What does conventional arms control mean for how wars end? Even the longest wars terminate, and many conflicts end with some kind of agreement, even if it is unconditional surrender. Yet the term unconditional surrender is, itself, misleading, although what differentiates surrendering from negotiating a surrender’s conditions may be a matter of degrees. Countries that surrender entirely are still surrendering with the understanding that conventional warfare will end: Cities will no longer be bombed, troops will no longer be shot at, and sieges will be lifted. When modern wars end, whether in victory and defeat, or in stalemate, countries often agree to conventional arms control. At the same time, the road to victory for one side and defeat for the other is often guided by notions of conventional arms control. That is, countries will seek to impose controls on their enemies while avoiding controls on themselves. As we think about how the Russo-Ukrainian War may end, and as each interested country thinks about how they would like it to end, conventional arms control should figure prominently in our calculations. This commentary will discuss specific options and possibilities on how conventional arms control may look when the conflict ends.
The war is due in no small part to conventional arms control failures, as I have argued in the past. Based on both the history of how conflicts end, and the root causes of this war, it is likely that conventional arms control will figure significantly in when and how the conflict is ended and what follows. At the risk of oversimplifying, there are three possible end-states to the war: Russia wins, Ukraine wins, or a stalemate. However, a total victory for Russia has different implications than a Ukrainian victory. A Russian victory means that Ukraine surrenders and concedes to Russian demands, while a Ukrainian victory will largely mean that Russia withdraws forces and might accept some controls on its military capabilities to the benefit of Ukraine’s security. Thus, the conventional arms control conditions are not the same, because while Russian forces might parade through Kyiv’s Independence Square, Ukrainian forces are not likely to march through Red Square. This means, as I will elaborate on, Russia can compel nearly unlimited conventional arms controls on Ukraine, but it is unlikely that Ukraine can do the same no matter how decisive its victory. Lastly, this commentary is based on the notion that Ukraine is not annexed in full — which is certainly a possibility in the event of a decisive Russian victory — in which case most any notion of post-conflict agreements between Moscow and Kyiv is irrelevant.
Conventional Arms Control Basics
In brief, adversarial conventional arms control focuses on rivalries (past, present, or future) or states in conflict. Conventional arms refer to weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction, and arms control refers to agreements that states establish to regulate military capabilities in some cooperative way. Other types of arms control agreements focus on humanitarian issues or nuclear weapons balancing, both of which differ substantially from adversarial conventional arms control. The last primer on conventional arms control is that there are three approaches: national limitations, narrow geographic demilitarization, and discriminatory measures. The first two generally reflect a balance between adversaries, while the third means that a victorious or stronger country compels a defeated or weaker state to remain significantly weaker.
How Wars End
Almost all wars end in some version of victory, defeat, or stalemate. When arms control measures are negotiated at the end of a conflict, mutual perceptions of the status quo define the bargaining space, and the status quo or its trajectory is usually upheld. That is, the stronger state remains stronger, and the weaker one remains weaker. This makes intuitive sense, but it is important to bear this in mind when conceiving its impact on conventional arms control. Kyiv, Moscow, and all interested parties, whether they support one side or the other or genuinely seek a more neutral peace (Saudi Arabia, China, and others), need to understand what victory or defeat might entail, and that the greater the victory, the more one can demand, and the greater the defeat, the more one has to concede. Conversely, the more one wants to demand, the more decisive their victory needs to be. The less they want to give up in some version of defeat, the less decisive they want their defeat to be.
The implications for how the war ends are significant from a conventional arms control perspective. The defeat and any geographic demilitarization of Russia will make it more vulnerable to attacks by NATO, as presumably there will be no limits on NATO forces in Ukraine — and Ukraine would be in a stronger position to assist NATO in any kind of general war (even without NATO troops in Ukraine). A stalemate with a demilitarized zone approximately along the current front line will create a frozen conflict, leaving both armies outside of limitations and compelling difficult strategic decisions. A Russian victory could significantly increase Russia’s capabilities by disarming Ukraine — leaving it as a potential invasion route into NATO states even if Russia were not to have forces in (unoccupied) Ukraine.
Ukrainian Victory
A Ukrainian victory would involve Russia agreeing to end its invasion and withdraw to pre-2014 borders. Ukraine’s goal thereafter would be to reduce the likelihood of Russia resuming the conflict at a later date, invading again when an opportunity arises. Russia’s goal would be to strike an agreement that ends, among other things, Ukrainian attacks within and incursions into Russia. There are several measures that a defeated Moscow and a victorious Kyiv might agree to reduce this likelihood of Russia attacking again. First, a buffer zone could be established within Russia, setting limits on the number of soldiers permitted within it, prohibitions on weapon systems such as tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and removal of fortifications and defenses. Such impositions on defeated states have been common; for example, in 1947, Italy was compelled to remove “fortifications and military installations along the Franco-Italian frontier, and their armaments”; and in 1999 NATO and Belgrade agreed to a 25-kilometer-deep air safety zone and a 5-kilometer land buffer zone along the Kosovo-Yugoslav border.
A buffer zone within Russia might include Ukrainian and/or international observers — even NATO — to prevent a Russian attack against Ukraine. An unoccupied demilitarized buffer zone in Russia might also be formally subject to Ukrainian occupation in the event that Ukraine believes that Russia is in a state of non-compliance. France and Belgium occupied the demilitarized Ruhr in Germany in 1923–25 when they perceived that Germany was behind in reparations payments. One of the benefits to a Ukrainian-occupied buffer zone in Russia would be that, were Russia to attack, they would have to risk damaging their own territory and killing their own citizens before they entered Ukraine. And, occupied or not, such a zone would give Ukraine warning before Russian forces entered its territory.
Russia might accept limits outside of the immediate border, such as on ballistic missiles of a certain range or prohibitions of naval vessels of a certain size or capability within a certain range of Ukraine or in the Black Sea overall. In 1940, for example, the Soviet Union and Finland agreed to a significant limitation of Finland’s Arctic fleet. Lastly, Ukraine could demand that Russia accept that its military would not be permitted to mass in Belarus.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, they are unlikely to be in a position to impose massive disarmament on the scale that the Allies temporarily accomplished with the Central Powers after World War I, and the Allies had intended to accomplish after World War II.
Russian Victory
A Russian victory would likely mean the disarmament of Ukraine, although there are different scales and approaches to this. The World War I peace treaties offer examples of disarmament short of full occupation. At the end of the war, the Allies established a template that they applied to all of the Central Powers that included limitations on the number of troops, the number and types of naval vessels they could have, prohibitions on weapon systems such as combat aircraft, removal of fortifications, and limits on the defense industries. One significant aspect of the World War I disarmament policies was the establishment of Inter Allied Military Control Commissions. These Allied national–staffed international commissions for army and industry, aeronautical, and naval capabilities were empowered with all-access inspections, and staff were based in the countries where they were inspecting.
The situation at the end of World War II saw the Axis states soundly defeated and, to varying degrees, occupied. Ceasefire and armistice agreements gave the Allies broad authority to basically do what they wanted wherever they wanted. In some cases, conventional arms control was very specific, setting limits along the lines of World War I. In others, they were vague but referred to general disarmament to peacetime levels while stating the supreme decision-making authority of the Allied powers. The September 1943 armistice with Italy, for example, stated that they were committed to “disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief,” and for Bulgaria, the October 1944 armistice stated that “the armed forces must be demobilized and put on a peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission.”
The peace agreements signed in the following decade would be more specific, implementing limitations similar to those of World War I. But with the exceptions of Finland and Austria, the limitations were informally lifted with the Cold War’s onset. Moreover, even during the war itself, disarmament was displaced when defeated Axis states joined the Allies.
Thus, were Russia to successfully overrun most of Ukraine, they might impose a crushing disarmament regime backed up by occupation. They might effectively ban the existence of any Ukrainian military forces, permitting only minimally armed police services. A less complete victory might see Ukraine agree to quantitative limits on weapon systems including naval vessels, combat aircraft, artillery, armored vehicles, and surface-to-air missile systems. Alternatively, an agreement could establish a buffer zone within Ukraine — similar to the one discussed above — only in the case of a Russian victory, the purpose would be to prevent a Ukrainian surprise attack.
Kyiv might also accept a ban on foreign military forces in general (with a possible exception of Russian forces). Indeed, this was a demand made by Russia in Article 4 of its December 2021 proposal to NATO. Similarly, the Kremlin would almost certainly demand Ukraine remain outside of NATO — a repeated demand made even formally shortly before invasion in Article 6 of the December 2021 proposal. Any agreement might see Russia conduct monitoring and verification activities, and they might do so with the support of their partners such as Iran, North Korea, and China.
Stalemate
If the war were to cease today, it would likely be considered a stalemate, because while both sides see a path to victory, they also might be aware that losses and other challenges may preclude victory. A demilitarized buffer zone along the line of contact might be the short-term fix that becomes a banner for a frozen conflict. The most famous, and one of the oldest, post-conflict demilitarized zones is the one sitting between North and South Korea. Other internationally operated buffer zones include ones established in 1974 in Cyprus, in Moldova in 1992, and in Ukraine in 2015.
These types of buffer zones function in a similar fashion. An approximately equal distance from the line of contact is declared demilitarized, prohibiting any military activity within that area other than that conducted or permitted by a neutral international peacekeeping force. The goals are severalfold: ending active combat to give time for diplomacy, separating combatting forces to prevent incidents, and interposing international forces or personnel to deter, usually by diplomatic costs rather than military resistance, attempts to push through the buffer zone and attack the other side.
Moreover, it is possible that there might not be any formal agreement to end the fighting, or an agreement to cease hostilities might be as simple as an agreement to end combat operations, with no commensurate agreement to establish a buffer zone or deploy an international peacekeeping force. Such an approach might decrease the likelihood of a ceasefire enduring, but an agreement may involve minimal commitments if both sides cannot agree on ceasefire-promoting measures.
Broader NATO/E.U.–Russia Implications
The Russo-Ukrainian War clearly involves NATO, and while the impact on any European-wide conventional arms control is uncertain, some points are clear. If Russia wins, it may have demonstrated its willingness to fight until it wins while demonstrating NATO’s weaknesses. In this case, Russia may be positioned to impose limits on NATO — or at least comparatively more limits.
Partly at the heart of the issue is disagreement over relative power and what the status quo implies for conventional arms control. However, if the outcome is clear that one is militarily superior to the other, an imbalanced agreement but one that is not as one-sided as a post-victory/defeat agreement might be the best path to stabilization. Two peacetime agreements that reflected and locked in an unequal balance of power are the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty Five-Power Agreement, which set a ratio of capital ships between the United Kingdom, United States, Japan, France, and Italy at 5:5:3:1:0.75 (respectively), and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval agreement, which fixed the ratio of naval tonnage at 100:35, respectively.
Prior to the war, the Russian proposals to NATO and the United States were favorable to Russia. If Russia prevails, it will be much more likely to have these or similar demands accepted. On the other hand, if Ukraine is victorious, NATO would likely seek to stabilize the relationship with Russia to NATO’s advantage — for example, a treaty with some similarities to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, only instead of a 1:1 ratio of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in five categories of major weapon systems, the ratio might be 2:1. If there is a stalemate, a broader NATO-Russian conventional arms control agreement might seek to simply accept that each side has advantages and disadvantages, but in the interest of stabilizing the relationship, they might accept parity (as in 1990).
Conclusion
The extent to which Russia and Ukraine want to limit the other’s military capabilities at the conflict’s termination will be determined by how the conflict ends, and particularly by which side, if either, is the mutually perceived victor. The victor will be able to make demands that the defeated may be compelled to accept. On the other hand, a stalemate will mean neither side will be able to compel the other to accept major military capabilities limitations, laying the conditions for a frozen conflict or a renewal of violence in the future. Thus, post-conflict conventional arms control forms a basis of Moscow and Kyiv’s strategic military goals, and will likely be a substantial component of a post-conflict peace. This means that both sides, their partners, and neutral parties seeking to facilitate negotiations to end the conflict should define conflict-ending conditions in part by conventional arms control goals; and then parties should be prepared to incorporate conventional arms control within any conflict termination agreements, while bearing in mind which demands and approaches are reasonable and which are unlikely to be accepted.
William Lippert is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He holds a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University, Washington, DC. His primary research focus is conventional arms control in Europe, on which he is finishing his dissertation. He previously worked for INTERPOL as a crime intelligence analyst and the US Department of Defense as an intelligence and strategy analyst.
Image: GoToVan via Wikimedia Commons
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