Hezbollah’s ambitions now contribute to its vulnerability
An-Nahar, Lebanon, September 20
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The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant informed American officials that Israel felt compelled to utilize military action to return its citizens to the North. An unnamed American official was cited stating that “US presidential envoy Amos Hochstein pleaded with Netanyahu not to wage war on Lebanon.” More critically, as highlighted by the well-informed American newspaper, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin communicated his grave concerns to senior Pentagon leaders about the looming threat of an Israeli ground operation in Lebanon.
Reflecting on Israel’s pager operation against Hezbollah, which resulted in over 3,500 casualties within Hezbollah, one can see that Israel’s strategic calculations have changed drastically. The stability that Hezbollah once sought, based on prior rules of engagement, is no longer tenable. The low-intensity warfare intended to wear down Israel is now uncontrollable, particularly after Israel’s daring operation and the earlier assassination of military commander Fouad Shukr in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Israel has moved decisively toward expanding the conflict, which, if not an outright war, could escalate into a significant and perilous confrontation imminently.
Hezbollah would do well to consider the internal dynamics within Israel. Unfortunately for the group, major divisions within Israeli society have faded when it comes to Hezbollah. A majority of Israeli public opinion now supports decisive action against Hezbollah. The shock of the October 7 attacks, combined with the threat posed by Hezbollah’s growing strength at the Israeli border, galvanized public conviction that peaceful coexistence with an Iranian-backed Hezbollah is untenable.
The aftermath of the Gaza Strip conflicts and Hamas has led to a radical shift in Israel’s stance on threats emanating from Lebanon. Since the major war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Lebanon had been off the domestic Israeli political radar.
However, current conditions could quickly spiral into a devastating war that would be catastrophically destructive for both sides. The disparity in capabilities between Israel and Hezbollah is stark. While Hezbollah can inflict significant damage on Israel, Israel’s military might is formidable enough to crush Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. The asymmetric balance Hezbollah aims to create in a protracted low-intensity conflict is unrealistic. Hezbollah’s missile arsenal, whether outdated or advanced, cannot counter Israel’s deployment of precision weapons with enormous destructive capacity, such as the Mark 80 series bombs.
If Hezbollah and Iran are banking on Israel’s reluctance for prolonged conflict, the ongoing Gaza war and prolonged skirmishes with Hezbollah, lasting almost a year now, should prompt a reassessment. Following October 7, Israel’s conflicts have become existential, overshadowing internal political disputes. Hezbollah may have gravely miscalculated by unilaterally initiating a war of attrition against Israel, aiming for a controlled, limited conflict. The changing strategic calculus returned control of the confrontation pattern and intensity to Israel. This shift leaves Hezbollah reacting instead of steering the conflict. Recently, Hezbollah tested new warfare tactics that eschew missiles or suicide drones, but it remains at the mercy of Israel, which now dictates the engagement scope.
Hezbollah staunchly refuses to retreat from its reckless engagement in its “war of support,” heightening risks to itself and Lebanon at large. The escalating operations – first the pager operation and then the walkie-talkies – underscore the precariousness of the situation.
With the United States seemingly losing hope in persuading Hezbollah to cease hostilities or in forming a coherent Lebanese stance to pressure Hezbollah, it is unlikely to oppose a wide-scale Israeli offensive in Lebanon. Despite calls for restraint, the US might covertly approve a severe blow to Hezbollah due to the threat it poses to American and regional interests, accentuating the conflict between Western-aligned, Israel-led security interests and an adept Iranian military proxy.
Hezbollah’s ambitions now contribute to its vulnerability. Its significant presence and role as Iran’s vanguard in the region provoke concerns that transcend Lebanon, affecting regional and possibly international stability. Hence, protecting Hezbollah within the current regional security framework is infeasible. While Iran’s influence will persist, it will not remain an indefinite destabilizing force.
Hezbollah’s current war might signal the end of the group as it currently exists. If a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah erupts, it will stem not just from Hezbollah’s current reckless ventures but from its substantial role at a time when the region is being reshaped.
The forthcoming conflict will go beyond mere displays of bravery; Hezbollah needs to understand that it will not resemble the Syrian war, where, with Russian intervention and tacit American approval, it secured a degree of success. Now, it faces a coalition of major international and regional powers intent on ending a dated phenomenon. Consequently, Hezbollah must adopt a posture of humility, acknowledging the vast and shifting geopolitical landscape it confronts. – Ali Hamada
Is Iran interested in a deal?
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, September 22
When examining the intricate daily occurrences in Gaza and recently in Lebanon, it is crucial to keep an eye on the broader picture in the Middle East, which remains deeply volatile. A new reality is forcefully imposing itself on us.
Iran, which continues its negotiations with the United States in an unspecified third country, has experienced significant setbacks among its regional proxies. This includes the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran during an official visit.
Iran’s stance recalls the mentality of an old Isfahani merchant haggling in a bazaar: It’s a time for deals. The new Iranian president’s statements, tinged with unexpected warmth toward the “Great Satan,” America, underscore the prevailing pragmatic political climate.
Consequently, Hamas and Hezbollah have been “left” to their own devices in their confrontation with Israel. Iran’s excuses range from Hamas failing to coordinate operations in October to asserting that Hezbollah doesn’t require external defense.
This viewpoint is further supported by the Syrian regime’s complete silence regarding the upheavals facing Hezbollah, its crucial ally. Syrian President Bashar Assad seems to have recognized that some powers have decided to sacrifice Hezbollah, making its defense a futile endeavor that Syria cannot afford, particularly given Iran’s tepid stance and Russia’s financial strain from the war in Ukraine.
The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Esmail Qaani, who succeeded Qasem Soleimani, was deeply involved in supporting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and even managed to recruit Salafi-jihadist movements for their cause, similar to previous indirect actions by the IRGC in Syria. However, recent developments indicate that Iran has withdrawn its support from Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran seems intent on securing a deal that would lift its economic sanctions, attract foreign investment, and maintain its allies as influential political entities in their respective countries. There is undoubtedly a price for such a deal, and the unfolding scenes in the Middle East seem to bear this out. – Hussein Shobokshi
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.
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