The inside story of the IDF’s role in Hezbollah pager explosions
The IDF on Wednesday made new disclosures about its role in the pager and walkie-talkie sabotage explosion attacks on Hezbollah from mid-September.
First, the IDF credited the Mossad with coming up with the earliest concept for pulling off the attacks around a decade ago.
Once the Mossad presented the concept to the IDF, both Israeli intelligence and operations arms started a forceful push to transform the concept into an actionable concrete weapon and plan.
Also, the IDF created mechanisms to study and compare scenarios for when it would be most effective to deploy the explosions to achieve the maximum impact and strategic advantage.
IDF and Mossad cooperation
Both the IDF and the Mossad funded different aspects of the operation, understanding that the goal was to decisively defeat Hezbollah at the right moment, whenever that might be.
From the start of the current war, a brigade-sized unit of officers was established to gather the various analyses, intelligence collection, and operations details needed to activate the operation.
Many of these officials worked on the operation at an intelligence collection base in the North.
The IDF recommended to the cabinet that the operation be used only at the moment when the government was ready to conceptually shift its focus to the Northern front, which was the primarily military focus while leaving the Gaza front as a secondary focus.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has alleged that some security officials opposed using the pager and walkie-talkie explosions against Hezbollah but that he overruled them and ordered the operation to go forward.
According to the IDF view disclosed on Wednesday, the military never opposed using the operation but said that the government first had to shift its focus to declare the North as the main front.
The purpose of such a shift would be to maximize the mix of using the operation in conjunction with a massive bombing campaign and eventual invasion.
The Jerusalem Post has also reported exclusively on contrasting views among top Israeli officials about whether the operation might have even been more effective if deployed in October 2023 than it was when used in September 2024.