Russia wields a formidable capability to target NATO’s undersea infrastructure in critical regions such as the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas, as well as across the world’s oceans: its “research” vessels. These are ostensibly civilian ships used for scientific exploration that double as intelligence-gathering platforms. Equipped with advanced surveillance technology, these ships often operate near critical undersea infrastructure, raising concerns about covert espionage and sabotage capabilities under the guise of academic study.
Though this threat is making headlines in Europe today, it is far from new.
A recent incident in the Irish Sea brought this danger into sharp focus. The Russian research vessel Yantar, infamous for its deep-sea operations, was intercepted by the Irish navy while reportedly deploying drones near vital subsea energy and internet cables. This is just the latest chapter in a series of provocative activities by Russian “research” vessels, fueling mounting concerns over the security of NATO’s undersea lifelines.
These vessels are more than they seem. Armed with cutting-edge surveillance tools, they have the potential to sever undersea cables and cripple energy and communication networks. Yet, even as Russia flexes its maritime muscles, its research fleet faces pressing modernization challenges.
Worse still, Russia’s ambitions extend beyond research ships. Reports suggest that tankers like the Eagle S, part of the so-called “dark fleet,” are being outfitted for espionage. If true, this marks a chilling escalation — transforming ordinary commercial vessels into covert tools of sabotage.
The implications for NATO are stark. As Russia ramps up its deep-sea activities, the alliance should act decisively to safeguard critical infrastructure in the Baltic, Barents, and Arctic regions. This is not just a matter of defending cables and pipelines — it’s about countering a calculated strategy to destabilize NATO countries by exploiting their vulnerabilities beneath the waves.
Russia’s “research” fleet campaign is a wake-up call for NATO militaries and coast guards, demanding enhanced vigilance, stronger capabilities, and a proactive approach to securing the lifelines that connect and power modern society. To inform better strategy, I explore the dual-use nature of Russia’s research fleet, examining its potential as both a scientific tool and a weapon of geopolitical disruption.
The Basics of Russian Research Vessels
The history of Russian research vessels stretches back to the early 20th century, reaching its height during the Soviet era between the 1940s and 1991. At its peak, the Soviet Union’s research fleet consisted of hundreds of vessels operated by academia, civilian ministries, and the navy, with estimates placing the total number at no fewer than 727 between 1946 and 1991. However, much about these ships remains shrouded in mystery. Records from certain years were never published. The fleet is similarly opaque today.
The classification of “research vessel” in Russia is broad and fluid. Officially, these ships are tasked with conducting scientific measurements and research at sea, but the definition often includes vessels that perform secondary scientific tasks, such as measuring air, water, or seabed parameters. This flexible categorization dates back to the 1950s, when the term “scientific research vessel” (Nauchno-Issledovatel’skoye Sudno) came into use. Over time, older ships or those repurposed from other duties were also labeled as research vessels, creating a category that spans everything from purpose-built expeditionary ships to aging transportation vessels adapted for scientific work.
This broad definition reflects the dual-use nature of many Russian research vessels, which often serve both civilian and military purposes. During the Soviet era, vessels operating in the Atlantic from 1959 onward were nominally part of civilian shipping companies but were, in reality, controlled by the Ministry of Defense. These ships were ostensibly assigned to the Department of Marine Expeditionary Work under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, yet their operations aligned closely with military objectives, including intelligence gathering and surveillance.
Hydrographic vessels have been particularly significant within the Russian research fleet. These ships are vital for gathering data to update navigation charts, identifying hazards, and equipping fairways. They often double as supply vessels and have been linked to suspicious Russian activities in international waters in recent years. Originally introduced in 1915, hydrographic vessels evolved during the Soviet era, with distinctions made between “hydrographic research” and “expeditionary oceanographic” vessels. By 1977, the latter were reclassified as “oceanographic research” ships, reflecting their more complex and often military-oriented missions.
Another important subtype is space communication support vessels, which fulfill a range of roles, from telemetry to equipment transport. These ships, like the famous cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, are nominally associated with civilian institutions such as the Academy of Sciences but are often repurposed for military or intelligence use. While some are strictly logistical, others are equipped for specialized missions, further highlighting the blurred line between civilian and military functions within the Russian research fleet.
Ultimately, the Russian research fleet exemplifies a longstanding strategy of leveraging ostensibly civilian assets for strategic and military purposes. This dual-use approach has allowed Russia to obscure the true nature of its operations, presenting a persistent challenge for NATO and its allies in countering these undersea activities.
Who Runs the Research Fleet?
Russia’s maritime research vessels operate under two key organizations, each with distinct but often overlapping roles. The Hydrographic Service of the Soviet Navy, once known as the Safety of Navigation Directorate, was renamed the Main Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography in 1972 and later became the Navigation and Oceanography Directorate in 2006. This organization is responsible for providing navigational, hydrographic, hydrometeorological, and topographic-geodetic support for Russia’s navy and armed forces in oceanic and maritime zones. A key element of its mission is organizing hydrographic, oceanographic, and marine geophysical work to support national defense and maritime activities. Officially, all navy research vessels are coordinated by this directorate.
However, the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, a highly secretive unit within the Russian Defense Ministry, also plays a pivotal role. Often regarded as one of the most elite and classified branches of the Russian military, it is reportedly under the direct control of the minister of defense. Its known tasks include deep-sea exploration of the seabed, studying human physiology under extreme underwater conditions, recovering equipment from sunken vessels or aircraft, and conducting rescue operations. This directorate is widely believed to oversee deep-sea sabotage and intelligence missions, adding a shadowy dimension to Russia’s maritime operations.
The vehicles and ships associated with the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research are based in Gadzhiyevo, a strategic location in the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea. These assets include special-purpose nuclear submarines like the BS-64 Podmoskovie and BS-136 Orenburg, deep-sea nuclear stations, and research vessels such as Yantar and Almaz (Project 22010), with the latter still under construction. Additional assets include the Evgeniy Gorigledzha (Project 02670). Meanwhile, other navy research vessels are distributed among Russia’s various fleets, ostensibly under the purview of the Navigation and Oceanography Directorate.
The exact relationship and division of responsibilities between the two directorates remain unclear. While both officially coordinate maritime research, no publicly available information explains why their tasks overlap or how their roles differ. The Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, in particular, is shrouded in secrecy, with limited insights gleaned from media and unofficial sources suggesting it handles specialized and highly classified missions.
Beyond the navy, other organizations also operate research vessels in Russia. The National Research Fleet Operator, under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, alongside Roshydromet, Rosnedra, and RosGeo, deploy ships for scientific purposes. While ostensibly civilian, some of these vessels are capable of conducting seabed topographic surveys and could potentially serve military objectives. This dual-use capability underscores the blurred lines between civilian research and military applications in Russia’s approach to maritime operations.
What Do These Vessels Do?
Among the navy’s research vessels, mainly hydrographic vessels can be used for intelligence and sabotage against NATO and E.U. members’ undersea infrastructure, especially in the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas and the Arctic Ocean. They have deep-sea surveillance capabilities and can be used for sabotage operations against undersea cables, subsea energy, and internet infrastructure. They can conduct deep-sea research of the seabed for topographic survey, search for various equipment from sunken ships or aircraft lost at sea, and carry out rescue operations. Such capabilities can also be used for intelligence and sabotage, for instance on adversaries’ undersea cables or pipelines.
Reportedly, in 2020 the Russian navy had hydrographic vessels designed to perform marine, river, and lake surveying and pilot work and (one Project 860 vessel, four Project 861 vessels, one Project 852 vessel, eight Project 862 vessels and two Project 865 vessels); small hydrographic vessels designed for hydrological research in the near sea and base zones, survey and work in areas dangerous to shipping, equipping roadsteads, and surveying the seafloor relief in coastal areas (five Project 870 vessels, five Project 871 vessels, 15 Project 872 vessels, two Project REF-100 vessels, three Project 16611 vessels); and three Project 19910 vessels, two Project 16609 vessels, one Project 90600 vessel, nine Project 19920 boats, two Project 23040G boats, and 20 boats of various Soviet-built projects (a total of 52 vessels and 31 large hydrographic vessels.)
According to a 2023 publication, the Russian navy also has large hydrographic boats of projects 22370G, 1896, G-1415, and others, as well as small hydrographic boats of projects 21961, 21960M, 16831, 1403A, and 727M — more than 120 units in total. Of these, only 15 are capable of operating in the distant sea zone and oceans, with the rest being intended to perform tasks in the near sea zone.
Based on open sources, the main research vessels used by the Russian navy include: large hydrographic boats of Project 23040G (in service since 2018-2021): Georgy Zima, Alexander Evlanov, Vladimir Kozitsky, Boris Slobodnik, Nikolay Ivashintsov, and Leonid Senchura; experimental research vessel Ladoga of project 11982; Leonid Molchanov and Valeriy Rozhdestvensky of Project 23370; Evgeny Gorigledzhan of Project 02670; Academician Aleksandrov (20180); Zvezdochka (20180);Academician Kovalev(20181) and Academician Makeev (20181, not yet in service). There are also smaller vessels, such as boats and catamarans. For instance, the Mikhail Kazansky catamaran is a multifunctional modular hydrographic boat and the lead vessel in a series of three under Project 23370G.
The Yantar and Admiral Vladimirsky are Russian navy ships that often appear in media outlets. Yantar has been in service since March 2015 and serves as the flagship of Project 22010 Kruys. If necessary, it can carry the deep-sea manned bathyscaphes Rus, Consul, and Mir. Reportedly, it carries devices that are designed for deep-sea surveillance, as well as equipment for connecting to top-secret communication cables. Yantar is also widely known as a Russian spy ship, with its activities noted in several parts of the high seas in recent years. The construction of another vessel of that project, Almaz, is expected to be completed in 2024. Another research vessel is Admiral Vladimirsky (Project 852, in service since 1975).
The Challenges
At first glance, Russia appears to have an impressive fleet of research vessels, but most were built in the 1970s and 1980s and they will soon be decommissioned. Since the 2010s, both Russian civilian and navy research vessel fleets have faced the same significant challenge: the need for modernization. Although Russia has been building new vessels since the 2010s, sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, the cut-off of cooperation with foreign shipbuilding companies, and the heavy workload on local shipbuilders have hindered progress in updating the fleet. Even before 2022, only small and large hydrographic vessels had been renewed, and in quantities far smaller than the number being decommissioned. In 2017, the Ministry of Defense’s report on the state of Russia’s national security in maritime activities stressed the dire condition of research vessels operated by the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, Roshydromet, and Rosnedra. The report described these fleets as being in a “catastrophic and critical state.” It noted that the average depreciation of the fleet exceeded 80 percent, the average vessel age was 34 years, and the technical condition of most vessels was assessed as unsatisfactory. The report warned that the remaining research vessels “may completely cease operations in the coming years,” potentially halting all expeditions monitoring Russia’s internal sea waters and territorial sea.
At the same time, there is no publicly available replacement plan for the vessels of projects 852, 862, and 865, capable of long voyages and operating in almost any point of the world ocean. Moreover, Russian experts stress that given the length of the Russian coastline and the diverse climatic and hydrological conditions of its coastal waters, the vessels currently being put into operation are insufficient to reliably provide hydrographic support to the navy even in Russian territorial waters. However, hydrographic support in distant sea zones can be provided by oceanographic vessels built for the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research.
Before the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the Nizhegorodsky Teplokhod Plant launched the construction of a series of large hydrographic boats of Project 23040G. The first two boats of this project were planned to join the hydrographic service of the Baltic Fleet of Russia. Also, the construction of small hydrographic boats of Project 21961 was launched for surveying the seabed in shallow waters.
Reportedly, it is planned to build four research vessels with unlimited seaworthiness, a displacement of about 5,000 tons, great autonomy, and long cruising range. Designs of the planned hydrographic vessels and boats stressed a high level of automation, equipping them with modern technical means for performing oceanographic, hydrographic, and hydrometeorological work, lifting equipment for working with floating warning signs, and outboard devices. It is also planned to reducing the total number of vessels and boats, as well as the nomenclature of different projects and creating universal vessels capable of partially replacing each other.
Conclusion
Since the Soviet era, Russia has maintained a research vessel fleet that serves civilian, research, and military purposes. While the Soviet Union once boasted one of the largest research fleets in the world, its collapse left Russia struggling to maintain and modernize its aging fleet. Today, this fleet, though diminished, remains a key element of Russian naval strategy, particularly in the realm of deep-sea intelligence and sabotage.
The Russian navy retains significant expertise and specialized capabilities for underwater operations, supported by a dedicated directorate for deep-sea sabotage and intelligence. Facing economic pressures from its invasion of Ukraine and its overall strategic inferiority in competition with NATO, Moscow is likely to prioritize strengthening these capabilities. Russia’s growing focus on deep-sea operations could also extend to targeting Europe’s renewable energy infrastructure, such as offshore wind farms and seabed projects, further escalating tensions in the region. Most recently, a Russia-linked dark fleet tanker, seized by Finland for damaging several undersea cables, reportedly had also intelligence devices.
One of the most immediate security challenges for Russia in the Baltic Sea is the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. This expansion has not only extended Russia’s land border with the alliance but also transformed the Baltic Sea into what Russian analysts describe as a “NATO lake.” The Gulf of Finland, a critical maritime route for access to and from Kaliningrad, could be easily blockaded by the Finnish and Estonian navies, leaving the Russian Baltic Fleet in isolation. Such a scenario underscores the strategic vulnerability of Russia’s position in the region.
Russia is also deepening its naval cooperation with China, potentially as a means to bolster its capabilities. Recent joint exercises in the Gulf of Finland included scenarios simulating mine-laying operations by an enemy force. Russian and Chinese vessels practiced detecting and destroying these minefields, along with search-and-rescue operations and combat support. Around the same time, a Russian navy research vessel was accused of violating Finland’s territorial waters, highlighting Moscow’s persistent provocations.
These actions have prompted NATO to enhance its own maritime capabilities to counter Russian aggression, particularly in key regions such as the Baltic, Barents, and North Seas, as well as the Arctic. While the Russian navy continues to demonstrate significant expertise in deep-sea operations, its research fleet is aging rapidly, with many vessels nearing the end of their operational lives. Modernizing this fleet will be critical if Russia intends to sustain its ambitions beneath the waves.
Nurlan Aliyev holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and security studies. His research area is primarily focused on Russia’s foreign and security policy, strategic studies, the Arctic, and the geopolitics and geoeconomics of Eurasia. He is the author of Reassessing Russia’s Security Policy. Follow him on X @anurlan.
Image: Andrey Luzik (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation) via Wikimedia Commons
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