On September 17, 1978, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat concluded the historic Egypt-Israeli peace accord at Camp David under the beaming and watchful eye of US president Jimmy Carter.
Three years and nine months later, on June 6, 1982, the First Lebanon War – a conflict that shook the region – broke out. Despite widespread calls throughout the Arab world for Egypt to sever ties with Israel and cancel the peace agreement, Cairo refused, seeing the treaty as vital to its national interests. As a result, the peace agreement endured that challenge and many others over the following 42 years.
On September 15, 2020 – four years ago on Sunday – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid signed normalization agreements known as the Abraham Accords at the White House under the beaming and watchful eye of US President Donald Trump.
Three years and one month later, on October 7, 2023, Hamas brutally attacked Israel, triggering the Israel-Hamas War that has since spread to six other fronts. Despite widespread calls throughout the Arab world for the UAE and Bahrain – along with Morocco and Sudan, which normalized ties with Israel a couple of months later – to sever ties and cancel the normalization agreements, they have refused, seeing the treaties as vital to their national interests.
The Abraham Accords have withstood this significant challenge, giving hope that they will – like the peace agreement with Egypt – survive regardless of the dramatic events that occasionally roil the region.
The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – four Arab states – did not cut off ties because of the war, though Latin America’s Bolivia, Belize, and Colombia did. The two Abraham Accord countries with ambassadors in Israel – the UAE and Bahrain – did not recall them because of the current war, though South Africa, Jordan, Turkey, Colombia, Chad, and Honduras did.
That the Abraham Accords have survived this current regional challenge intact is neither a given, a trifling matter, nor something that should be taken for granted. This is especially the case since there has been significant domestic pressure inside the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to scuttle their ties with Israel, as well as pressure from other Arab and Muslim countries to do the same. (Sudan is currently in the midst of a devastating civil war and its focus is elsewhere.)
While Israel’s ties with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco are not exactly what they were during the first three heady years of the agreement – fewer high-level visits, fewer people-to-people, and cultural exchanges – the diplomatic, security, and economic ties still remain significant.
Take trade, for example. One could imagine that as a result of the war, trade with the UAE – the most significant trading partner among the Abraham Accord countries – would have taken a hit. That’s precisely what happened with Turkey, a country now openly hostile to Israel, where trade in the first seven months of 2024 dropped 71% compared to the same period in 2023 (from $3.75 to $2.19 billion).
By contrast, trade with the UAE in 2024 has stayed apace with the record-breaking level of 2023, with $1.9b. of trade from January through July of this year, as compared to $2b. for the same period last year.
But the prospect of trade is only one of the factors, and a relatively minor one, that led to these accords. Yes, an interest in tapping into Israel’s hi-tech, powerful economy was one reason for the Gulf countries’ interest in normalizing ties with Israel, but not the main reason.
The surface-to-surface ballistic missile fired by the Houthis on Sunday morning that landed in the center of the country is a reminder of the principal reason: common enemies.
A common threat
The Abraham Accords are a result of a realization by the Arab signatories to that agreement that their biggest threat is not from Israel but rather from Iran and its proxies – like the Houthis, for instance – and that normalized ties with Israel can help them counter those threats. The UAE and Bahrain have both been attacked in the past by Houthi drones and missiles.
The Houthi threat to the UAE and Bahrain, as well as to Saudi Arabia, remains as acute today – if not more so – as when the accords were signed in 2020.
Why is the threat more acute today? Because if the perception is that Iran and its proxies are able to defeat Israel, then they will be emboldened to challenge others in the region. The hegemonic designs of Iran, the Houthis’ paymaster, do not begin and end with Israel but also extend to the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the region.
The threat posed by Iran and its proxies, a threat concretized on Sunday by the ballistic missile from Yemen, is the powerful glue holding these accords together, despite the war – a cataclysmic event in the Middle East that could have disrupted the accords.
On the fourth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, it is important to highlight the good news: none of the signatories have withdrawn from the accord. Both the UAE and Bahrain, which have embassies in Israel, have kept them working, and Morocco continues to run its liaison office.
This continuation reflects shifting security alliances in the region, which have not changed despite the war. That the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco remain committed to the accords shows they have determined that the benefits of maintaining the relationship with Israel outweigh the potential downsides – and they are willing to endure criticism from within their countries and from other Arab and Muslim nations.
The bad news, however, is that Hamas, with its attack, successfully derailed plans to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia – an agreement that seemed tantalizingly close last September when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in a Fox News interview that “every day we get closer” to an agreement.
That type of agreement, which would have meant game-changing integration for Israel in the region despite the Palestinian issue remaining unresolved, was a nightmare scenario for Hamas and its patron, Iran.
Scuttling such an agreement was one of the primary objectives of Hamas’s October 7 attack, and in that regard, the terrorist organization succeeded, at least temporarily.
Nonetheless, the Saudis have made it clear – even during the war – that they are still interested in normalizing ties, although they insist on a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of the process.
Why are the Saudis still interested, even 11 months into a war that many in the Arab world view as Israeli aggression? The reason is the same as for Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE: These relationships, as the Houthi missile attack starkly reminded everyone, are crucial for their shared security interest in confronting Iran and its proxies and preventing them from dominating the region.
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