Five key challenges for Israel after latest Houthi missile attack
The attack on Israel on September 15 by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen is another example of how Israel is facing new threats during this long war that began on October 7.
In the wake of the attack, Hezbollah has carried out attacks on northern Israel, illustrating how Israel faces numerous threats on multiple fronts. It is worth considering now some of the challenges Israel faces.
Deterring enemies
The largest challenge for Israel today is finding a way to deter Israel’s multiple Iranian-backed adversaries. Hamas in Gaza, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other groups are all attacking Israel.
Each of these groups is now not deterred from their attacks. Prior to October 7, it was believed that Hamas had been deterred. In addition, Hezbollah was largely deterred after 2006 from launching new attacks on Israel.
However, the deterrence has been rapidly eroded. While militias in Iraq might have been worried at one time about launching drone attacks on Israel, today, they brag about it.
The Houthis may once have been focused on a war against Saudi Arabia. However, they learned from how the West abandoned Riyadh during that war that they could get away with broader attacks. They also quickly learned in October and November 2023 that they could target Eilat and ships in the Red Sea and would not face major retaliation.
Hezbollah has learned that it can rain down rockets on northern Israel and force Israelis from their homes, and the response is mostly proportional and precise.
As such, Hezbollah doesn’t suffer much pain. It has lost over 400 men in the war, but this is not a game changer. People can be replaced.
Overall, the Iranian-backed axis is not deterred. It is the one choosing the time and place of attacks, and it feels like it has all the time in the world to prepare for more complex attacks.
Changing the equation and deterring enemies is clearly an essential issue for Israel in this war. Israel has historically rested on its abilities to use superior capabilities to deter numerous enemies, because enemies often surrounded Israel.
Tactics and proportional responses
Israel has been focused on Gaza since the October 7 war began. This has led to a policy of proportional responses on other fronts. The question now is whether this tactic is working. Israel is primarily waging a tactical war on multiple fronts.
This means that in Gaza, the IDF is focused on the tactical defeat of various Hamas units, such as the Rafah Brigade. There is a wider question of strategy.
The absence of a strategy on multiple fronts means that each front against Iran’s proxies has become a tactical and mostly proportional response.
The IDF is waging a tactical war on terror in the West Bank, for instance. This isn’t designed to change strategy in the West Bank but rather to increase operational tempo to confront the rising terror threat.
What is the end goal and strategy? It is primarily simply to go after gunmen, which becomes another kind of “mowing the grass” or “whack-a-mole” tactic.
Will this defeat the terrorists or lead to another round with them? This is the key question.
There are similar questions about the other fronts. Hezbollah is carrying out daily attacks, and it is met with more airstrikes and artillery bombardment.
However, it feels that it can carry out the attacks and not face much of a response. Hezbollah clearly thinks there is an equation here. It attacks up to a few miles inside Israel, and it expects Israel to do the same in Lebanon.
If Israel carries out deeper attacks, Hezbollah does the same. Hezbollah is waging a war of attrition. Is this in the interests of Hezbollah or Israel? That is a key question.
Air defenses are not a strategy
Israel’s air defenses have faced increasing challenges on multiple fronts. This war has tested them to an unprecedented degree. Hamas, for instance, began the war by launching thousands of rockets at Israel, hoping to overwhelm Israel’s defenses.
The Hamas rocket threat has now been largely defeated, but the group still launches a rocket every day or every two days. This can still threaten Ashkelon and other cities.
The Houthis have also been able to threaten Israel despite Israel’s air defenses working well. Israel has multi-layered air defenses such as the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3.
These are all successful and have gotten an unprecedented workout in this war.
However, the enemy is constantly changing its capabilities as well. It uses drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The enemy finds different ways to threaten Israel and also tries to attack from different directions.
Ultimately, air defenses are not a strategy for checking these threats. Air defenses are a tool. Israeli media on September 15 spent a lot of time discussing the missile threat and Israel’s air defenses and how or when the missile was detected or intercepted.
These are technical questions. However, no defense system is entirely able to defend against everything at all times.
As such, defenses are not really a strategy. They only give a military time and some options. Israel should consider that it must address the threats as if there was no air defense array. Then, it might consider a strategy on what to do next.
The long war in Gaza and the multi-front threat
The war in Gaza has continued for eleven months. Hamas had likely sought through its attack on October 7 to drag Israel into a long war in Gaza.
It’s also likely that Hamas and its backers abroad, such as Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and China, wanted to leverage October 7 to increase the Hamas presence in the West Bank.
The longer the war in Gaza continues without a knock-out of Hamas, the longer Israel is distracted from other threats.
If the war in Gaza winds down and if Hamas is defeated, then Israel could focus on other fronts. However, the Gaza war has sucked Israel into a long war and forced Israel to expend resources and capabilities in Gaza.
This includes munitions and deploying soldiers. Israel’s leaders historically did not see long wars like this as in Israel’s interest. They preferred a 1967 war type of scenario of knocking out enemies and letting Israelis return to everyday life. The war in Gaza is now wagging the proverbial dog on other fronts.
The Abraham Accords and Iran’s escalation
Iran’s escalation against Israel since October 7 is designed to isolate Israel. This has prevented Israel from pushing other agendas, such as economic and diplomatic initiatives.
This is an attempt to roll back the success of the Abraham Accords. Iran wants to make Israel’s borders all boil with low-level wars and force Israel to fight endless small wars all around Israel’s borders. While Israel does that, Iran is on the march in the region.
Iran hopes that isolating Israel via war will enable Iran to work closely with Russia, China, Turkey, and other countries. Their goal is to leverage the Arab League and also other Muslim countries against Israel. As such, the Iranian escalation over the last 11 months has enabled Iran to pursue its economic and diplomatic interests.
Iran is also hoping the international community does not come to Israel’s support regarding the other fronts.
Iran has used Yemen and Lebanon to attack Israel, for instance. The response abroad is that most countries call for de-escalation. They don’t call for Hezbollah or the Houthis to stop their attacks.
This puts Israel in the awkward position of being told not to escalate when it is Israel that is the victim. Iran, meanwhile, seems to get off without any critique by the international community despite plunging the region into a massive war.
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