In a press conference on Jan. 7, President-elect Donald Trump declined to rule out using military force to acquire Greenland. Previously, he proclaimed that American “ownership and control” of the semi-autonomous island, which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, was “an absolute necessity.” The incoming president has also reposted a recent article arguing the virtues of a U.S. takeover of the island and even extended a Christmas greeting to “the People of Greenland, which is needed by the United States for National Security purposes” a few days later. All this has reinvigorated speculation that President-elect Trump will once again try to acquire Greenland. The previous Trump administration initially tried to buy the island in 2019.
This speculation should be taken seriously. It taps into an ongoing debate among former Trump officials who have focused on designing more realistic plans for acquiring the island. Kaush Arha, Alexander B. Gray, and Tom Dans have offered the most sophisticated proposal, suggesting that the United States should pursue a Compact of Free Association with an independent Greenland, like the current arrangement between Washington and a handful of Pacific micro-nations such as Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. Under this arrangement, Greenland would gain independence from Denmark but offer the United States access to its territory in return for a security guarantee and promises of economic and administrative support, such as large annual direct economic transfers, judicial and diplomatic services, and a coast guard. Free association, the authors argue, would be beneficial for the United States as it would allow “the stationing of U.S. military personnel,” give the United States “an essential source of critical minerals,” and counteract a Chinese presence on the world’s largest island.
However, pursuing free association with Greenland would be a costly mistake. As I have previously argued in these pages, the United States is already achieving its geostrategic objectives in Greenland, while passing on the hefty bill for running the island to Denmark. While the proponents of free association accurately identify the three most important American goals in Greenland — maintaining military access to the island’s territory, getting access to critical minerals (such as rare earth elements), and avoiding Chinese influence over the island — free association would not enable Washington to reach those objectives. While it may be more realistic than trying to buy the island outright, free association would yield no geostrategic benefits, while ensuring the United States would incur new costs. It would also alienate Denmark, a NATO ally, which opposes the move. In short, pursuing free association would be a bad deal.
Free Association is Expensive
The Trump administration’s attempt to buy Greenland in 2019 was a strategic cul-de-sac that led to nothing but unnecessary tensions with Denmark. When the dust had settled, the United States quickly abandoned this approach and instead began pursuing a cost-effective engagement strategy in Greenland.
The current U.S. engagement strategy builds on existing agreements and combines an effective public diplomacy effort, anchored at the American consulate in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, with minor economic and political incentives to Greenland and Denmark in return for local acceptance of American geostrategic ambitions. Such incentives include ensuring that installation support services at the American Pittufik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) are provided by a local company at lucrative rates, as well as small support packages for the minerals, tourism, and education sectors. Washington has not disclosed the total sum of these efforts, but based on publicly available data it is estimated to cost less than $50 million per year.
The U.S. strategy also tacitly acknowledges that interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark, including American probing into the question of Greenlandic independence, is the third rail of Danish–American relations. Most Greenlandic elites as well as the broader public want independence from Denmark, and most Danish elites share the view that the island’s future is up to its inhabitants. While Denmark is unlikely to prevent Greenlandic independence if Nuuk wants to strike out on its own, Copenhagen views external meddling in what it considers its internal affairs to be out of bounds. As part of its engagement strategy, the United States has therefore stayed out of debates about the future status of Greenland and has strived to only engage with Greenland in ways that are seen as acceptable under the existing laws and norms governing Danish–Greenlandic relations.
Free association, by contrast, would involve touching that third rail by actively supporting Greenlandic independence and offering Greenland a better deal than the one Nuuk is currently getting from Denmark. It would lead to unnecessary tensions between the United States and one of its most stalwart allies in Europe.
Free association would not only cause consternation in Copenhagen, it would also entail taking on a substantial economic burden. Polls show that Nuuk would therefore only accept independence and free association with the United States if Washington at a minimum offers to replace Denmark as Greenland’s main source of administrative support and direct economic transfers worth at least $700 million per year. Free association would thus increase the price of U.S. involvement in Greenland by more than 1,000 percent.
The United States Is Already Getting What It Wants
At the same time, free association would not help the United States achieve any of its three geostrategic goals.
First, the United States has had a military presence in Greenland for several decades. The island plays an important role in U.S. deterrence of both global and regional threats. The radar and satellite installations at Pittufik Space Base, the Defense Department’s northernmost installation, support missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions. While Greenland currently only plays a limited role in supporting maritime and airspace capacities and operations in the wider Arctic and North Atlantic regions — such as anti-submarine operations against Russian forces — the island’s strategic location could warrant more U.S. military attention in the future. If the United States wants more access than existing agreements allow, Greenland and Denmark have shown themselves to be amenable to Washington’s preferences, especially if given more political or economic incentives, the cost of which would be a tiny fraction of current Danish support to Greenland. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the United States would encounter significant pushback to expanding its current military presence should the need arise.
Second, American firms do not currently require free association to mine the critical minerals — including rare earth elements — found in Greenland. In 2019, the United States and Greenland agreed to strengthen existing cooperation in the development of mineral resources. Greenland’s 2024 foreign policy strategy emphasized a strong interest in attracting direct investment and trade from like-minded partners such as the United States, particularly individual states such as Alaska and those in the northeastern United States. At present, the Greenlandic mining industry largely remains dormant due to a number of factors, including low world market prices, high costs associated with mining under the harsh Arctic conditions, cumbersome regulations, and occasional local resistance by civil society groups. Free association would not remedy those challenges.
Third, the United States aims to prevent a significant Chinese presence on the island and maintain Greenland’s place within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. This has already been achieved through the current set-up, and free association would add no tangible benefits. While Russian entities have shown little interest in gaining a foothold in Greenland through investments or other types of cooperation, Chinese companies and research institutions made several unsuccessful attempts to establish a presence between 2014 and 2018. The lack of success was largely due to Danish and American efforts to deny China. Beijing has since moved on from its Arctic ambitions in Greenland — there have been no major attempts by Chinese actors to garner influence on the island since 2019.
Stick to the Current Engagement Strategy
The United States would gain nothing but additional expenses and unnecessary tensions with one of its close allies by pursuing free association with Greenland. In fact, free association would spoil what is a near-perfect arrangement for the United States, as Washington is already achieving its geostrategic objectives, while letting Denmark foot the bill for running Greenlandic society. Abandoning the cheap and successful engagement strategy would be an unforced error that would only benefit America’s adversaries.
Instead, the United States should maintain its current efforts and strive to find cheap ways to further strengthen its ties with Greenland. The United States could invest in additional support packages aimed at cooperation with Greenland in areas such as tourism and education. To make it easier for U.S. mining companies seeking to work in Greenland, Washington could incentivize new ventures by creating favorable loan schemes or a special investment fund for Arctic mining. This would not only secure important mineral supplies, but it would also weave the Greenlandic and U.S. economies closer together. Finally, Greenland has suggested the establishment of an Arctic North American political forum. Washington should support this initiative. Such a forum could be a place where the Arctic countries and local governments in North America (such as Alaska and Nunavut), as well as organizations representing local and indigenous communities, could strengthen dialogue and cooperation.
There is still cheap low-hanging fruit that can be picked to strengthen cooperation between Greenland, the United States, and Denmark — and thus secure American interests in Greenland. Washington should stick to these cost-effective efforts rather than pursuing complicated schemes like free association that will only make the United States worse off.
Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen is an associate professor at the Royal Danish Defence College, where he is the head of research at the Center for Arctic Security Studies. The views presented here are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the Royal Danish Defence College or any other Danish government entity.
Image: Oliver Schauf via Wikimedia Commons
Jesus Christ is King
