If this isn’t a war, what exactly is it?
An-Nahar, Lebanon, Sept. 13
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We are nearing the precipice of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. This alarming prediction was made by a senior Lebanese official involved in the diplomatic talks that have taken place following Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr on July 30. Despite Hezbollah’s grandiose threats, the actual response fell short. Hezbollah’s retaliation involved an attack of 340 basic missiles and six drones, none of which hit their publicly announced targets as declared by the party’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah.
Nasrallah’s rhetoric has noticeably softened since his initial speech after Shukr’s assassination, signaling a need to temper expectations within both Lebanon and the broader Iranian-aligned factions across the region. The narrative has shifted from ambitions of “destroying Israel” to merely preventing an Israeli victory. A review of Nasrallah’s speeches over the years reveals a stark contrast between the rhetoric and actual actions of Iranian leaders and their allies.
The outcomes of recent conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran’s responses to numerous strikes in Syria and Iraq, have been inconsistent and unremarkable. Indeed, the Aqsa Flood operation carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7 took Israel by surprise, revealing the intensity of Palestinian resistance. However, it also opened the floodgates for the most extreme Israeli operation in Gaza, resulting in the deaths and injuries of approximately 150,000 Palestinians and the destruction of vital civilian infrastructure. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially sought to force a large-scale Palestinian exodus from Gaza into the Sinai Peninsula, the firm stances of Egypt and Jordan thwarted this aspiration.
Nonetheless, this setback did not prevent the continued devastation of Gaza and the severe restrictions imposed on the West Bank, framed by the Israeli government as a “Second War of Independence,” echoing their narrative from the 1948 conflict, which Palestinians and Arabs call the “Nakba.” Interestingly, early in the Gaza conflict, officials in Iran suggested that Hamas’s operation was a response to the 2020 assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani by the US. Some Iranian media figures speculated that the attack was also a reaction to the Indian-Arab-European economic corridor project announced in Delhi in August 2023, which includes a route through Israel.
Additionally, it was posited that the operation aimed to disrupt the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Israel, a possibility hinted at by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a September 2023 interview with Fox News. These insights reveal the complex nature of the current Middle Eastern conflict, centered on Gaza and potentially extending to Lebanon.
Currently, Lebanon appears poised to be the next battleground. While some dismiss the notion of an all-out war, believing the conflict to be one with a definable time horizon rather than boundless escalation, the reality is that an unprecedented year-long war is unfolding. In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s war began with limited attacks aimed at unsettling Israel while it conducted its operation in Gaza, while avoiding a broader conflict.
However, since February 2024, following unsuccessful American and French diplomatic efforts to broker a ceasefire, Israel’s actions have escalated dangerously. Israeli strikes have intensified in scale and violence, culminating in the assassinations of Shukr in Beirut and Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. These assassinations followed Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, where he met US leadership, including President Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump.
Hezbollah’s ineffective response and Iran’s reluctance to escalate have exacerbated the situation, resulting in increased Israeli operations in the West Bank and southern Lebanon. Israeli forces have systematically destroyed new areas in southern Lebanon and displaced an estimated 140,000 people. The destruction of residential areas has surged, with over 25% more damage compared to the period before August. Concurrently, Israel has targeted weapons depots and missile platforms across the south while continuing its assassination strategy.
International efforts to avert an Israeli-Hezbollah war have diminished, leaving both sides on a collision course. Hezbollah insiders now acknowledge the increasing likelihood of a large-scale conflict in Lebanon imminently. Hezbollah’s media now discuss scenarios of an Israeli war in Lebanon and Syria. Ultimately, Hezbollah can no longer rely on slogans of “support” and “liberation” to disguise the impending crisis. What looms is a potential war of survival, threatening to deplete a significant portion of Hezbollah’s military and morale. As tensions remain high, this conflict could persist indefinitely. – Ali Hamada
Harris won the debate. Now what?
Al-Ittihad, UAE, Sept. 12
Kamala Harris clinched a pivotal victory in the debate against Donald Trump last week. Remarkably, even some of Trump’s staunchest supporters conceded that their candidate performed poorly. As we ponder whether another debate will take place, the implications for Harris’s polling numbers are yet to become clear. The answer, however, should reveal itself shortly. Harris faced an uphill battle on debate night.
Unlike Trump, who has been a fixture in national debates since 2016, Harris had to introduce herself to a broader American audience and meet three critical benchmarks. First, she needed to demonstrate her competence in leading the country and acting as commander-in-chief, addressing issues such as economic policy, national security, and immigration control. Second, she had to prove she could stand up to Trump, known for his aggressive tactics against opponents, particularly women. Third, she needed to carve out her own identity, distinct from the Biden administration, while still offering a fresh, youthful vision to an electorate weary of “old white men.”
Immediate reactions to Harris’s performance indicate she met these challenges head-on. She refused to let Trump intimidate her. Instead, she took the offensive, challenging and mocking his statements, some of which were so outrageous that her mere expressions sufficed to undermine them. A striking example of this was Trump’s baseless claim that illegal immigrants from Haiti are kidnapping, killing, and eating their neighbors’ cats and dogs.
Observers are curious about how Harris will navigate complex foreign policy issues, such as the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and relationships with international leaders. Here too, Trump appeared to fall into Harris’s well-laid trap. She candidly addressed Ukraine, asserting that the US and its allies are committed to Ukraine’s victory over Russia. In contrast, Trump dodged the question, claiming he could end the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza “overnight,” even before taking office in January 2025. On the delicate matter of Israel-Palestine relations, Harris struck a careful balance to avoid alienating either side, while Trump recklessly accused her of “hating Israel” and predicted Israel’s demise under her presidency within two years.
Harris’s meticulous preparation was evident, successfully provoking Trump into angry outbursts, particularly when she ridiculed the size of his campaign rallies, his role in the January 6 Capitol attack, and his inconsistent claims of the US being a failed state on the brink of World War III. With Election Day still weeks away, and early voting already beginning in some states, both campaigns will zero in on swing voters in key battleground states. The next fortnight will be crucial in determining whether the debate will shift the race’s dynamics.
If either side perceives a downward trend in their poll standings, they might push for a second debate. The Republicans hope their candidate can improve his performance, while Harris’s team may prefer to avoid another face-off unless they are supremely confident of replicating their success from September 10. A significant development in the US economy or an international crisis might compel them to revisit their strategies. Absent such events, the Harris campaign will likely continue to leverage debate footage as a strategic propaganda tool, aiming to portray Trump as increasingly old and irritable to the electorate. – Geoffrey Kemp
Egypt & Saudi Arabia: The Arab nation’s beating heart
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, Sept. 15
King Abdulaziz Al Saud declared long ago, “The Arabs cannot do without Egypt, and Egypt cannot do without the Arabs.” This profound statement underscores the unique nature of Egyptian-Saudi relations, with Egypt serving as a strategic depth for Saudi Arabia and vice versa.
The two nations have historically maintained close ties, rooted in a deep, mutual dependence. Egypt has consistently stood alongside Riyadh through every pivotal moment, while Saudi Arabia, in turn, has always offered unwavering support to Cairo through crises and turbulent events in the Middle East. This steadfast partnership is an indisputable fact, evidenced by the enduring bond that dates back to the Treaty of Friendship in 1936.
Under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Egyptian-Saudi relations have flourished. The frequency of visits between leaders of the two nations has increased, and cooperation has expanded to include military, economic, and investment sectors. Numerous agreements have fortified their strategic partnership, making Saudi Arabia Egypt’s largest trading partner in the Middle East.
Despite occasional differences in viewpoints, the historical relations have proven resilient, providing a model of solidarity that others can emulate. The strong historical and popular ties, coupled with shared interests, have imbued these relations with a unique character. The necessity of cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia is driven not only by regional challenges but also by the bilateral development ambitions outlined in their respective national visions. Egypt’s large-scale national projects present attractive opportunities for Saudi investments, particularly in the green economy, technology, and renewable energy production.
The stability and strength of Egyptian-Saudi relations are undeniable. Together, they form the beating heart of the Arab nation and possess an extraordinary capability to navigate and resolve the Middle East’s crises. The ongoing tensions and potential for conflict in the region, exacerbated by Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, underscore the critical need for cooperation. The depth of their ties and the solid foundations they rest upon paint a promising future for both nations.
History tells us that Egypt and Saudi Arabia prioritize consultation, communication, and coordination on all bilateral and regional issues. Enhancing their economic partnership is an urgent necessity, especially given the persistent efforts by certain parties to undermine their relationship and weaken both nations, as well as the broader Arab world. Recognizing these challenges, there is a clear need to shield and fortify their alliance.
As cornerstones of Arab and regional security, recent political and diplomatic initiatives reflect the growing desire to deepen relations further. These moves are a testament to their ability to address shared security challenges, counter cybercrimes, and enhance capabilities through the exchange of expertise. The recent strides towards bolstering cooperation align with the economic and investment policies implemented by the Egyptian government. These policies aim to attract Arab and foreign investments with positive signals to the business community, including a package of tax incentives designed to improve investor relations with the Tax Authority and stimulate business activity.
The objective is to make investors feel valued, overcome tax-related obstacles, and ultimately enhance productivity and economic growth, thereby fostering a more robust macroeconomic structure reliant on production, export, and foreign trade.
In conclusion, strengthening Egyptian-Saudi relations during this critical period in Middle Eastern history stands as a political and diplomatic triumph. Egyptian-Saudi relations are stable and solid, forming the beating heart of the Arab nation with a unique capacity to resolve the many crises plaguing our region. – Majed Mounir
10 years of Houthi-Iranian presence in Yemen
Al Rai, Kuwait, Sept. 13
It is astonishing to think that the Houthis have maintained control over parts of Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, for an entire decade. This situation has become an unavoidable reality requiring acknowledgment and response. It also highlights a facet of American foreign policy failure, rooted in a historical underestimation of the Houthi movement’s growth in Yemen and its close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
This failure further underscores Iran’s adeptness at capitalizing on the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab region to further its own ambitions. Yemen, where the Muslim Brotherhood orchestrated a coup against Ali Abdullah Saleh, stands as a prime example of Iran’s strategic manipulation and exploitation of opportunities to infiltrate crucial Arab nations like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with the intent of destabilizing them from within. This political entity now serves as a strategic foothold for Iran in the Arabian Peninsula, functioning as an Iranian military base in one of the ongoing conflicts prosecuted by the Islamic Republic.
Through its maneuvers in the Yemen conflict and its involvement in Gaza, Iran aims to demonstrate to the world, especially the US, that it holds the decisive influence in the region. On this day in 2014, the Houthis were advancing on Sanaa after conquering the Amran Governorate, a region where the remnants of the Yemeni Army were expected to make a stand. They successfully dismantled the influence of the al-Ahmar family, leaders of the Hashid – a once-significant Yemeni tribe whose importance waned after the death of Sheikh Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar in 2007.
Subsequently, the Houthis neutralized the 310th Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Hameed Al-Qushaibi, reputedly one of the best-equipped units in the Yemeni army. This occurred with the tacit approval of the interim president at the time, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Hadi made a point to visit the 310th Brigade’s headquarters immediately following its defeat by Ansar Allah, mistakenly believing he could rally their support to stabilize his precarious position. He failed to grasp that the Houthis, backed by Iranian strategy, had long-range plans dating back to the overthrow Saleh’s regime, culminating in his resignation in February 2012 and the subsequent accession of his deputy to the presidency.
Long before the coup against Saleh, US policy in Yemen exhibited a persistent underestimation of the Houthi threat, which is intrinsically an Iranian threat. The American focus remained on al-Qaeda, which, while undeniably dangerous, was not a threat of greater magnitude than the evolving Houthi movement – especially from the moment Saleh was ousted until the fall of Sanaa and the concurrent takeover of Hudaydah Port on the Red Sea. American policy, particularly since the October 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Aden port, orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, concentrated on al-Qaeda’s activities and their links with Yemeni political and security factions.
From the Cole bombing to the current Houthi disruptions of Red Sea navigation, American policy towards the Houthis has been overly simplistic, if not downright foolish. The US failed to recognize the Houthi menace, even when they engaged in direct conflict with Saleh in late 2004 or eventually killed him in late 2017. American leniency towards the Houthis contributed to their ascendancy in Sanaa and their subsequent endorsement by the UN.
The date September 14, 2014, will remain a pivotal one in modern Yemeni history. On that day, a new regime emerged over part of Yemeni territory, controlled by the Islamic Republic. The future trajectory for the residents of these controlled areas remains uncertain. Over the past decade, however, this regime has effectively eradicated more than one generation of Yemeni youths, conditioning them to bear arms instead of pursuing education. The US, alongside the Muslim Brotherhood—whose actions led to the ousting of Saleh without fully grasping the consequences – shares considerable responsibility.
This is not to exonerate the former Yemeni president from his numerous mistakes. Notably, the actions of the Brotherhood have inadvertently benefited the Houthis – and by extension, Iran. Through all this, the US remains a passive observer, undervaluing Yemen’s strategic significance, seemingly indifferent to the prospect of northern Yemen transforming into an Iranian military outpost, staffed predominantly by teenagers armed with Kalashnikovs, ignorant of their own homeland’s heritage.
A fundamental question lingers after 10 years of Houthi rule in Sanaa: Have they succeeded in completely dismantling Yemen’s tribal structure, or does the tribe still retain a role that might resurface in a society far more resilient to change than Iran anticipates? – Kheirallah Kheirallah
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.
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