, maneuvering throughout the Hamas tunnel network.
The Magazine learned that in the initial stages of the war, Goldfus’s forces were required to focus on basics, such as recording the size of the tunnels, their volume, and their depth. Likewise, they just needed to get used to the aspect of the tunnels and to dig into them, gather photos, and study them. Over time, this systematic approach began to help build more confidence.
Goldfus and his troops would slowly explore various tunnel depths and examine the types of equipment Hamas used in differing tunnels but with very targeted and circumscribed goals and missions.
WHEN HE and his forces went in, Goldfus, being a soldier’s soldier, insisted on entering a huge number of tunnels himself to see them up close despite the extra risk to his person, as they usually did not yet know what to expect.
The Magazine understands that they would have a specific goal for each area in question, usually starting with tunnels about which Goldfus had received more extensive pre-operation intelligence from Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and IDF intelligence sources – particularly if Hamas was putting up a bigger fight to fend off IDF advances from a particular tunnel shaft.
At the outset, neither Goldfus nor any of the other generals allowed full units to maneuver down into the tunnels. So, even in early January, three months into the war and a full month after the then-brigadier general had invaded Khan Yunis, IDF soldiers very rarely ventured into the tunnels.
EVENTUALLY, GOLDFUS realized that the Hamas tunnels were not separate systems but one massive decentralized network. This conclusion was reached when he and his top advisers found a convergence of trends.
The next step, diagnosing the convergence, was reserved for Special Forces. Division 98 started assuming slightly greater risk by entering the tunnels to maximize the benefit of taking over given areas above ground.
These Special Forces and engineers then began to diagnose the components of each particular tunnel on a deeper level. Goldfus would be the first to admit that this stage also took a long time.
Finally, early in January, the Division 98 commander and his forces had a breakthrough.
They had discussed and debated, sometimes through the night as they sat for their operational situation assessments and constructed a plan for entering the tunnels. The Magazine understands that Goldfus and his team asked themselves: What level of risk should we take to explore the tunnels? What are they worth to the enemy?
All levels of command were involved, including IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, because going into the tunnels was taking a big risk.
Finally, Goldfus succeeded in understanding what Hamas was and was not doing. Surprisingly, he realized that Hamas had not come to fight underground. It just wanted to use the tunnels to survive and rest.
SUDDENLY, GOLDFUS and his team began to view the issue of the tunnels in another light.
The Yahalom Special Forces unit, along with various commandos, began entering the tunnels in larger numbers, with greater frequency, and covering larger distances.
Then, more “regular” infantry units such as the Unit 7 combat team, the Givati Brigade soldiers, and others went in.
In terms of understanding how the tunnels in various parts of Gaza relate to one another, Goldfus holds that this is not fully possible until one has seen a large number of different tunnels in various parts of Gaza. He would point out that every tunnel has different nuances: For instance, the doors built into the tunnel look different, and the cement material for framing the tunnel is different.
For example, in his view, anyone who saw the Shifa Hospital tunnels at the start of the war was in some sense a bit misled or “faked out.”
Many in the IDF who focused overly on Shifa thought that all the tunnels that the military went on to find would be the same. Goldfus would label this a “substantive error” because many tunnels are different.
In his view, Khan Yunis tunnels are different from Rafah tunnels, which are different from Jabalya tunnels, which are different from Shejaia tunnels. And there were different kinds of diggers in Khan Yunis and for each area.
ACCORDING TO Goldfus, some people thought he was crazy, but he was convinced that under their feet was a single giant network. These were not separate strategic tunnels, tactical tunnels, or separate areas. In his narrative, it was a single giant network from which it was possible to enter around Erez in northern Gaza and come out at Rafah and Egypt – like the process of water seeping through and flowing down a mountain.
Another analogy for the web of tunnels and the difficulty in navigating all of it that Goldfus likes to use is from a scene in the 1987 movie Spaceballs, a spoof on Star Wars, where Stormtroopers are told to “comb the desert” for escapees. They are then seen, literally and futilely, “pulling” a giant comb through the vast desert.
A recent operation to retrieve the bodies of hostages took less than 24 hours from start to finish, partially because Goldfus had acquired enough experience and intelligence regarding the tunnels to plan all the specifics.
In his view, he could not have done this without everything the IDF had learned along the way. This was a significant and complex operation, and the major general felt that he and his team had achieved something unusually significant.
All of this eventually led to IDF’s capability, in mid-and-late January, to shift to the process of simultaneously attacking above and below ground.
Will all of these breakthroughs help the IDF succeed in destroying all of Hamas’s tunnels?
Goldfus took into consideration that the IDF would not be able to get to all the tunnels. Rather, it would succeed in destroying the critical mass of tunnels that threaten the State of Israel because of their proximity, the Magazine has learned.
Further, the Division 98 commander’s view is that the military will be able to blow up many kilometers of tunnels – and key connecting tunnels that are central to the Gaza network – even if it will never be able to destroy them all. This equation does not disturb Goldfus. He would suggest looking to the kilometers of Japanese tunnels from World War II in Okinawa, many of them still there.
If no one is using them, he believes that the task is not the tunnels themselves but for the IDF to kill or wound Hamas terrorists – and to convince the Gazan population that they have alternatives to being ruled by the terrorist group, being used as human shields, or working with Hamas out of fear.
Goldfus disapproves of those who lack the patience to utilize a systematic approach to destroying the tunnels. His approach is that the IDF must be systematic and produce and utilize deep knowledge to maximize achievements within the minimum time necessary.
For example, in Shejaia his forces destroyed eight tunnels in just two weeks, the Magazine has learned. However, his forces were nowhere near that level of effectiveness in other areas.
The major general advocates that the IDF aspire to continue to up its game to rid the area of as much of the tunnel threat as possible.
IN HIS next challenge in the Northern Command, Goldfus will focus mainly on a variety of land forces, but he will also work with the Air Force and others to attempt to improve the holes in the military’s air defense. Although he has not yet fully assumed his new position, his view on using the older anti-aircraft Vulcan defense system to protect against drones is that, if used, it should remain the last line of defense.
In a recent interview, former Air Defense chief Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav told the Magazine that on the one hand, the Vulcan was not a solve-all solution; but on the other hand, he thought it could have a place in plugging some of the holes in Israel’s current air defense, which is geared more toward rocket defense and less toward drones.
Goldfus’s approach is that, with the Vulcan systems’ utility limited by their short-range capabilities, it is impractical to spread them throughout Israel’s borders.
He considers that playing defense is difficult and that part of the solution is to be increasingly on the offensive against the drone threat.
This is hardly surprising, given that Goldfus began his career in the Shayetet 13 naval commandos.
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