While Washington fixates on TikTok’s potential to share personal data with Chinese intelligence for disinformation and hybrid warfare, a far more dangerous data-collecting technology is quite literally flying under the radar: Chinese-made agricultural drones. The threat that they pose to national security can be more devastating than any data scrubbed from social media platforms. These non-military drones, which are now embedded in global markets, go beyond tracking personal data — they collect highly specific agricultural data that could be weaponized to gain unprecedented leverage over critical food production, resources, and supplies. In response to growing levels of food insecurity driven by climate change and population growth, farmers around the world rely on new technologies that could help China gain a dominant position in the global food market. More radically, agricultural data can be used to unleash biological warfare against crops, annihilating an adversary’s food supply. Such scenarios pose a significant threat to national security, giving China more than one avenue to undermine critical infrastructures by wreaking devastating impacts on food availability, threatening trade and economic resilience, and undermining agricultural systems.
The high level of security vulnerabilities associated with smart agriculture technologies and the current lack of preparedness to address them make these technologies a potential target for any adversary. Deficient regulatory oversight increases the threats associated with agroterrorism from both state and non-state actors. Addressing the threat associated with Chinese-made technologies requires interdepartmental and interagency collaboration, as well as international regulatory frameworks to address the data privacy concerns related to smart agriculture technologies and to prevent misuse.
In this respect, farmers, national security establishments, and consumers will do well to take a page from the “know your farmer, know your food” campaign and demand to “know your technology, where it comes from, and who has access to your data.” As smart agriculture technology advances, it is crucial to prioritize data security and increase broader security awareness and practices in the agricultural sector. In the current confrontation with China, what often gets occluded is that at the heart of such technological innovation is not merely geopolitical competition but also working to create a more secure global food system.
Beyond Telecommunications
Democratic capitals — from Washington, DC, to Tokyo — are concerned about their reliance on Chinese technologies and its implication for national security. While much of the focus remains on telecommunications companies and social platforms like TikTok and the potential misuse of personal data, this narrow scope overlooks broader vulnerabilities that pose far more significant risks.
Technological innovation is the centerpiece of leader Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” which should turn the country into a leading global powerhouse by 2049. In this respect, it is crucial to shift the attention from just banning Chinese-developed technologies to examining their broader security implications and to hone a more meaningful national security policy and rhetoric to address their vulnerabilities. A recent report by the U.S. House of Representatives highlighted the threats posed by the use of Chinese drone technologies in academic research programs not merely for siphoning off raw data but also (and inadvertently) as a pathway for gaining backdoor access to university information technology systems and knowledge repositories.
The securitization of Chinese technologies began with measures against the telecommunications giant Huawei and its involvement in establishing 5G networks. Today, legislators across North America and Europe are deeply concerned about TikTok’s potential misuse of consumer data by its Chinese owner, ByteDance. This data could be shared with Chinese intelligence services and the military, posing a significant security threat. With the House of Representatives passing a bill on March 13 that ByteDance must divest its American assets or face a ban, House Republican Steve Scalise stressed that “this is a critical national security issue.” And while this may well be the case, the question remains whether a social media platform owned by a Chinese company is the critical national security concern.
The public and policy attention lavished on TikTok is an attempt to address the prospective threats associated with the data gathered by Chinese technologies. Yet, such attention seems to reflect perfectly the security theater underpinning much of the current securitization of Chinese technologies — it implements measures that provide the feeling of improved security while doing little to achieve it. While the Chinese Communist Party could use TikTok data for disinformation or hybrid warfare campaigns, social media–based manipulation is not a new issue, and recent reports show that China has been ineffective in such operations. Despite this, there is no discussion of other data-collecting technologies that can be harnessed to threaten national security in more destructive ways. One such overlooked technology is agricultural drones.
Drone Danger
The People’s Republic of China is the world leader in the agricultural drone industry, having experienced a drone revolution in agriculture since the late 2010s. Chinese-owned drone manufacturers XAG and DJI are leaders in the smart agriculture industry. These farming-specific drones can spray, feed, and monitor crops with more precision and speed than any human. They are fast-growing and one of the most widely used industry-level drones. Driven by advanced AI and cloud computing, any internet-connected device, such as a smartphone, can control data transfers and collection. These technologies revolutionize agricultural practices in response to the need for increased crop yields and viability in the face of climate change and the growing population. However, the very connected technologies that are changing agricultural operations and improving farming efficiency are posing qualitatively new challenges for national and food security. It seems that the bulk of the smart agriculture security debate is on cybersecurity and the potential threats posed by malware to hack farming data. Yet, when it comes to agricultural drones, owing to poor regulation, third parties can have access to the full spectrum of data gathered by these technologies without having to use illicit means.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have alerted officials that drones manufactured by DJI can threaten national security. Just this past January, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency published its cybersecurity guidance report blacklisting drones manufactured by DJI due to the threat of critical infrastructure espionage. At the center of these concerns is China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which dictates that all Chinese corporations must cooperate with intelligence services and give them access to data collected in China and internationally. Indeed, these drones capture high-definition aerial images and real-time recordings that can identify the location of critical infrastructure, but this is not the only concern. The pressing yet unaddressed issue is that these agricultural drones collect comprehensive food production data worldwide, which China can weaponize and use to exert influence.
As part of their investment strategy, the Chinese government has made military agreements with Chinese-owned agriculture drone manufacturers and agriculture research universities. Their Military-Civil Fusion strategy, integrating civilian technologies with military goals, enables the Chinese government to exploit critical farming data for economic and military advantages. To support sustainable food production by monitoring crop health and predicting crop yields, the drones collect alarmingly specific data about the crops and region of the customer using them. For example, a drone used for corn fields in the United States, one of the world’s biggest corn exporters, will collect detailed data about the area’s climate, soil conditions, and pest and disease susceptibility. The onboard AI can analyze this data to report crop vulnerabilities and identify optimum growth needs for these and other crops such as rice and wheat, foods on which much of the world’s population depends. From Brazil’s soy farms to Spain’s olive groves, the Chinese government can potentially access the farming data of any customer in any region.
This data exploitation will facilitate the Chinese government’s efforts to design “perfect” products that farmers will want for healthier crops and increased yield. Chinese drone manufacturer XAG has already signed agreements with Bayer and Chinese-owned Syngenta, two of the world’s foremost agricultural sciences corporations. Farming data shared with these research and development enterprises helps them create precisely what farmers need — fertilizers that optimize crop growth and quality, highly effective spray pesticides and fungicides, and genetically modified seeds that withstand drought and other extreme conditions. This may not matter now, but it will in the next few decades when farmers struggle to grow healthy crops, and there won’t be enough crops to feed the world.
Chinese companies are seeking to become the leading suppliers of smart agricultural technologies, which will help Beijing dominate the global food market. China can use price controls, set export restrictions, and implement trading fees for products that affect crop growth. This would also impact other sectors, such as the meat and dairy industry, since crops such as corn are used for livestock feed. In addition, China can establish trade agreements with other countries for food items they need, potentially reducing reliance on Western markets. This market influence strengthens China’s economic power and gives it significant political leverage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has already warned about the Chinese Communist Party’s economic espionage efforts and plans to dominate the global market. In this respect, smart agriculture drones can become an important tool in China’s strategic outreach.
Conclusion
While concerns about critical infrastructure espionage tied to Chinese drones are growing, their potential to dominate the food market, not to mention the potential to conduct biological warfare against crops, remains largely overlooked. As the Chinese agricultural technology juggernaut quietly grows, policymakers must act now to safeguard national security. Nations can protect their food security and economic interests by regulating the data collected by agricultural drones, preventing third-party access, and reassessing the broader strategic implications of these technologies. Yet, for now, the data gathered by these drones is far less regulated than the data collected by TikTok. Failure to act can give China a decisive advantage in any prospective future confrontation. Left unchecked, the exploitation of smart agriculture data could leave nations vulnerable to food-based coercion. If this were part of China’s asymmetric warfare strategy, they are clearly playing the long game for global dominance.
Claris Diaz is an independent researcher specializing in the political implications of emerging and disruptive technologies. With a master of arts in international security and development and building on her background as a scientist, she explores how technological advancements pose indirect threats to international security. She authored The Race to Feed the World: How a Plant Genomics Lab at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Is Up Against the Clock (2021) and recently completed a study on China’s agricultural drones, analyzing their disruptive impact on global food security and geopolitical dynamics.
Emilian Kavalski is the NAWA chair professor at the Center for International Studies and Development in the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) and the book series editor for Routledge’s Rethinking Asia and International Relations series. His expertise centers on decentralizing international relations theory and practice, with a focus on the rising influence of non-Western actors on the global stage. He is the author of four books, including The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (2018) and the editor/co-editor of twelve volumes, including The Routledge Handbook on Global China (2024).
Image: MB-one via Wikimedia Commons.
.jpg){kind=link}