The geopolitical turbulence triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western efforts to counter Moscow, and uncertainties surrounding the future of U.S. foreign policy underscore the strategic imperative of stabilizing the South Caucasus. One of the region’s key vulnerabilities is Armenia’s closed borders and lack of diplomatic relations with two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia and Azerbaijan are nearing the conclusion of bilateral negotiations on a peace agreement. Simultaneously, Turkey and Armenia have been engaged in efforts to normalize relations, a process that Ankara ties to Baku’s approval. Prolonged delays in these negotiations risk making Armenia a flashpoint in the broader Russia-West standoff. In this volatile context, two decisive steps could significantly bolster regional stability: Turkey honoring its July 2022 commitment to open its border with Armenia to foreign nationals, and Azerbaijan and Armenia finalizing the preliminary peace agreement they have been negotiating. Such steps would not only promote stability but also unlock pathways for increased trade, deeper regional integration, and sustained prosperity for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and their neighbors.
Thawing a Frozen Conflict
Relations between not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also Armenia and Turkey have been crippled for over 30 years by the long-standing conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh, formerly a majority-ethnic Armenian–populated autonomous enclave within Soviet Azerbaijan, became a focal point of conflict during the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s when Armenian forces seized control of the enclave and surrounding territories, displacing hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis. Nagorno-Karabakh gained de facto independence as a result of this war, though it never garnered international recognition. After three decades of diplomatic efforts failed to yield a political settlement, Azerbaijan decided to revert to using force. In 2020, in a six-week war, it regained the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and part of the enclave. That war ended with a Moscow-brokered ceasefire and Russian troops deployed to the portion of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast that still lay outside Baku’s control. When negotiations failed again to resolve the status of the enclave, Azerbaijan reclaimed the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh three years later in a military strike carried out Sept. 19–20, 2023, displacing more than 100,000 Armenians who fled in anticipation of Baku’s further advance.
Throughout the decades of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, Turkey has stood as Azerbaijan’s staunch ally. Ankara cut off its own talks with Armenia in 1993, as Armenian forces were advancing into the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan. To date, it has neither established diplomatic relations with Yerevan nor opened the border between the two countries.
Azerbaijan’s military successes in 2020 and 2023 forced a form of “victor’s peace” onto the region, setting the stage for future negotiations, including between Armenia and Turkey. In the aftermath of the 2020 conflict, diplomatic talks between Armenia and Turkey led to tangible steps forward, including the resumption of direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul, halted in 2019, and the initiation of air cargo trade. By mid-2022, Yerevan and Ankara were promising their common border would soon open to third-country nationals. Yet, despite these initial gains, progress stalled, and the border remains closed. Turkey, not wanting to get ahead of its ally, was holding back to pressure Armenia and to further strengthen Azerbaijan’s hand in bilateral negotiations, maintaining that full normalization with Yerevan would only follow its settlement with Baku.
Talks between Yerevan and Baku remained tense. Progress between 2020 and 2023 was limited. In late 2023, soon after Azerbaijan’s September offensive, Armenia and Azerbaijan entered into extensive bilateral negotiations, aiming to finalize a peace deal. In December 2023, they agreed to a prisoner exchange, with Armenia also supporting Azerbaijan as the host of the annual U.N. climate change forum. In 2024, the two countries made headway in demarcating the northern section of their shared border and agreed to remove several contentious questions – most notably regarding a planned transport route that is envisioned to stretch from Azerbaijan’s main territory, through Armenia, to its exclave Nakhichevan — from the text of a possible agreement, with an intention to address these later. However, negotiations slowed through the summer and early fall, with a major sticking point being Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia unequivocally recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territory by amending its constitution to remove an implicit claim on Nagorno-Karabakh as Armenian territory. Armenia, for its part, started to regard Baku and Ankara as unreliable negotiating partners who continually add new demands without delivering on what was previously agreed.
Specifically, Baku requested revisions to the constitution of Armenia, which references the country’s 1990 Declaration of Independence — a document that, in turn, refers to a 1989 unification act between the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. While Azerbaijan asserts that changes are necessary to remove any potential basis for future Armenian claims on Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian opposition argues that this demand constitutes interference in Armenia’s internal affairs, placing Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s embattled government in a challenging position. For his part, Pashinyan asserts that the peace agreement conforms with Armenia’s constitution and that no article of the document contains any direct or indirect reference to Nagorno-Karabakh. He further emphasized that, in cases of conflict between Armenian domestic law and international treaties, the provisions of the latter would prevail.
Testing Geopolitical Waters
In an effort to strengthen its negotiating position against Baku’s demands and fears over the possibility of a new Azerbaijani offensive into internationally recognized Armenian territory, Yerevan has sought external support. Its long-time ally Moscow, however, has disappointed it. Although Russia brokered the 2020 deal that ended fighting with Azerbaijan, its peacekeepers that deployed to the region after the war to guarantee the safety of the Armenian population stood by as Azerbaijan’s military established complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Moreover, Armenia’s membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, which involves a mutual defense clause, failed to prevent Azerbaijan’s limited incursion into Armenia proper in 2022. Thus, Armenia has suspended its participation in the organization and has sought to develop relationships with the European Union and the United States, capitalizing on their geopolitical competition with Moscow. While neither Brussels nor Washington has provided security guarantees, the United States held joint military exercises with Armenia in 2023 and 2024 and initiated cooperation on development of a nuclear power plant. Additionally, France has increased its rhetorical support for Yerevan and signed an arms sale agreement, challenging Moscow’s dominance in arms trade with Armenia.
These developments have raised concerns in Ankara and Baku about Armenia’s growing ties with the West. They worry this shift may exacerbate the region’s role as a stage for geopolitical drama between Russia and the West. Additionally, it could undermine Turkey and Azerbaijan’s shared ambition to enhance strategic influence through integrated trade and energy routes connecting with Central Asia.
For many years, Russia was seen as the primary obstacle to easing tensions in the region. A peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, was thought to risk expanding Western influence in the region at Russia’s expense. However, this dynamic appears to have shifted. Russia’s influence in the region has diminished since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the strategic divergence between the West and the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance suggest that normalizing relations with Armenia may not necessarily lead to greater Western influence in the South Caucasus.
A Way Forward
Ankara and Baku can help reduce the risk that regional dynamics will be further distorted and exacerbated by the standoff between Russia and the United States and other Western powers, particularly France, by taking steps now to move forward toward peace with Yerevan. Baku and Yerevan could further finalize and sign the peace treaty they have been negotiating bilaterally. Additionally, Turkey could honor its 2022 commitment to open its borders with Armenia to third-country nationals — which Armenia is ready to reciprocate. These actions could pave the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations and creation of a framework for addressing follow-up disputes, including border demarcation.
The three countries have recently been taking steps in this direction. Active negotiation resumed in summer 2024 with the Turkish and Armenian envoys and Azerbaijani and Armenian deputy prime ministers meeting at the border crossings between the respective countries in July and October 2024. In October again, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan and reconfirmed their commitment to reaching a settlement. With Yerevan and Baku intensifying their work on the peace agreement and indicating that they are close to finalizing its text, tangible steps toward normalization of relations by the three capitals are the best way to prevent the momentum from slipping away. Hardliners in the Armenian opposition have labeled Pashinyan a traitor for his efforts to pursue peace, and should he lose power, any successor is likely to adopt a more hostile stance. Furthermore, in the absence of tangible steps toward normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, current and future Armenian governments will likely continue looking to external backers — whether in Washington, Brussels, Paris, or Moscow — to balance the influence of Baku and Ankara. Pashinyan’s own position could also shift. The next election in Armenia is scheduled for June 2026, but informal campaigning is likely to begin by mid-2025, just months away. This will likely push Pashinyan toward a more rigid political stance.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey have a pivotal opportunity to take decisive actions toward peace and stability. By honoring the commitments to open the border between Armenia and Turkey and finalizing the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they can shift the region’s trajectory from entrenched conflict to dynamic cooperation and shared prosperity. Inaction now risks empowering hardliners and unraveling the fragile gains made thus far, with consequences that could echo for generations to come.
Philip Gamaghelyan is an associate professor at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, and the director of programs at the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation.
Nigar Göksel is the Turkey director of the International Crisis Group.
Image: Presidential Executive Office of Russia via Wikimedia Commons.
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