Experts warn of Israeli intelligence lapses after seized documents show Hamas’s tactical depth
In a recent reveal, Israel’s Channel 12 News exposed documents that were found during the ground operation that showed years of effort on Hamas’s part to gather intelligence about border towns and villages in Israel, including the movements and habits of leading local figures and security officers. Through meticulous information-gathering, Hamas was not only able to execute a surprise offensive but a precise one.
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“It was clear for a long time that with the aid of Iran, Hamas had been collecting intelligence methodically and doing so in a professional manner,” Prof. Kobi Michael, a researcher at the Institute of National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, told The Media Line. “This also shows Israel’s great permeability; it wasn’t too hard of a job.”
On Oct. 7, 2023, thousands of Hamas terrorists stormed Israel’s border with Gaza and carried out the largest single-day terrorist attack against the Jewish state. Approximately 1,200 Israelis were killed and thousands more were injured. Hamas took 250 people into captivity, 100 of whom are still being held in Gaza, though many are presumed dead. The attack stunned Israel, and as the shock subsided, many questions were raised about Israel’s preparedness, the extent of the intelligence it had, and what could have been done to prevent such a tragedy.
According to the Channel 12 News report, documents and sensitive information were collected for years. Hamas hacked surveillance cameras throughout southern Israel, and the organization managed to infiltrate sensitive systems, allowing them to diligently monitor the movements of critical security figures in the border area.
“Hamas did an excellent job using OSINT (open-source intelligence) and gained access to CCTV cameras, which are so prevalent today,” said Michael. “Together, this was an endless source of intelligence.”
Since the attack, Israel launched a massive war against Hamas in Gaza. Tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed while the Israeli army has conducted thousands of airstrikes and a massive ground operation. Israeli troops are still on the ground in Gaza, though to a lesser extent than at the beginning of the war.
“In order for Israel to prevent a terrorist army to exist on its border, it needs full security control in Gaza,” Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), told The Media Line. “These abilities, developed by Hamas, grew as a result of Israel’s lack of control on the territory.”
Michael added that the Israeli army and its soldiers also lack operational discipline, often disregarding directives about information safety and the usage of social media.
“The defense establishment was indifferent in a sense,” he said. “The local authorities also didn’t attach much importance to this issue, and it became a blind spot that widened.”
Hamas took advantage of the growing blind spot for years.
Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, 38 years after it captured the territory from Egyptian hands during the 1967 Six-Day War. Israel maintained control of the border crossings it shared with Gaza and also its airspace and territorial waters through a strict naval blockade. Egyptian soldiers and Hamas operatives manned Gaza’s border with Egypt until Israel took control of the border town of Rafah and the crossing several months ago.
Hamas’s growth
“From 2005 until October 7, with the absence of Israeli presence on the ground, there was an exponential growth of Hamas’ abilities, including its intelligence capabilities,” said Avivi. “They developed very advanced surveillance systems which are akin to systems the Israeli intelligence holds and also operated human intelligence operations, while significantly hindering Israel’s ability to use human sources to gather intelligence.”
These circumstances demonstrate the complexity of Israel’s relationship with Gaza and the Palestinians.
Gaza residents have entered Israel to work since 1967. More work opportunities and higher wages made Israel a lucrative work destination for Palestinians. This trend continued even when Israel disengaged from the territory. This arrangement, together with Israel’s hold on most of Gaza’s borders, meant Israel and the Gaza Strip were still deeply connected, both dependent on each other.
For Israel, Palestinians provided cheap labor in certain fields, such as agriculture, in which most Israelis no longer work. For Palestinians, employment in Israel was the key to improving their standard of living in one of the world’s most impoverished territories. Over the decades, the number of work permits fluctuated, often symbiotic with the rise and ease of tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.
One clear example of this fluctuation was in the days leading up to Hamas’s stunning attack. Days before the war, Gaza residents approached the security fence with Israel, demonstrating against the blockade. In response, Israel barred the entrance of Gaza laborers into the country for a short period. In an attempt to diffuse the tension, Israel then lifted the sanction, allowing Palestinian workers in. However, tensions were not diffused. Instead, war broke out that would change the face of the region.
The economic interdependence also exists in the West Bank, territories which Israel also captured in 1967 and refers to as Judea and Samaria. Some of the territories are fully controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA), others are fully controlled by Israel, and some are under Palestinian civil control and Israeli military hold.
In response to the war in Gaza, Israel also drastically reduced the number of Palestinian workers allowed to enter from the West Bank. From over 100,000 workers a day, the number has been lowered to a few thousand, citing Israeli security concerns and the potential for further tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. From Gaza, where the war is ongoing, there has been no entrance of workers since the fighting began.
Before Oct. 7, 2023, the Israeli defense establishment and much of the political echelon believed that the entrance of Palestinians to work in Israel, both from Gaza and the West Bank, defused tensions and decreased motivation to engage in terrorism while creating an incentive to maintain the quiet between Israel and the Palestinians.
“This presumption was wrong,” said Michael. “In Gaza, it didn’t cause Hamas to change its ideology or reduce its motivation to carry out such an attack; it didn’t create a positive impact but also created an intelligence platform for Hamas.”
According to Avivi, “It was clear that work permits for Palestinians would create extensive intelligence for Hamas.”
Throughout Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank are Palestinians who share familial connections, another vulnerability that is believed to have been used by Hamas in Gaza to collect intelligence in and on Israel.
Israeli forces carry out daily raids in the West Bank against terrorist activity, detaining tens of suspects every day, making for a clearer intelligence outlook. Consequently, Israel’s ability to thwart attacks from those territories has been consistently better, and the chances of an attack similar to Oct. 7 being carried out from the West Bank are slimmer, though not non-existent. This is due to the existing familial connections and the current flow of workers into Israel.
“One cannot rely on technology alone for intelligence, and in the disengagement, Israel lost the critical ability to gather intelligence through human sources,” Avivi said. “While in Judea and Samaria, Israel has complete freedom to operate and control the arena through massive settlements, in Gaza, this was not possible, making the ability to generate quality intelligence non-existent.
Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 made it almost impossible for Israel’s secret service to recruit Palestinian agents. The withdrawal also saw an Israeli commando unit charged with recruiting agents unable to operate from within Gaza. While Israel’s security grip on the West Bank is much stronger than it has been in Gaza, it is not immune from a similar Oct. 7 scenario.
“Israel must presume that the Palestinians are capable of gathering such intelligence on Israel from the West Bank as they did from Gaza, even though Hamas’s capabilities there are much more limited,” said Michael. “But in the end, geography has little significance in such cases where surveillance cameras can be accessed remotely.”
For now, Israel remains in Gaza, with the government vowing to retain control over security matters in the territory indefinitely. With 100 remaining hostages waiting to be released from the hands of Hamas terrorists, making up for years of little intelligence is critical.
“Israeli intelligence control is therefore increasing, but there are still gaps,” said Avivi. “There is a lot of intelligence about the hostages, but in order to release them, that is not enough. It is very rare that the operational conditions that allow for rescue operations exist.”
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