President-elect Donald Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine even before being sworn in. He has explicitly refrained from providing any details as to how exactly he may do that, arguing it would be foolish to show his cards before any such negotiation. Any possible deal entailing a peace-for-territories trade would represent a significant reversal from President Joe Biden’s promise to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” It would also fly in the face of Europe’s preference to continue to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s war of aggression. It is therefore important to explore Europe’s response options to a possible Trump-led peace deal for Ukraine. We argue that Europe (i.e., E.U. countries plus the United Kingdom) is unlikely to either prevent a deal from happening or fill the void left by a hypothetical U.S. decision to pull the plug on Ukraine aid. Instead, it should focus its energies on ensuring that any future deal is sustainable and guarantees Ukraine’s survival as an independent country, ideally by bringing Kyiv into NATO and the European Union. To shape the ground for such a deal, Europe should use the right mix of economic, financial, and military incentives. In other words, European countries may be unable to stop Trump’s Ukraine peace deal from landing but, if they play their cards right, they can have a say over the actual landing zone.
What Kind of Deal?
There’s been no shortage of speculation on what a Trump peace deal for Ukraine may look like. A former Trump White House aide suggested a deal may entail Ukraine ceding Crimea and much of the Donbas, limiting NATO expansion and curbing Russia’s military, economic, and industrial dependence on China. More recently, Vice President-elect J. D. Vance outlined the contours of a possible plan that would lead to the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the east while the rest of Ukraine would refrain from seeking NATO membership. An “enforcement mechanism” would then be put in place to prevent either side from breaching the ceasefire and prevent a repetition of the failure of the Minsk agreements.
The debate around a possible deal for Ukraine is not new. More than a year ago, Francois Heisbourg suggested a possible deal drawing inspiration from Western-Soviet negotiations over the status of Germany following World War II. Back then, the Western powers and West Germany accepted the Soviet Union’s de facto control over East Germany without recognizing its legality or giving up on the long-term objective of German reunification. West Germany, in turn, joined NATO, while the Marshall Plan and European Community provided a framework for its economic reconstruction and integration in the West. Taking a cue from that experience, Heisbourg suggested that Ukraine could accept a de facto loss of territory in exchange for peace and NATO membership, which would guarantee the deal’s longevity. Such a deal would be based on a simple logic: a big ask for Ukraine (i.e., de facto acquiescing to a loss of territory) in exchange for a big win (NATO membership).
The former head of NATO’s Private Office actually floated a similar idea in the summer of 2023, and was criticized at the time for stepping out of NATO’s official position to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. However, with Ukrainian forces struggling on the frontline, and war fatigue running higher elsewhere, the idea of some form of peace-for-territories arrangement kept coming back. Barely a few days after stepping down as NATO secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg argued that granting Article 5 protection to Ukraine would be possible “if there is a line that is not necessarily the internationally recognized border.”
Europe Alone Can’t Save Ukraine
With Trump’s election, the coming of a peace-for-territories deal seems all but inevitable. While it is impossible to tell what kind of deal Trump may push for, his drive for peace appears to be informed by two sets of considerations. First, he has promised to keep Americans away from war and intends to deliver on such a promise. From that viewpoint, putting an end to the fighting takes precedence over making a deal either fair or sustainable. Second, and relatedly, China matters more than Russia. In fact, a second Trump administration may not necessarily see a strong(er) Russia as a bad thing, insofar as a weak Russia could play to Beijing’s advantage. Trump could even contemplate a broader understanding with Russia, not so much to peel Russia off from China but with a view to limiting the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation. Leaving aside the difficulties inherent to any attempt to meddle in Sino-Russian relations, any such scheme would need to include the acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
Trump’s insistence and Ukraine’s seemingly bleak outlook may well be the main drivers behind a possible peace deal. But there’s another important factor at play: Europe’s inability to fill the gap left by a hypothetical U.S. decision to terminate Ukraine aid. Any European push in that direction would require not just serious money but also political leadership, defense-industrial depth, and escalatory potential. Europe would likely struggle on all these fronts. Thus, without the United States, the entire Ukraine support infrastructure would probably falter.
To be sure, the idea that Ukraine should be supported for as long as it takes has been dismissed as a half-baked approach premised on giving Ukraine sufficient aid to resist but not enough to repel Russia. Whatever its shortcomings, “as long as it takes” was based on two assumptions: the fact that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been violated; and that, for all its downsides, “as long as it takes” was deemed to be less costly than the prospect of a Russian advance.
After all, an independent Ukraine — together with Moldova — shields allied territory in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans from Russia. If Kyiv were to fall within Moscow’s strategic orbit, the entire continental space running from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea would be in play, creating a steep demand on NATO resources from a deterrence viewpoint. In other words, an independent Ukraine is a cost-effective way of containing Russia. “As long as it takes” is thus ultimately about denying Ukraine to Russia.
It is therefore unclear whether supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes is conceptually flawed or, rather, whether the problem lies in the fact that such an approach has not been realized to its full potential. Kyiv can only outperform Moscow in a context of attrition if its backers get serious in terms of military spending and defense-industrial production. And that has not happened.
Russia and its backers — most notably China — have adopted a wartime pace in terms of defense spending and are outpacing Europe and the United States in terms of defense-industrial production. This raises questions about the feasibility of supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes. But those questions are now moot. Without a clear U.S. commitment, “as long as it takes” surely looks like a losing proposition. Ukraine’s European backers should recognize this reality and shift gears. They cannot prevent a peace deal from happening if Trump is determined to push ahead and should focus instead on shaping the ground for a deal they could live with.
Peace For Better or Worse
From a European perspective, a worst-case “peace” would entail the United States forcing Ukraine to yield all territory currently held by Russia (including Crimea), “demilitarizing” or “neutralizing” the rest of Ukraine, and having a light or no mechanism to enforce the deal. Such an arrangement would invite Russia to pause, reload, and go after what’s left of Ukraine further down the line — with little chance that, in the event of a resumption of conflict, Trump would come to Ukraine’s aid.
A best-case peace would limit territorial losses to the Donbas, secure Ukraine’s west and south (i.e., no land bridge to Crimea), demilitarize Crimea, and bring the rest of Ukraine into NATO. Ideally, the NATO security guarantee would be substantiated through some form of forward deployment of U.S. forces to western Ukraine, possibly through NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence mechanism. Admittedly, such a best-case scenario may not be within reach, given Trump’s own reluctance to commit U.S. military resources to Ukraine and the fact that this is likely to be a red line for Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, there are many shades of good and bad between these two extreme options.
When it comes to a security guarantee to Ukraine, more intermediate examples could include NATO membership followed by a deployment of European (and not U.S.) troops; NATO membership without the deployment of any allied troops (i.e., de facto extending the acquis of the now defunct NATO-Russia Founding Act to Ukraine); or a deal excluding NATO membership but guaranteed by the United States and other relevant European powers.
Either way, NATO membership should be the main target for Europe. To be sure, NATO’s focus thus far has been on denying Ukraine to Russia rather than “having Ukraine.” In fact, Ukraine’s NATO membership was considered by many as suboptimal, as it would worsen security dilemmas and potentially invite further Russian escalation. But we are now in suboptimal territory and have reached a point at which NATO membership may be the only realistic way of denying Ukraine to Russia. That said, convincing Trump of letting Ukraine into the alliance may prove ultimately unattainable.
Getting Ukraine and Russia to sign off on a deal that is in Europe’s interest will be no easy feat either. Ukraine may well be the softest target. As others have argued, a threat to withdraw Western aid and the promise of NATO and E.U. membership could help bring Kyiv around the table. Getting Putin on board would be far more complicated. That would be mostly on Trump, however, who may well decide to increase aid to Ukraine before trying to impose a deal on both sides. There is still ample margin for escalation when it comes to U.S. and Western military aid (e.g. long-range weapon supplies), gas and oil sanctions, or the seizing of frozen Russian assets. Carrots would be needed too. Paradoxically, Trump’s aura of unpredictability and negotiation style may well offer the best opportunity to bring Putin to the table.
Critically, by facilitating any strategy on the part of Trump to bring the parties to the table, Ukraine’s European backers would pave the ground for inserting themselves in any ensuing diplomatic process. The hardest part would be affecting Trump’s landing zone. But they may actually have some cards to play.
Europe’s Trump Cards
Trump is known for his insistence that Europe should pay for its own security, as well as Ukraine’s, and for his transactional approach to foreign policy more generally. In layman’s terms, the more Trump can get out of Ukraine and Europe, the more likely he is to accommodate European preferences.
Expediting (western) Ukraine’s (and possibly Moldova’s) E.U. membership would be an important move. Relatedly, the European Union, its member states, and the United Kingdom should take the lead in Ukraine’s economic reconstruction and political stabilization. E.U. membership, however, is only likely to work if accompanied by NATO membership and the credible security guarantees that come with it. Moreover, European NATO allies could offer to help fund the potential (but unlikely) deployment of a U.S.-led multinational battalion to (western) Ukraine as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence mechanism, including through E.U. instruments such as the European Peace Facility, in cooperation with the United Kingdom. Additionally, they could offer to complement a U.S.-led multinational battalion with another, European-only, NATO multinational battalion, ideally led by the United Kingdom and France. An offer by NATO’s European allies to fund the modernization of the Ukrainian air force, army, and navy with state-of-the-art, NATO-interoperable capabilities would help too. Relatedly, European NATO members should announce an increase in NATO’s defense spending floor (beyond 2 percent of GDP) and link that to the purchase of signature U.S. platforms and munitions. Last but not least, the European Union and NATO could commit to a broader alignment with U.S. economic, technological, and diplomatic priorities vis-à-vis China.
Conclusion
To recap, in the event of Trump pushing ahead with a peace deal for Ukraine, Europe should refrain from trying to prevent the deal from happening and focus instead on trying to influence the deal’s landing zone. Any such deal would entail some sort of trade-off between peace and territories. But the devil lies in the details, and there are many questions about what kind of peace and which territories should conform to the deal. Concretely, European efforts should focus on two key aspects: securing as much of Ukraine’s south as possible, and ensuring the deal is as sustainable as possible, ideally through the offer of NATO and E.U. membership to Ukraine. We have outlined the levers Europe could draw on to influence the deal’s landing zone. While Ukraine’s backers may have failed to carry through “for as long as it takes,” they would still have a chance to fight for an acceptable alternative.
Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He is also a senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Lotje Boswinkel is a Ph.D. researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, a non-resident associate fellow at NATO Defense College, and a Hans J. Morgenthau fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center.
Image: Shealah Craighead via Wikimedia Commons
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