Is Germany Ready to Take Space Seriously? Requirements for Germany’s First Space Security Strategy

By admin On Sep 16, 2024

A war that begins with a cyber attack on an American company on Earth to disrupt a foreign military’s satellite-based communications, hectic scenes aboard the International Space Station after a satellite is shot down, and a billionaire who now controls more than half of all active satellites: What at first glance looks like the plot of the next James Bond movie is actually a snapshot of recent reality, highlighting how the use of space has changed in recent years.

The dependence and vulnerability of digitally networked societies and modern militaries on space-based services continue to grow — and with that the potential for conflict and escalation. At the same time, international regulation of the use of space lags far behind political and technological developments. With space becoming ever more critical as a key enabler of multi-domain operations, a potential future battlefield, and a means of projecting power, geopolitical competition on Earth has spread to space.

As more nations and commercial actors venture beyond the atmosphere and the number of satellites rapidly increases, states are competing to achieve milestones in civil space, promoting their national space industries, and expanding their military space programs. This often goes hand in hand with the development of counterspace capabilities, such as weapons and technologies designed to deny adversaries the use of their space-based data, products, and services. These counterspace technologies range from reversible jamming of communications or global positioning service signals and cyber attacks on space systems to more destructive measures like kinetic anti-satellite weapons. These were demonstrated by Russia in November 2021, when it shot down one of its defunct satellites with a ballistic missile, generating thousands of pieces of debris. High-powered microwaves or lasers, such as the Russian Peresvet system, also aim to disrupt or destroy satellites. More recently, co-orbital weapons systems have become a growing concern to NATO allies, whether in the form of rendezvous and proximity operations by inspector satellites like Russia’s Luch 2 satellite or Moscow’s reported plans to put a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon in space. So far, there is no comprehensive international consensus in sight to curb the arms race that is already looming over our heads.

In this highly contested, congested, and competitive environment, Germany should position itself as a responsible and capable actor to address both the changing security environment in outer space and the centrality of space-based capabilities for security and defense. The post-Ukraine watershed in Germany’s strategic thinking has led to a number of significant changes in Berlin’s security and defense policy. It should also apply to space. Germany cannot achieve its self-imposed goal of being “a guarantor of European security” with the “best-equipped force in Europe” without finally fully recognizing the security dimension of space.

Despite some encouraging steps in recent years, Berlin still has a number of challenges to overcome before it can play the ambitious role it aspires to. Germany’s first-ever Space Security Strategy, due later this year, will thus provide an overdue opportunity to actively advance Germany’s role in space security and as a reliable partner, but only if it puts the necessary conditions in place. These include a clear strategic vision based on a realistic assessment of risks and threats, the prioritization of security in Germany’s overall approach to space, the provision of sufficient expertise, financial resources, and the necessary capabilities for the German Armed Forces, greater involvement of commercial actors, and close cooperation with international partners. More important, all this requires the necessary political will to implement a new strategy.

Background

Germany has a promising scientific and industrial base, including leading research institutions like the Fraunhofer Institute for High-Frequency Physics and Radar Techniques, which developed the ground-based GESTRA radar system for monitoring objects in low Earth orbit. While the United States remains the dominant force in the global space industry, Germany’s growing space sector, consisting of established companies like Airbus Defense and Space or OHB SE and a number of start-ups such as Isar Aerospace and Rocket Factory specializing in microlaunchers, is internationally competitive in key technologies.

Germany is also internationally recognized among military space powers, as evidenced by its participation in exclusive cooperation formats and military exercises. It regularly takes part in the Schriever Wargame and joined the U.S.-led Combined Space Operations Initiative in 2019, which aims to improve multilateral cooperation in space operations, the resilience of critical space infrastructure, and space situational awareness. Germany has also been invited to join the U.S. Space Command’s Operation Olympic Defender alongside France and New Zealand to bolster deterrence and prepare for conflict in space. Like Paris, Berlin has yet to formally commit — but would be wise to do so in order to address the heightened security environment in space and to intensify operational cooperation with its closest allies.

Given Germany’s strong civilian, economic, and military dependence on space and the associated vulnerabilities, the Bundeswehr views the use of space as a permanent operational task (Dauereinsatzaufgabe). This includes supporting missions with space-based capabilities, conducting space operations, providing space situational awareness, and protecting critical space infrastructure. To this end, the Bundeswehr operates its own satellite systems: SATCOMBw for communications and SARah for radar reconnaissance. In 2017, the Federal Ministry of Defense outlined key objectives in the classified Strategic Guidelines for Space. In July 2021, the Bundeswehr established a Military Space Command under the responsibility of the German Air Force to centralize space-based capabilities and services, pool expertise, and provide a central anchor point for international cooperation.

Despite recent progress, however, Berlin has yet to fully grasp the overall strategic and, in particular, security dimension of space compared to the United States or European partners such as France or the United Kingdom. Depending on whom one talks to in government, military, and industry circles, a limited understanding of the importance of space in society and politics, a dominant focus on the scientific and economic rather than the security dimension of the new space race, cuts in national budgets, and disagreements between federal ministries over priorities and the distribution of funds are among the factors that have so far hampered Germany’s approach to space security.

In its 2022 National Security Strategy, the German government has therefore rightly committed itself to finally placing “a stronger focus on space as a strategic dimension.” In this context, Germany is currently developing its first space security strategy under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Federal Foreign Office, which is expected to be presented in late 2024. Germany is thus following in the footsteps of partners such as France (2019), the United States (2020), the United Kingdom (2022), as well as NATO (2019), and, more recently, the European Union (2023) in recognizing space’s growing significance for security.

A Clear Positioning Is Required

While the updated National Space Strategy, presented in the fall of 2023, outlines nine central but predominantly civilian fields of action for German space policy, the forthcoming space security strategy offers the opportunity to focus on the strategic and military dimension. Although little known in the public debate, “attacks to, from or within space” could trigger NATO’s Article 5. The strategy should therefore be based on a realistic analysis of security-related trends, threats, and dependencies and, building on this, define a clear position by setting out Germany’s interests, objectives, and level of ambition. Of course, Germany’s role in space will be based on its commitment to multilateral cooperation within the European Union and NATO. This means balancing cooperation for deterrence and defense within NATO and with the United States on the one hand and the European Union on the other. Washington will remain the Alliance’s primary provider of space assets for the foreseeable future, while the E.U.’s aspirations for strategic autonomy and reduced external dependencies are underscored by the IRIS² program to establish its own satellite-based communications system.

National approaches to space security can vary due to differences in threat assessments and space capabilities, particularly with regard to the role of offensive space capabilities. The U.S. 2020 Defense Space Strategy defines space as a “warfighting domain” of critical importance in the Great Power rivalry with China and Russia. By expanding its “space power,” which includes diplomatic, economic, and military means, the United States seeks to ensure its superiority over its competitors in space. Comparable assessments of the deteriorating security situation in space can be found in the British and French strategies, with France considering actively defending its own space systems with offensive capabilities if necessary — a stance not universally shared in Europe.

What is Germany’s position? In keeping with Germany’s strategic culture, Berlin has so far been reluctant to position itself clearly in this geopolitical climate: According to then Federal Minister of Defense Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, German military space operations should rightly be exclusively defensive in nature, and diplomatically the government is committed to norms and principles of responsible behavior to prevent conflict in space. However, this should not preclude an unbiased examination of the capabilities the Bundeswehr needs to defend itself and fulfill its mission, nor a clear positioning in this geopolitical space race alongside the United States and like-minded partners as Germany’s most important security allies.

Prerequisites to Be Met

The federal government should not only define Germany’s strategic approach to space security in the strategy, but also lay the foundations for creating the necessary conditions to achieve the defined goals. Instead of continuing to view space as an isolated and subordinate domain, the space security strategy should help to better integrate the security relevance of space as a cross-cutting issue into overarching political and strategic considerations.

Here, too, Germany’s familiar problems in other policy areas have become apparent: a whole-of-government approach that only works to a limited extent, a lack of cross-agency funding approaches, and the challenge of reconciling the ongoing modernization of space systems with ever-faster innovation cycles in the face of still lengthy and notoriously inert military procurement processes. Due to the predominantly commercial and research-oriented nature of German space projects, traditionally the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action has the lead in developing the German government’s approach to space. In recent years, more informal bodies have been set up to improve interagency decision-making on security issues: an interministerial steering group on the use of space and space security at the directorate-general level and a space security coordination team for situation assessment and early crisis management in the event of space incidents. Ideally, the strategy paper should inspire better institutional coordination of decision-making and distribution of resources, possibly through a national space council along the lines of the U.S. model. This would enable Berlin to prioritize security aspects, to synchronize Germany’s civil, commercial, and security policy activities with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, and to counteract the current diffusion of responsibilities through clear processes and allocation of competencies.

To strengthen Germany’s resilience and ability to act, more funding, broader expertise, and technology-driven civil-military procurement concepts are needed. Key areas include SATCOM (e.g., by increasing the data transmission capacities or exploiting space-based laser communications), space situational awareness and space domain awareness (e.g., by establishing with partners a permanent sensor network with global coverage to monitor near-Earth and geostationary orbits and advancing the Bundeswehr’s synthetic aperture radar technology), and responsive space, leveraging insights from the German Responsive Space Cluster Competence Center, to explore, for instance, alternative launch capabilities.

Similar to Germany’s past experiences (and difficulties) in securing specific expertise for the cyber realm, it is important to recruit and train qualified personnel for the space domain. Space expertise must be developed and, above all, retained in military careers over the long term. The promotion of engineering sciences with a focus on space technology, but also nontechnical areas such as space law and security policy, should be a starting point. The United States and the United Kingdom have established specialized training centers, the U.S. Space Force Space Training and Readiness Command and the Space Academy. As a first step, it would be advisable for Germany to integrate the space domain more strongly into training with a view to space operations and combat support. Cooperative training and exchange formats with allies through liaison elements should be expanded and attractive civilian and military career models be created within the armed forces.

Recent cuts to the national space program’s budget for innovation and international cooperation — over 10 percent from €371 million (about $410 million) in 2023 to €333 million ($368 million) in 2024 and a further 12 percent reduction to €291 million ($321 million) in the recently proposed 2025 budget, which still does not include any space security positions — alongside the generally inadequate defense budget to meaningfully expand military space capabilities, notwithstanding the €100 billion ($110 billion) special fund for the Bundeswehr, send negative signals both domestically and internationally. Despite its often-stated ambition to be a leading (military) space player, Germany risks slipping further into the European midfield if this financial decline continues.

Commercial Stakeholder Engagement

The role of Elon Musk’s Starlink for the Ukrainian people and military in the war, which has already been characterized as the “first commercial space war,” underscores the increasing relevance of commercial actors in national security, not least due to the dual-use nature of space technology. This places a priority on finding ways to foster a competitive domestic space industrial ecosystem and research landscape, control of key technologies, and security of raw materials and the supply chain through measures like stricter export controls and foreign investment screening. Compared to other spacefaring nations, there is still considerable untapped potential in Germany for involving commercial actors as key drivers of innovation. Best practice examples from the United States and other countries can provide insights on how to improve public-private cooperation and to better align the development of space capabilities with military needs. As a potential option, the 2023 National Space Strategy announced a space innovation hub to improve synergies between the public sector and private providers of space services and streamline procurement processes. While the hub is yet to be established, the involvement of the German Armed Forces is essential and should be guaranteed.

Ultimately, enhancing the capabilities and the resilience of critical space infrastructure, which should be regulated to cover all components of space systems and not just the ground segment as is currently the case, requires effective public-private cooperation that can reconcile government requirements with business realities. The space security strategy should therefore not only address the importance of involving commercial actors, but also identify and enable the necessary conditions for practical implementation. These could include anchor contracts with German suppliers, fewer bureaucratic hurdles and faster procurement processes, higher participation rates for small and medium-sized enterprises, or the long-overdue adoption of a German space law to create legal and investment security for both the state and the private sector.

Responsible and Sustainable Use of Space

The sustainable, peaceful, and responsible use of space is a central pillar of German policy in line with the integrated security approach that the strategy is intended to reflect. Despite its infinity, space is a limited resource for mankind, currently endangered by the race for available orbits and frequencies, but most of all by space debris. This calls for a clear commitment to international law in space, promoting a behavior-based approach to prevent conflict, and building consensus on international norms with like-minded partners. Germany’s commitment to follow the U.S. initiative and refrain from destructive anti-satellite direct-ascent weapons tests is an important diplomatic signal. In addition, Germany should actively promote space debris prevention measures within the European Union and NATO, and through more operational formats such as the Combined Space Operations Initiative, by, inter alia, intensifying the exchange of information, promoting transparency of space activities for escalation management, or playing an active role in shaping the anticipated E.U. space law and space traffic management guidelines. In light of the almost insurmountable differences in advancing international space law or creating binding treaties, the space security strategy should identify alternative forms of arms control in terms of transparency and confidence-building measures. Finally, the issue of equitable access to space should not be ignored so that space is also available to less advanced spacefaring nations as a global common good, as envisioned in the Outer Space Treaty, rather than to a few on the basis of first-mover advantages.

Ultimately, however, the presentation of the space security strategy is not enough. Rather, it should provide the necessary impetus to initiate a broader debate in Germany on the strategic relevance of space, to raise awareness of vulnerabilities and threats, and to expand space-specific expertise in politics, ministries, think tanks, science, and society. Without greater space literacy, strategic thinking fully adapted to the new geopolitical realities, and the sufficient political will at the relevant levels to implement the necessary measures, it will not be possible to successfully address the many challenges and be a reliable partner. Given the increasing dynamics in space, Germany can no longer afford to remain on the sidelines when it comes to space security.

Andrea Rotter is the head of the foreign and security policy division and the deputy director of the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs at the Hanns Seidel Foundation, a think tank based in Munich, Germany. She is also a member of the extended board of Women in International Security Germany. This article expresses the personal opinion of the author.

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