On Sunday, the 60-day period for the IDF to withdraw from southern Lebanon expires.
On Saturday, the IDF is due to withdraw from Netzarim, opening the floodgates for a potential million plus Palestinians to return to northern Gaza from southern Gaza. There are also supposed to be in the near future Palestinian Authority-affiliated officials handling aspects of the Gaza-Egypt Rafah Border Crossing, a highly controversial matter for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
On February 3, the IDF and Hamas are due to start negotiations over making the current 42-day ceasefire permanent and about what the post-war Gaza order will look like.
All of this could blow up in a moment, and war could return to one or both fronts in an instant.
Will it?
At press time, all Israeli defense officials, Lebanese officials, and Western officials were waiting to hear what the Israeli cabinet would decide in terms of whether to try to extend the IDF stay in some parts of southern Lebanon or complete the withdrawal. There were leaks from an Israeli official that at least there would not be a complete withdrawal on Sunday itself, but this left plenty of room for interpretation.
While Netanyahu has asked the support of US President Donald Trump to keep around five IDF positions in Lebanon, and the military itself has asked for another 30 days to ensure Hezbollah weapons on the Lebanon-Israeli border get destroyed, there has been pushback from Trump.
In theory, Trump probably does not care much if Israel overstays the deal somewhat, but if this led to Hezbollah firing rockets and a renewal of the war on the northern border, he would probably be furious with Netanyahu.
This is exactly what Hezbollah has threatened, including a detailed and updated threat on Thursday night. But are they serious? And would they really roll the dice all out if the IDF just stayed another 30 days or another 15 days?
Part of this is the Israeli-Lebanese government-Hezbollah sides all trying to shape the terms of the post-war order within Lebanon and on the border.
Sure, Israel got Hezbollah to stop firing rockets as of the ceasefire
But can it really prevent Hezbollah from returning to southern Lebanon with no physical presence there?
And given the Lebanese army’s reluctance to clear Hezbollah’s weapons, will they really stop Hezbollah from returning?
If Hezbollah only returns very gradually and in various camouflaged ways, how far will the IDF go in potentially attacking from the air, which could lead to civilian and Lebanese army harm?
As Lebanon’s new president and prime minister – who Hezbollah opposed – take office – how much will they press Hezbollah to give up pieces of its military control of the state versus trying to get along with Hezbollah so that they can remain in office?
All of these questions and Israeli efforts to convince Trump it can keep some longer foothold in Lebanon are why Israel started rolling out press release after press release in recent days, including on Thursday, about finding new Hezbollah weapons on the border – this after weeks of basically radio silence about Hezbollah.
On Thursday, the IDF said that Division 91 and the 7th Armored Brigade found anti-tank missiles, grenades, and Kalashnikov assault rifles during its patrols.
Moreover, the Yahalom combat engineering unit and other soldiers unearthed several additional tunnels belonging to Hezbollah, including weapons storage.
Once again, many of these same questions have been transferred in one way or another to Gaza.
Once a million Palestinians return to northern Gaza, who will run their lives if not Hamas? Is it viable for Israel to threaten to go back to war there with so many civilians just returned after 15 months?
Once the PA has even a technical foothold at the Rafah Crossing, how will Israel really prevent them from expanding their reach in Gaza if they reach a deal with Hamas, moderate Sunni donor countries, and the West?
Netanyahu’s spokesperson noted that EUBAM, a European unit, will supervise the actual transfer of humanitarian aid via the Rafah Crossing, but will that really prevent the PA from gaining a foothold?
The prime minister has been adamant that the IDF will return to war on Day 42 and will not withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor. But he also wants the remaining 30 hostages back from Hamas.
Why would Hamas return all of those hostages once it gets closer to Day 42 if it does not believe the ceasefire will continue and that the IDF will leave the Philadelphi area?
What will Netanyahu do when Trump makes it clear to him that he does not want the war re-ignited and that, at most, he might approve ongoing smaller raids by IDF forces as in the West Bank?
And if Hamas refuses to return the remaining hostages beyond the 33 guaranteed in Phase I, unless Israel commits to ending the war in principle and concretely to two additional periods of around 42 days to receive the additional hostages, will Netanyahu fight back against a new level of fury from the hostage families?
On the flip side, will he not jump back into the war in Gaza on some level on Day 42 if Betzalel Smotrich threatens to topple his government otherwise? And with that hanging over his head, might Netanyahu not start shaking the boat with Hamas on Day 16 to try negotiating for it to give up control of Gaza to Sunni allies and the West?
But even if Hamas says a conditional “yes” if the Sunni allies and the West condition their help on giving the PA a greater role, supported loudly by opposition leaders Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid, who will give Netanyahu a government safety net vote, which way will Netanyahu go?
All of this will make for an explosive coming days and weeks as many of the fateful post-war questions that Netanyahu has delayed for 15 months finally come charging back to haunt him.
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