Iran’s inability to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime and prevent its collapse, coupled with recent significant blows to Hizballah and Israeli strikes within Iranian borders, underscores Tehran’s unprecedented regional weakness.
With Russian support proving unreliable, the rapid Syrian downfall reminds Iranian leadership of the danger of their growing domestic estrangement. Now, Tehran faces a critical choice between dangerously advancing its military nuclear ambitions as the ultimate deterrent or seeking de-escalation at the risk of seeming vulnerable.
As Donald Trump prepares to take office again, a unique opportunity to influence Iran’s direction arises by renewing the combination of effective pressure and robust negotiations, mainly aimed at a permanent detailed weaponization ban, while providing Tehran with possible domestic benefits. At the same time, the military “Plan B” against Iran’s nuclear program that was recently debated by the Biden administration should remain at hand — operationally and politically — in case diplomacy fails.
Iran’s Chain of Failures
In recent months, the Iranian regime has faced a series of setbacks that have severely undermined its regional prestige, bringing it to a record low. These include the decimation of most of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, the substantial weakening of Hizballah’s leadership and its offensive capabilities in Lebanon, the first extensive Israeli military strike deep within Iran (a move unprecedented since the war between Iran and Iraq), and the collapse of Assad’s regime despite Tehran’s prolonged efforts to stabilize its Syrian ally. Collectively, these events highlight the vulnerabilities of the Iranian regime and portray it in a negative light.
Iran’s strategy, aimed at cultivating peer forces to encircle its adversaries with security challenges, has largely failed. The control over a crucial corridor stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon was disrupted, the cohesion of the “axis of resistance” has weakened, and instead of shielding its territory through proxies, Iran found itself engaged in direct confrontations with Israel. These exchanges severely compromised Iran’s air defense systems, increasing its vulnerabilities. Furthermore, despite two notable demonstrations of Iranian missile power in the past year, these efforts have yet proven insufficient to prevent further Israeli strikes.
The failure of the axis of resistance and the missile project to protect Iran’s national security has positioned its nuclear program as the principal potential deterrent against adversaries. However, despite significant advancements in recent years, the nuclear component, in its present state, appears to remain insufficient in warding off external threats.
Are Nuclear Weapons a Solution for Tehran?
Iran now stands at a critical juncture. Should the Iranian leader, heeding advice from prominent figures within its political sphere and drawing lessons from the experiences of North Korea, Libya, and Ukraine, opt to pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent? Assad’s failed reliance on Russian aid could embolden regime insiders who advocate for such strategic autonomy. But this strategy, while aimed at securing the regime’s survival, risks legitimizing significant foreign attacks on Iranian soil. Alternatively, should the Iranian leader favor de-escalation to reduce confrontation risks and maximize economic gains, albeit at the potential cost of eroding Iran’s resilient image? This dilemma might underlie the Iranian foreign minister’s statement that “2025 will be an important year regarding Iran’s nuclear issue.”
Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei, showcasing more risk-prone behavior in recent years, is nearing a decision regarding this strategic issue, as numerous internal challenges are at stake: a widening rift between the regime and the public, severe economic difficulties, and increased focus on succession. The disintegration of Assad’s regime provides the Iranian leadership a stark reminder and a possible foreshadowing of Tehran’s fate if these issues remain unresolved.
Improved Conditions for a New Deal
In this context, recent developments in the Middle East, coupled with Trump’s forthcoming presidency, present a unique opportunity to alter the strategic landscape and possibly prevent Iran from taking perilous steps in its nuclear pursuits. Trump’s reputation as an unpredictable and forceful leader, coupled with his noted eagerness to swiftly secure agreements that have eluded others, might create favorable conditions for negotiating a new deal with Iran.
Trump’s review of the military strike options against nuclear facilities in Iran could signal to decision-makers in Tehran a possible policy shift in Washington. The president-elect’s leniency toward Israeli use of force could further empower him to influence Iran’s strategic decisions. Trump’s eagerness to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin may facilitate collaboration between Washington and Moscow, potentially encouraging Russia to exert pressure on its ally in Tehran, aiding in reaching a deal with Iran. The new administration’s readiness to intensify pressure on Beijing could result in more decisive measures, including stricter enforcement of oil sanctions against Chinese entities. This would increase the economic pressure on Iran, which heavily relies on oil exports to China.
Achieving a “longer and stronger” nuclear agreement with Iran is possible, but the pathway is challenging, and time is constrained. By October 2025, the international mechanism to reimpose U.N. Security Council nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will expire. Furthermore, growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear advancements and their impact on long-term security interests may drive Israel towards a preemptive strike, similar to those it conducted against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. The increasing calls for an attack, especially following the downfall of the Assad regime, the weakening of Hamas and Hizballah, and the Israeli long-range strikes in Yemen, suggest that such a move is more likely today. This possibility remains pertinent irrespective of whether a strike would permanently eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat.
Unlike the previous time-limited agreement, which focused on fissile materials, a new timeless arrangement should prioritize detailed scrutiny of nuclear weaponization and strengthen safeguards. Along with the importance of inspections for increasing transparency and trust, flexible access to Iranian facilities acts as both a hurdle and a potential deterrent against covert activities to promote nuclear weapons.
In addition to its political importance in binding decision makers in Tehran, an agreement focused on weaponization holds declarative value vis-a-vis Iranian technological circles as well. Senior scientists in organizations previously involved in weaponization, such as Iran’s Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (often known by the initials SPND), may perceive the current public debates on military nuclear breakout as implicit permission for related actions, including covert activities. Consequently, a formal agreement in this area could help suppress grassroots initiatives, some of which might proceed without leadership approval and potentially hasten the breakout timeline.
While extending the time for fissile material breakout remains essential, some of Iran’s technological advancements are no longer reversible and do not constitute bottlenecks. Under current circumstances, maintaining a one-year distance from Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium to military-grade levels may not be feasible. Nonetheless, the current state is untenable, with Iran merely a few days away from this capacity.
In addition to applying effective pressure, the Iranian regime needs to see a choice, anticipating sustainable economic benefits and internal stability at the negotiation’s conclusion. Allowing the preservation of other limited Iranian deterrence capabilities can help Iranian leaders avoid the perception of capitulation, thereby reducing the likelihood of a future resurgence in nuclear weaponization ambitions as a last resort for projecting power to ensure regime preservation. Focusing on incorporating regional or missile issues into a new agreement could undermine the primary objective. Furthermore, Iran has recently sustained significant setbacks in some of these components, which can be deepened without the regime’s consent.
Given the well-known Iranian tactics of prolonging talks, a limited timeframe should be assigned to negotiating a nuclear agreement. Simultaneously, a new deal should not be viewed as an end in itself, and the urgency to resolve the current perilous situation should not lead to compromises that maintain Iran in a hazardous nuclear position. Consequently, the military Plan B against Iran’s nuclear program should be prepared in case diplomacy fails, while operational readiness and political maturity are essential to enable a swift action.
Fall or Change
As observed, even entrenched autocratic regimes eventually collapse. The primary factors behind such downfalls are internal frailties and external circumstances that facilitate change. The rift between the Iranian regime and its citizens is likely to further widen and the global landscape continues to evolve rapidly. Consequently, the Iranian regime may ultimately either collapse or be compelled to undergo significant transformations.
When the Iranian regime eventually faces change, there is a possibility that its longstanding ambition to possess nuclear weapons may be relinquished. Until such a transformation occurs, the focus remains unwavering: The regime should be prevented from advancing any closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon. This is crucial to avert a radical destabilization of the Middle Eastern order and to stop acceleration of regional nuclear proliferation.
Assaf Zoran is a research fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is a lawyer with 25 years of experience addressing policy and operational issues in the Middle East, engaging in strategic dialogue with decision-makers in Israel and other regions.
Image: Fars Media Corporation via Wikimedia Commons
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