The Russian invasion of Ukraine is profoundly changing strategic relationships globally, due to worldwide solidarity coalitions. Its origins, strategies and possible resolution are intensely studied. A significant contribution to this analysis is the recently published Collisions: The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability (Oxford University Press, 2024) by Michael Kimmage, Ukraine adviser from the Obama Administration.
Kimmage starts off with a description of the Obama policy of democracy promotion. In 2014, it led to the Maidan protests in Kiev but due to a political embarrassment by the KGB, Obama abandoned it. He outsourced western policy regarding Ukraine to Germany and France. They signed the one-sided Minsk Agreements with Russia, which required Ukraine to negotiate with its own breakaway provinces, forcing it to qualify its sovereignty. Despite far-reaching compromises, Moscow was always dissatisfied and would not withdraw from the occupied territories. In 2019, Vladimir Zelensky was elected President of Ukraine as a peace candidate.
Donald Trump become the President of the United States in 2017 and was the first to provide $250 million in lethal aid to Ukraine, instead of modest humanitarian assistance. This became the subject of impeachment of Trump in July 2019 when he threatened to delay this aid, allegedly for political reasons. Despite this stiffening of policy, Kimmage claims that Trump contributed to the subsequent outbreak of the war. He calls Trump “an American Nero” and “mafia boss.” He claims that Trump “abandoned democracy… had no patience for human rights …and was a Putinist…”
The inauguration of President Biden resulted in a change of U.S. foreign policy to one of restoration of relations with Europe and Russia, similar to Obama reset. Kimmage described it as putting a limit on conflicts, so-called guardrails. Immediately, Biden signed the START II arms control agreement and restored cooperation in public health and climate change with Russia. Biden also gave permission to Germany for completion of the Nordstream 2 pipeline to provide Russian natural gas to Germany and Europe, which Trump vetoed. Support for Ukraine was lowered to $100 million but it continued to participate in NATO exercises in March, June, and September 2021.
In April 2021, U.S. intelligence observed a buildup of Russian troops near the Ukraine border. In response, Biden held up aid to Ukraine and initiated talks with Russia, which led to the Geneva summit of June 2021. In its aftermath, two working groups were established: on cybersecurity and on maintaining stability. Despite the seemingly successful outcome of the summit, Putin gave a speech on July 12, 2021 disparaging Ukraine. In August, Biden engaged in the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Putin’s belligerence toward Ukraine increased markedly after the Afghanistan debacle.
to transfer virtually its whole military arsenal to Ukraine: 340 tanks, hundreds of armored vehicles, anti-aircraft launchers, artillery, guns, ammunition, gasoline, MiG aircraft, and numerous other items. This equipment allowed Ukraine to withstand the initial Russian assault.
It was only on 25 March 2022 when Biden came to Warsaw to sign the necessary agreements that American military aid started flowing to Ukraine through Poland. First guns were provided in April and military equipment in May 2022. Biden decided to assist Ukraine only after it withstood the initial Russian attack with the help of East Europeans and was successfully defending itself “not with a certainty of victory but with the certainty that Ukraine would not give up…”
In conclusion, the author makes observations about war origins and blame for failure of peace efforts, which will impact the postwar settlement. He clearly states that the Russian invasion was caused by a failure of deterrence in Europe, in Ukraine, and in the United States. In Europe, he points to the Minsk agreements and how they demonstrated that France and Germany were limited as European powers and how they assumed that Russia was a necessary partner in European affairs.
Ukraine had a reputation as a corrupt and divided country and its military was underestimated by all sides due to its 2014 defeat. Zelensky himself was unpopular. However, once the war started these assumptions were proven wrong. The government and citizens were united defending their country. No Ukrainians want to live under Putin’s boot.
But perhaps the most significant failure was on the part of the United States. The author describes policies of Obama and Biden administrations of a virtual lack of military aid, pushing the problem on the Europeans deeply compromised by political and business ties with Russia, and flights of rhetoric about liberal international order but no consideration about how to actually defend it. When Putin threatened the invasion, the U.S. announced weak sanctions for after the invasion and engaged in “ceaseless diplomacy.” The U.S. did not arm Ukraine and did not threaten to use its own military power, therefore it was not taken into consideration by Putin in his decision to invade. Kimmage admits: “Had Putin factored the U.S. role in, he might not have invaded…” Another weakness was that the Biden Administration was ready to make significant concessions to Russia.
What changed Biden’s attitude was the successful initial defense of Ukraine due to a resolute, cohesive leadership, impressive military performance by Ukrainian forces, and massive initial military, humanitarian, and diplomatic support by countries of Eastern Europe. Once successful defense was mounted and inaccurate political judgements about Ukraine, Russia and Europe were discarded, Biden decided to support the Ukrainian war effort.
Image: Oxford University Press
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