The war against Hamas, which began in the wake of its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was one of the longest sustained wars that Hamas has had to face in its almost 40-year history. The group was prepared to face this challenge. Now that Hamas appears to be emerging in Gaza, it is worth asking some initial questions about how it survived.
When the war began, Hamas sent several thousand of its fighters to attack Israel. Hamas was estimated after October 7 to have around 24 “battalions.” This was around 30,000 fighters. There were other terrorist groups in Gaza, primarily Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which had thousands of fighters as well. This means that when the war began, the terrorists may have been able to kill up to 40,000 men. The terrorists faced an Israeli army that called up 300,000 reservists and deployed around five divisions to fight in Gaza.
The main Israeli divisions that fought in Gaza included the 36th Armored Division, the 162nd Division, the 98th Division of Paratroopers and Commandos, the Gaza Division, the 99th Division, and the 252nd Division.
After the initial attack on Israel, Hamas retreated into tunnels in Gaza. Hamas had lost some fighters in the attack on Israel. Estimates say thousands of Palestinians were killed in the attack on Israel. However, it’s not clear if those estimates are correct.
What matters is that Hamas waited in Gaza for the IDF attack. The IDF also waited from October 7 to 27 to launch the ground campaign. This gave Hamas a lot of time to prepare and recover from the October 7 attack. Of course, it was Israel that truly had to recover, but Hamas also had to deal with an unprecedented number of hostages and face the Israeli Air Force airstrikes that followed October 7.
Hamas gains and losses
The initial IDF advance targeted northern Gaza and was designed to cut off northern Gaza from the south. Most initial advances were not in urban areas, instead the IDF’s 162nd Division moved from Zikim south along the coast while the 36th crossed south of Gaza in the Netzarim corridor, seizing the Salah-a-Din road and other key areas. Once the divisions linked up, the IDF launched attacks into northern Gaza.
The IDF and Israeli defense ministry estimated that these initial attacks defeated the ten or twelve Hamas battalions in northern Gaza. This later proved to be false.
However, Hamas did lose thousands of fighters in the north. The IDF never entered many neighborhoods around Gaza City, and even when the IDF went into places like Jabaliya or Beit Hanoun, it didn’t fully clear these areas. Hamas moved away, mixed with civilians, and waited. In many cases, the IDF didn’t check civilians fleeing Gaza City for the south, and it’s clear Hamas was able to leave if it wanted.
In January and February 2024, the IDF’s campaign became less intense. The IDF shifted focus to Khan Younis, and the 98th Division spent months clearing this key area of Hamas. By April, the 98th was done, and it left. Then, the IDF decided to go into Rafah after a long pause. In essence, Hamas was given a kind of de facto ceasefire in Gaza in March and April in Gaza, which enabled it to regroup. This was the era when the US was pressing to build a floating pier attached to the Netzarim corridor. The pier failed, but the time all this took mattered.
When the IDF finally went into Rafah and the Philadelphi corridor on the border with Egypt in May 2024, Hamas was able to move back to Khan Younis because the 98th Division had left. Now, it was the job of the 162nd Division to remove Hamas from Rafah, a process that took three months. Possibly 1,000 Hamas fighters were eliminated, and hundreds were detained. Hamas regrouped in northern Gaza in Shejaiya and Jabaliya, and Hamas settled down in central Gaza in Nuseirat, Bureij, Deir al-Balah, and Maghazi. In these areas, Hamas created a mini-state and kept governing. It also controlled the Mawasi humanitarian area, and from there, it projected influence and power by profiting off aid coming into Gaza.
In September, the IDF shifted its focus to Hezbollah. The 98th Division went north, leaving few troops in Gaza. The IDF expanded the Netzarim corridor and also killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, but the lack of troops meant this could not be exploited. Hamas waited and watched. By this time, Hamas only operated on the surface in small groups. It had moved most of its command and control into schools, and many of its members had relocated to hospitals to hide. It suffered losses but kept up this practice of using civilian areas to hide. It also began using more booby traps against the IDF.
By October, the IDF was ready for a new offensive in northern Gaza. The 162nd Division was sent into Jabaliya and eventually into areas in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya. In Jabaliya, 70,000 civilians had to be evacuated, and the IDF found thousands of Hamas fighters. This proved to be a difficult battle, and dozens of IDF troops became casualties. Hamas showed that it had not been defeated and had actually recruited and possibly grown in strength in Jabaliya.
By the time the IDF was done clearing this area, the hostage deal was being signed. Now, the IDF has withdrawn from northern Gaza and is redeploying from Netzarim. Hamas has survived because it was never defeated in central Gaza or Gaza City. When Hamas lost units, it rebuilt them. When it lost commanders, it replaced them.
Hamas has lost many commanders and leaders in the past, such as Sheikh Yassin Abdel Aziz Rantisi or Saleh Shehade. Palestinian Islamic Jihad has also lost commanders in the past, such as Baha Abu al-Ata. Losing fighters and commanders is a way of life for these groups. During the May 2021 war, the IDF claimed to have eliminated 25 top Hamas commanders. It’s possible this was an exaggeration, but even if it wasn’t, Hamas replaced them.
Hamas controls the 2 million people in Gaza. It recruits from a pool of around 300,000 young men. All Hamas has to do is recruit a small percentage of these men, and it can continue to replenish its ranks.
Additionally, the population of Gaza is young; more than half are under 18. Hamas has a ready pool of recruits. Each generation grows up under Hamas rule. They know nothing else. They don’t recall a time without wars every year or two. They are used to Israel’s airstrikes and walking amongst the rubble. They don’t see an alternative, and Hamas preys on their misery.
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