Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s calls for the withdrawal of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, and headlines of rocket attacks resulting in numerous casualties, have brought to the forefront questions about the safety of U.N. peacekeepers and the utility of today’s peacekeeping enterprise. These developments highlight perennial challenges faced by peacekeepers worldwide: operating in volatile environments where escalating tensions can place them in harm’s way. Moreover, they illustrate the vastly different levels of risk tolerance between the United States and the United Nations.
Throughout my recent three-year assignment as the commander of U.S. military members assigned to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide, I was responsible for overseeing and supporting teams stationed in some of the world’s most challenging operational environments, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya, Western Sahara, and Israel. The hazardous nature of the missions and the environments in which our peacekeepers are deployed meant that a key focus of my command was managing the risks our peacekeepers faced while balancing the strategic desire to maintain our contributions to these missions.
This article looks at Washington’s approach to risk management for U.S. peacekeepers, examining three cases with parallels to the developing situation facing U.N. peacekeeping in Lebanon: the withdrawal of the U.N. mission from Mali, the high potential for state-on-state conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, and the immediate aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks in Israel. The decisions in each of these cases highlight both the lengths to which the U.S. military goes to maintain the safety of its peacekeeping forces and the risks that U.N. missions face. Ultimately, both of these approaches are appropriate to the political requirements of the respective institutions; at their best, both can operate in tandem to help bolster global peace and security.
America Has Peacekeepers?
Across the Department of Defense, few are aware of the extent to which the department supports U.N. peacekeeping operations. In fact, the department has supported U.N. peacekeeping operations since the 1948 inception of the very first peacekeeping mission, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Israel. Of the more than 61,000 uniformed personnel deployed in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations today, the United States provides just 24 peacekeepers who serve as military staff officers in six of the 11 ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operations. This marks a downturn from a high of 115 officers in 1993, though the level of personnel support has ebbed and flowed with each administration. These officers serve in critical staff positions, helping to plan, coordinate, and execute U.N. operations that include monitoring ceasefires, protecting civilians, and supporting political processes.
The overall U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations is far more impressive, with direct U.S. budgetary support to the U.N. Department of Peace Operations assessed at 22 percent of the U.N.’s peacekeeping operations budget (nearly $1.2 billion for 2024–25), and programs like the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative focused on building international peacekeeping capacity (funded at $1.4 billion from fiscal years 2005 to 2022). Nevertheless, the token personnel support is a visible sign of America’s commitment to the United Nations and its role in building a liberal international order.
During each of my visits to the U.N. missions we supported, the U.N. leadership universally recognized American staff officers as some of the most proficient and reliable members of the missions — and pleaded for more of them. Not only does their participation provide valuable deployment experiences to U.S. officers, it also strengthens our relationships with international partners and qualifies them to compete for future roles in U.N. military staff positions. Positions of influence within the U.N.’s Office of the Military Advisor and on its small military staff can offer opportunities to compete against our adversaries in what has emerged as another venue for competition. Although small in number, American uniformed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations are a strategic investment in the success of these multilateral missions.
The U.S. Military Observer Group approach
Throughout my recent three-year assignment as the commander of U.S. military members assigned to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide, I was responsible for overseeing and supporting teams stationed in some of the world’s most challenging operational environments. The hazardous nature of the missions and their environments meant that a key focus of my command was managing the risks our peacekeepers faced while balancing the strategic imperative to maintain our contributions to these missions.
Washington’s approach to risk was informed by the tragic experience of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, a U.S. Marine Corps officer captured in 1988 while serving as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Abducted by Hizballah, he was held hostage and ultimately killed in 1989. His death profoundly impacted U.S. policy toward peacekeeping, underscoring the unique security risks for American personnel in U.N. missions and shaping future U.S. approaches to risk tolerance and personnel safety. His legacy remains a reference point for the risks associated with American participation in peacekeeping operations.
Overall, the U.S. approach was rooted in the Army’s composite risk management process, which involves identifying and assessing hazards, evaluating the likelihood and severity of incidents, implementing controls, and making risk decisions. The types of risk we evaluated expanded well beyond anything described in Army Techniques Publication 5-19, Risk Management. Concerns over political and reputational risks often played as significant a role as operational and tactical ones. Regular communication with U.S. Africa Command and Southern European Task Force–Africa, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Central, our local U.S. Embassies, and the United Nations was critical to maintaining our situational awareness and informing our risk decisions.
Recognizing their high-risk category, U.S. peacekeepers undergo extensive training across medical, marksmanship, and driving skills, with additional training provided by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. This preparation helped mitigate some of the risk, especially given the limited availability of U.S. military assets for evacuation or recovery.
Given that lack of available support, our contingency plans were rudimentary: when the security situations deteriorated, there were usually few options other than seeking refuge in their residences or their offices on U.N. compounds or withdrawing to safer locations, such as the closest U.S. embassy compound. There was always concern that a U.S. withdrawal might trigger a chain reaction, prompting other nations to reconsider their commitment, undermining confidence in the mission and further worsening the security situation. Some of our peacekeepers also feared resentment from colleagues left behind, which we termed “reputational risk.”
An unstated but clear aversion to casualties, stemming from the experience of Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, shaped the decision-making process and our contingency planning efforts. While some might argue that military service entails heightened risk, even a single U.S. peacekeeper casualty could have profound political and strategic ramifications and affect the U.S. willingness to continue participating in these operations. Ultimately, our decisions had implications far beyond the immediate safety of U.S. forces and risk to reputation. Thus, while we sought to avoid any appearance of “abandoning” missions, decisions were made with clear-eyed assessments that prioritized the safety and security of our individual peacekeepers. In three cases, this stood in stark contrast to some of the other troop-contributing countries and the United Nations, who were more willing to bear the consequences of the high cost of human lives.
Mali: Anticipating Risk as the Mission Winds Down
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali faced a significant turning point when the Malian government withdrew its consent for the deployment of U.N. forces in June 2023, setting an end date for their deployment by December 2023. Our team anticipated that as the mission drew down, the risk of violence would increase, given the mission’s stabilizing role in the country. Our confidence in the U.N.’s force protection plans, which relied first and foremost on security provided by the host nation, was low, as repeated attacks against U.N. troops had demonstrated the Malian government’s inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to protect the mission against threats from the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin terrorist group.
The drawdown of the 14,000-strong peacekeeping force required us to assess the security environment constantly, leveraging intelligence and strategic communications with the United Nations and partner nations, U.S. Africa Command, and the Department of State. As we monitored developments and considered the right time to direct the redeployment of our peacekeepers, the U.N. force headquarters chief of staff approved a drawdown plan for the staff that would see the U.S. peacekeepers departing in mid-September 2023 — before we expected the security situation to worsen. His decision came as a great relief to me as the commander responsible for our team’s well-being.
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Rising Fears of State-on-State Conflict
Much like the current situation in southern Lebanon, our experiences in the Congo saw an escalating conflict that posed significant risks to our peacekeepers.
Violence in July 2022 had already exposed the limitations of the U.N.’s ability to secure its facilities, as protestors overran and ransacked the force headquarters. The advance of the M23 opposition group, believed to be supported by Rwanda, raised concerns that Congo could descend into a broader state-on-state conflict with Rwanda. Our peacekeepers, stationed at the U.N. headquarters in Goma near the Rwandan border, faced limited options for evacuation should violence indeed escalate.
When tensions surged again in late 2023, we decided to temporarily relocate U.S. peacekeepers to Kigali, Rwanda. By departing the area among escalating tensions, our peacekeepers’ safety was assured. The U.N. leadership did not react well to the decision, made while the U.N. force commander was on leave, but it was necessary to ensure their safety. Although their departure did not cause other nations to follow, upon their return several months later, they indeed faced criticism from colleagues and superiors.
Israel: Turnover Amid an Escalating Conflict
The outbreak of the Israeli-Hamas war on Oct. 7, 2023, coincided with the arrival of a new cohort of U.S. peacekeepers assigned to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. The sudden hostilities, which led to the suspension of commercial flights, required us to quickly adapt our turnover plans. We had to coordinate a creative exfiltration for departing peacekeepers, ultimately relying on a U.S. Air Force C-17 returning from delivering security assistance to Israel.
The complex logistics of getting peacekeepers on the flight from Israel’s Nevatim Air Base required close coordination with the U.S. defense attaché and security cooperation offices at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This was further complicated by the deteriorating security situation in the region, and it underscored the unpredictable and high-risk environment in which these operations take place.
The U.N. Approach
The U.N. uses a similar risk management methodology that weighs risk likelihood and severity and considers operational impacts. However, in each of the three above cases, the United Nations and fellow troop-contributing countries were more willing to accept the increased risk by opting for less disruptive mitigation measures than the removal of peacekeepers from mission. Occasionally, they might reposition a force protection element to reinforce security at a given site, but more frequently they would opt for more passive risk mitigation measures, such as directing staff to remain home and simply telework during times of increased tension. It was clear that the U.N. leadership, both in mission and in New York, was more willing to accept risk than the United States.
In the current situation in Lebanon, U.N. Undersecretary General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix testified to the U.N. Security Council about efforts to increase force protection for peacekeepers. These included relocating personnel away from danger areas, confining U.N. personnel to their bases and in shelters, limiting or even ceasing operational activities, and lodging protests with the Israeli authorities. Despite the increasing risk to peacekeepers, the United Nations seems determined to remain in place, with Lacroix underscoring commitment to implementing the U.N. Security Council mandate for the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon.
Luckily, the United States has no peacekeepers deployed as part of this force, or once again we would likely be forced to prioritize peacekeeper safety and consider whether to evacuate them.
Conclusion
As the situation in Lebanon demonstrates, the enduring dangers and complexities of these multilateral peacekeeping missions continue to test the international community. The experiences of the U.S. Military Observer Group offer important lessons that should inform how the United States navigates its future participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Ultimately, navigating this delicate balance between force protection and mission accomplishment will continue to define the future of U.S. engagement in U.N. peacekeeping. Thoughtful risk management, robust contingency planning, and clear-eyed strategic assessments will be essential to sustaining a prudent and impactful U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping operations going forward. While the host nations and United Nations share responsibility for peacekeeper safety, the United States must remain actively involved to ensure the safety and effectiveness of its personnel, while also upholding its broader commitments to international security and the liberal world order. This may require occasional tough decisions to temporarily suspend or reduce troop contributions when the risks become untenable, and the United States should be ready to bear the political consequences of such decisions.
The U.S. aversion to risk and the profound political and strategic implications of American peacekeeper casualties place unique constraints on our decision-making. This stands in stark contrast to the generally higher tolerance for risk exhibited by many other troop-contributing countries, some of which are more willing to accept the human cost of these dangerous assignments. As evidenced by the cases in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel, the United States is often compelled to make difficult choices that prioritize the safety of its personnel, even if that means scaling back or temporarily withdrawing from a mission.
In contrast, the United Nations must grapple with balancing the stabilizing benefits of maintaining a peacekeeping presence against the heightened risks, as the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon situation continues to demonstrate. The U.N. responsibility to safeguard all its peacekeepers, regardless of nationality, creates inherent tensions with the U.S. imperative to protect its troops at all costs.
COL Christian Werner is a U.S. Army foreign area officer with past assignments in Somalia, Stuttgart, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He holds a master’s in public policy from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, a master of science from the Belgian Royal Military Academy, and a master’s in strategic studies from the Army War College. Currently serving as a faculty instructor at the Army War College, he commanded the U.S. Military Observer Group from 2021 to 2024. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army or the U.S. government.
Image: Lance Cpl. John Hall
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