Growing Russian-Chinese collaboration in the Arctic was showcased in July 2024 through a major naval exercise and maneuvers including nine Russian and Chinese naval vessels on a joint patrol in the Northwest Pacific. In another historic first that month, two Russian bombers and two Chinese bombers flew into Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone, leading to their intercept by U.S. and Canadian fighters. Some scholars argue that such Russian-Chinese cooperation “is still limited” in the Arctic, driven primarily by opportunism and economic interests. However, these Arctic exceptionalism views miss the growing geopolitical competition, driven largely by Russia’s dominance over the Arctic relative to NATO.
The Arctic becoming a strategic battleground was explicitly acknowledged in June 2024 through the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Strategy, noting growing Russian-Chinese collaboration. Despite major combat losses in Ukraine, Russia continues to expand its Arctic military presence and activities. The Arctic’s unique environment requires specialized training and equipment, posing challenges for the United States in projecting and sustaining military forces in the region. This task is further complicated by the American strategic focus on countering China in the Indo-Pacific. NATO represents an ideal form of Arctic burden-sharing, allowing the United States to concentrate elsewhere.
As the Trump administration pivots back to Asia, maintaining strong NATO ties is crucial, despite rhetoric to the contrary. NATO has been tying its strategic survival to an Indo-Pacific pivot since 2019, and the Trump administration will need to rely more on Arctic-minded NATO allies to deter Russian and Chinese ambitions. The U.S. military has minimal forces capable of operating in the Arctic but also needs to defend its space-based infrastructure around the region. By leveraging NATO, particularly the Arctic expertise of British, Canadian, and Nordic allies, the United States can ensure a stable Arctic presence, enabling a robust military posture in the Indo-Pacific.
The Strategic Importance of the Arctic
The Arctic has become a unique arena of global competition. It is the sole area of the world where both Russia and China operate in close proximity to North America across various domains. Melting sea ice and technological advances have increased accessibility, transforming the Arctic from a “strategic buffer” to a hotspot for valuable resources like oil, gas, rare earth minerals, and new fisheries, as well as opening shorter sea routes between Europe and Asia. This increased accessibility unlocks immense economic potential, including an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas, and $1 trillion in rare earth minerals. However, these opportunities bring heightened competition, where the growing Chinese and Russian presence directly challenges U.S. and NATO interests.
The Arctic has long been central to Russia’s identity and security, controlling 53 percent of Arctic coastline, and its Arctic policy identifies its economic and security needs. As the ice melts, the region becomes a real security concern for both Russia and the United States. The Arctic is crucial to Russia’s economy, accounting for 10 percent of Russian GDP and 20 percent of exports. Russia has expanded its military footprint, reopening Soviet-era bases, deploying advanced missile systems, and investing in nuclear-powered icebreakers. The Kola Peninsula, home to most of Russia’s ballistic missile submarines, underscores the Arctic’s role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Moreover, Russia attempts to control the Northern Sea Route, challenging international norms of freedom of navigation, posing a direct threat to NATO’s Northern Flank and member states’ economic interests.
China’s Arctic activities further complicate the security landscape. Despite not being an Arctic nation, China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and seeks influence through its Polar Silk Road initiative. These efforts, often dual-use, support military objectives. Sino-Russian joint Arctic exercises, including coast guard and naval patrols as well as joint bomber patrols, demonstrate increased military alignment against the United States. They pose a strategic challenge to NATO and the defense of the American homeland, by combining Russia’s military presence with China’s economic and technological capabilities.
NATO’s Valuable Arctic Expertise
Converging Russian and Chinese interests both in and beyond the Arctic requires the United States to work by, with, and through allies to counter threats in the region. Traditionally, the United States has enjoyed unrivaled military dominance, but in the Arctic, it now faces an emerging alliance between two formidable competitors. This situation underscores the need for a collaborative approach with NATO allies to ensure preparedness for a crisis in the Arctic. American dominance cannot be taken for granted. In the Arctic, U.S. capabilities are not enough to counter Russia, let alone a Sino-Russian alliance.
Per our recently published research, successful military operations in the Arctic require not only specialized equipment but also dedicated training and doctrine for polar warfare. Arctic operations are uniquely challenging, with complex logistics, extreme weather, and seasonal shifts like polar days and nights. Accordingly, building Arctic-ready forces requires “the deliberate education and development of Arctic-minded leaders alongside collaboration with allies and partners to foster enhanced cold weather war-fighting capabilities across the spectrum.” Arctic warfighting requires more than just specialized equipment — rather, it demands the dedicated attention of those troops who will be assigned to conduct it. Lessons learned from previous Arctic conflicts include the need for cold weather warfare training and equipment, dedicated polar war-fighting doctrine, joint operations, interoperability, mobility in Arctic conditions, planning for increased supplies and unique logistics, Arctic domain awareness and intelligence, space weather disrupting command and control, inimitable polar weather issues associated with polar days and nights, controlling Arctic sea lines of communication, and ensuring unity of command.
Fortunately, NATO already has much of the necessary infrastructure in place with the Nordics. For instance, the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force was established in 2014 and emphasized Arctic warfare capabilities with Nordic military forces in the High North. More recent developments include the establishment of a NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command in Finland, the formation of a Nordic Air Force, and the creation of a NATO Commander Task Force Baltic in the German port city of Rostock. All reflect a boost in NATO’s cohesion, capability, and communication, helping establish the “3 Cs of Deterrence” around the Arctic Circle.
NATO’s role in defending the Arctic has grown increasingly vital, and the alliance can capitalize on the polar expertise of its Arctic countries. Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland are highly trained in cold-weather warfare, have a deep understanding of Arctic operations, and are geographically positioned to respond quickly to threats in the region. Moreover, the Nordic countries are jointly negotiating the procurement of an infantry fighting vehicle specifically for the subarctic climate.
Finland’s expertise in Arctic warfare can be traced to the Winter War (1939–1940), when it held off a numerically superior Soviet invasion force longer and better than expected due to superior tactics adapted to its unique Arctic environment, before ultimately losing. Finland’s contributions to NATO include substantial ground forces and long-range fires. Likewise, Norway hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. Sweden’s recent ascension to NATO bolsters the air capabilities and industrial base of the alliance while Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command provides critical presence, experience, and capability. Canada has long been a key U.S. partner in the Arctic as a part of the bi-national North American Air Defense Command.
Filling Gaps in the Ice
While Canada and the Nordics specialize more in Arctic warfighting, NATO still faces significant military capability gaps in the Arctic. To effectively counter potential aggression from Russia and China in the Arctic, NATO needs to strengthen its ability to conduct a range of specialized military operations in the Arctic including long-range fires, multi-domain awareness, air and missile defense, attack aviation, amphibious operations, and the logistical sustainment of resilient forces capable of enduring prolonged engagements in harsh polar conditions.
NATO faces specific challenges in Arctic naval readiness, particularly in ice-capable vessels and icebreakers, which are an “important element of Arctic sovereignty.” Russia holds a clear advantage with 46 icebreakers, Project 22100 Ocean Patrol Vessels, and its new ice-capable Project 23550 ships. These vessels offer Russia a massive Arctic advantage enabling superior presence and mobility. NATO should focus on building additional vessels like Canada’s Harry DeWolf Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and an updated version of Denmark’s Thetis-class frigates. The recently penned collaborative ICE Pact between the United States, Canada, and Finland is a step in the right direction for bolstering their respective industrial bases to build more icebreakers. Additionally, partnerships with non-NATO allies that have icebreakers, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, could support NATO operations in the Arctic if needed in a crisis. For current gaps in Arctic coverage, NATO needs more anti-access and area denial capabilities to pose a credible threat to Russian operations. NATO needs to embark on a sustained investment campaign to bolster its Arctic deterrence capabilities both on land and at sea in the Arctic.
Minimal Arctic Capabilities
The United States needs NATO for Arctic stability, due to struggles in committing tangible resources to the Arctic besides more hollow strategies. Increasing Arctic-specific training, expanding icebreaking capabilities, and enhancing interoperability with Canada, the Nordics, and Arctic-minded countries (such as the United Kingdom) are essential steps for projecting force in the Arctic. Training exercises like Arctic Edge and the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Rotation 24-02 demonstrate progress but should be scaled up to counter the threat posed by the growing Sino-Russian alliance. The United States also maintains critical Arctic installations — including Pituffik Space Base in Greenland, which serves as a critical hub for missile defense and satellite communications — but more Arctic bases are needed to effectively compete in the region. Similarly, the U.S. Army established the 11th Airborne Division “Arctic Angels” in 2022 at Anchorage, Alaska, with 11,000 soldiers focused on extreme cold weather operations. However, it is problematic that this unit maintains “readiness for global deployments … [and] for large-scale combat operations” when it should be wholly focused on polar warfare. Worse, the unit struggles with numerous internal morale issues.
The United States ought to go further in building its Arctic capabilities, by ramping up its Arctic-specific training programs and investing in research and development aimed at enhancing cold-weather operational capabilities. This includes expanding its fleet of icebreakers, which is currently insufficient to conduct the necessary peacetime missions, let alone support a potential conflict in the region. However, these initiatives are unlikely due to the Arctic being a low priority under current global force management postures. Ruthless defense prioritization means the Arctic will likely continue to be neglected, despite growing risks. Thus, the United States should foster greater cooperation with its NATO Arctic allies, particularly Canada and the Nordics, to ensure a coordinated and effective response to any potential crisis in the region. Undergirding that should be civil society engagement with indigenous populations around the Arctic Circle in a mutually beneficial way to ensure their security and to partner with them to increase Arctic domain awareness.
A Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for the Arctic
Canada, the Nordics, and other Arctic-minded allies should lead NATO in Arctic defense as the United States pivots to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The combined Sino-Russian threat is global, and the United States needs allies to share the burden of defense. The United States and NATO should leverage the expertise of Arctic allies to establish a Nordic-led Arctic-focused Combined Joint Expeditionary Force within NATO, allowing the alliance to establish a dedicated force as a credible deterrent in the Arctic.
Forming a Nordic-led Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for the Arctic would reduce the strain on U.S. forces. NATO lacks an Arctic strategy other than an October 2024 statement about defending “Allied interests in the Arctic.” NATO needs a comprehensive Arctic strategy that leads to investments in infrastructure, training, and equipment to match Russian power in the Arctic. Without proper resourcing, Russia will keep dominating the Arctic, making it less safe for international trade, freedom of navigation, and rule of law. Sino-Russian dominance of the Arctic has severe implications for global security and economic stability. Through collective action and improved Arctic-specific readiness, NATO can deter Sino-Russian aggression in the Arctic while supporting a U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific.
Ryan R. Duffy is a retired U.S. Army infantry officer who served primarily in Europe. He served in light, Stryker, and armored formations. His most recent assignment was at U.S. Army Europe and Africa where he has worked on campaign and contingency planning.
Jahara ‘FRANKY’ Matisek, Ph.D., is an active-duty U.S. Air Force command pilot serving as a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College and is a fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy and the European Resilience Initiative Center. He has over 3,700 hours of flight time and was previously an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Jeremy M. McKenzie is a retired U.S. Coast Guard officer and aviator. His last military assignment was as a researcher at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy. He previously served as an Army aviator and has a Masters in public policy from Brown University as well as a Masters in social science from Syracuse University.
Chad M. Pillai is a senior U.S. Army strategist who has served in a variety of assignments in the U.S., Europe, Middle East, and Asia. He is an editor for the Emergent Defense Magazine and a member of the Military Writers Guild. He earned his Masters in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.
Image: Corporal Ben Beale via Wikimedia Commons
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