On October 7, 2023, Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement, conducted an unprecedented attack on Israel. This raised the legitimate question of why Hamas did it, knowing well the expected Israeli response. In what follows, I will stress a point that is overlooked in many instances in the West regarding religious certainty, which provided the Hamas leadership with the rationale and the courage to go for October 7.
The responsibility of the attack undoubtedly lies with Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas. A main reason is that the belief system of a fundamentally religious organization is binding for all, thereby ensuring the total obedience of the military commanders, such as the head of the military wing, Mohammed Deif, and his deputy Marwan Issa. For a valid explanation of what happened, we need therefore to look at no more than at Sinwar’s motivations.
Sinwar may have underestimated Hamas’s capabilities, thinking that the Israeli casualties would be limited, thereby not warranting a large military action. Or he may have miscalculated about the extent of the Israeli response, thinking that it would be restrained due to the local tensions in Israel and the expected high casualties of a large military operation. But a point that is overlooked in many instances in the West is that unquestionable belief in Islam was a main driver, providing the Hamas leadership with the rationale and the courage to go for October 7.
In an interview with Sky News Arabia last February, Esmat Mansour, a former cellmate of Yahya Sinwar in the Israeli jail,, claimed that “if Sinwar knew what the consequences of the assault would be, he would never have planned an operation this way.” In the same vein, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Yasser Abed Rabbo, a senior PLO leader, said that the operation was perhaps meant to be a limited one, involving the capture of some soldiers and minor clashes. However, this view is not consistent with the forces mobilized for the operation, the intensive training conducted in Gaza and abroad, and the instructions given to incur maximum casualties among the Israelis.
The forces that implemented October 7 involved about 3,000 fighters, hundreds of them received specialized combat training in Iran. They were equipped with thermobaric grenades, which can quickly cause massive fires in a home, and they had enough ammunition and food to keep going for days. Also, according to some reports, the instructions were to “kill as many people and take as many hostages as possible.” The reasonable assumption is therefore that Hamas leaders did intend to cause maximum casualties, but they may have underestimated the extent of the Israeli response, anticipating a limited engagement akin to previous wars. As an example, Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, admitted that they did not anticipate the severity of Israel’s response, even though it was consistent with the military strategy of the Hebrew state based on built on three pillars: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. A more reasonable explanation is that Sinwar accepted the consequences, convinced that the political gains will outweigh the losses.
crushing defeat of the Israeli army, arguing that despite the tactical losses, Hamas still had the upper hand, and that international pressure would force Israel to end the war. In the same vein, according to a recent document published by the German newspaper Bild dating to Spring 2024, and which has been approved by Yahya Sinwar personally, the Hamas leadership is not seeking a quick end to the war despite the losses incurred by the organization and Gazan civilians.
While we may never know the reasons that led Hamas leaders to authorize an attack that will most likely lead to the destruction of the organization, religious certainty seems to be the key motivation, guaranteeing gains for Muslims even in the face of a military defeat. Moreover, the recent appointment of Yahya Sinwar as head of Hamas’ Political Bureau put an end to the rivalries between the military and political wings of the movement, and strengthened Iran’s influence. Therefore, Sinwar is in no hurry to end the war as was reported by the German newspaper Bild, nor will he accept Netanyahu’s recent offer of safe passage to flee to Egypt. Like Hitler before him, he will prefer to be killed in his bunker. Any ceasefire will only be short-term to allow for the organization to regroup and rearm. Soon after that, the religious certainty that was at the source of October 7 will provide Hamas leadership with the motivation and courage to restart a new cycle of violence.
Mohamed Bechri is a former professor at the University of Tunisia, his forthcoming book: Letter to the Muslim Nation.
Image: DrRandomFactor
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