“In the United States people are singularly oblivious of the close relation between peace and preparation.”
–Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1912
Only 34 percent of Americans can find Taiwan on a map and they are even less aware of U.S. strategic interests there. The Chinese Communist Party leadership likely knows this. National will is critical for preventing or winning a protracted war over Taiwan. The stakes of conflict determine national resolve. “Rally around the flag” effects from initial fighting can be short-lived. Resolve falters as costs mount unless stakes are high. Government efforts to catalyze national will are essential before conflict. Wars from Korea to Ukraine testify that adversaries initiate conflict when they perceive America lacks resolve.
President Joe Biden has said America will defend Taiwan, but U.S. officials have not explained why Taiwan is worth a war. Most elites seem to understand, but official U.S. statements are largely silent on the topic. This may explain why most elites support U.S. troops defending Taiwan, but most Americans are opposed despite believing China critically threatens U.S. “vital interests.” Americans do not understand the stakes. As elites call for a larger and more diverse defense–industrial base and military budget increases, the question “why?” looms unanswered.
U.S. officials tend to avoid publicly discussing Taiwan’s strategic importance because of political sensitivities with China, but silence damages resolve and deterrence, making war more likely. Actively downplaying Taiwan’s value is even riskier. U.S. interests in Taiwan are primarily geostrategic, but some view these as incompatible with Washington’s “one China” policy. Even if valid, harm to deterrence may outweigh costs of transparency. Officials can strengthen deterrence by articulating the stakes in Taiwan and bracing Americans for protracted war. China does this while leveraging the “one China” policy to suppress Washington from the same. Ambiguity about whether America will defend Taiwan is a fact, but ambiguity about why it might fight is a dangerous choice.
Costly Silence
In 2021, Ely Ratner, responsible for U.S. Indo-Pacific defense policy, broke precedent by testifying to Congress about Taiwan’s geostrategic value to the United States. This triggered a firestorm of criticism. Ratner’s subsequent testimonies from 2022 to 2024 reverted to the norm of stock talking points. The U.S. “one China” policy makes officials reluctant to openly discuss strategic interests in Taiwan.
U.S. officials are concerned that Beijing views U.S. strategic interests as incompatible with this policy. Under this policy, Washington acknowledges Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China but does not endorse this claim. Instead, Washington supports peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, including possible unification if it reflects Taiwanese popular will and occurs without coercion. Officials worry that implying U.S. interests are best served by Taiwan remaining separate from China will lead Beijing to conclude that the United States opposes peaceful unification, potentially justifying the use of force.
These officials seem to assume Beijing believes that Washington does not already have strategic interests in Taiwan and that peaceful unification is plausible. The first assumption is almost certainly untrue. Chinese officials, scholars, and media reflect the prevailing Chinese assumption that U.S. strategic interests fuel America’s use of Taiwan to “contain” China. Beijing noticed Ratner’s delineation of U.S. interests in 2021, as well as arguments by U.S. elites that assert Taiwan’s geostrategic importance. Publicly explaining U.S. interests will not expose anything Beijing does not already know.
Uncoerced unification is possible in two scenarios, both of which are unlikely: if China liberalizes politically and embraces the U.S.-led order, or if Taiwanese social and political trends radically shift to welcome unification. Beijing probably understands peaceful unification is unrealistic. Taiwan’s public support for unification has steadily declined for decades and is at a low of 1 percent. China’s minister of defense recently said the prospect of peaceful unification is being “eroded” by Taiwanese politicians. If Taiwan’s democratic process is already driving Beijing towards abandoning peaceful unification, there is minimal additional harm from explaining U.S. interests.
U.S. officials may also worry that openly discussing American interests vis-à-vis Taiwan would intensify Beijing’s paranoia that the island would become emboldened to declare independence. But Washington can affirm U.S. interests while reiterating it does not support independence, as U.S. leaders already do. And it is important to remember that the vast majority of Taiwanese support the current status quo.
Silence risks weakening deterrence. Beijing may doubt U.S. readiness for a protracted conflict, undermining its belief in American resolve. Winning such a conflict requires national mobilization, a stronger defense-industrial base, the support of allies, and clear communication of the stakes. Officials can and should rally public support, and they can do so without undermining the “one China” policy.
The Stakes
U.S. leaders and officials should explain that America’s interests regarding Taiwan are primarily geostrategic. While democracy and human rights appeal to Americans’ sense of morality, they are unlikely to justify sustained sacrifices. A Chinese attack on Taiwan would inflict immense and immediate economic harm on U.S. citizens by disrupting critical supply chains, especially for semiconductors. This makes deterrence a practical investment for Americans.
Beyond the immediate economic fallout, the American people should also understand that losing Taiwan would alter the geostrategic landscape and generate long-term economic damage that far outweighs the investments required to deter a war and, if necessary, win one. Allies and partners in the region likely see Taiwan as a test of U.S. resolve. If the island is lost to China, some may seek accommodation with Beijing. China could then use its resulting regional supremacy to pressure Asia-Pacific countries constituting one-third of global GDP to limit trade with the United States and decrease reliance on the U.S. dollar. Other countries might balance against China and develop nuclear weapons. Either way, shifting geopolitical alignments would polarize the region and make additional costly wars more likely.
Losing Taiwan would also threaten the security of Americans. Once China controls the “front gate to the Pacific,” the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands become highly vulnerable. China might also rotate military forces into the Western Hemisphere. An international relations theory influential among Chinese elites advises states to secure their region and disrupt other states from controlling neighboring regions. By leveraging ports in the Americas to maintain an episodic naval presence, China could alleviate U.S. military pressure in Asia by tying down U.S. forces and menacing the U.S. homeland.
Geostrategic considerations provide the strongest case. Controlling Taiwan would allow China to dominate the first island chain, threatening key trade routes and regional stability. The stakes for the United States are vital but not existential. China will probably have an advantage over America in relative resolve. But America does not need superior resolve, it only needs sufficient resolve to credibly deny seizure of Taiwan while enduring a protracted war. No amount of resolve can transport the Chinese military across the Taiwan trait if its amphibious and commercial lift is destroyed — it cannot simply will itself across the strait. Bombing alone, without ground forces, cannot produce victory. If China cannot cross the strait or bomb Taiwan into submission, it cannot translate higher resolve into military victory. By clearly articulating the stakes, officials can strengthen American resolve and deter aggression.
Jake Yeager is a Marine officer in the intelligence career field in the Commandant of the Marine Corps Strategist Program, pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at Stanford University. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Defense Department, or any part of the U.S. government.
Image: Lisa Ferdinando via DVIDS.
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