When President Joe Biden announced on Jan. 15, 2025 that the United States had successfully brokered a fragile ceasefire and phased hostage exchange between Israel and Hamas, he underscored how the cessation of violence could open the doorway for regional integration and economic prosperity: “At the G20 summit in Delhi in September 2023, I rallied key countries behind a vision of an economic corridor from India across the Middle East to Europe. That vision can now become a reality.”
That vision, known as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, was launched on Sept. 9, 2023, when the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, and Italy to advance the transcontinental infrastructure project. The Biden administration hailed it as a major diplomatic and commercial breakthrough — a project that could compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
But Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel and the regional conflict that it triggered just weeks after the G20 summit has damned enthusiasm for the project and led to uneven investment in its future.
With the first phase of the ceasefire deal gradually being implemented, and President Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor should enjoy a breath of new life. In order for that to happen, the Trump administration will need to tackle some of the region’s most complicated security challenges while simultaneously empowering partners along the economic corridor to take the lead in developing a cohesive commercial model. If performed successfully, the United States would both incentivize the establishment of a new regional architecture and take an important step towards reducing its role in the Middle East.
A 21st-Century Superhighway
When the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was first introduced, it was met with much fanfare. Sitting alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Biden told the G20 audience that the corridor was “a really big deal” and part of a collective effort to: “building sustainable, resilient infrastructure, making quality infrastructure investments; and creating a better future that represents greater opportunity, dignity, and prosperity for everyone.”
Few details about the corridor were shared at the time. From what can be understood from the memorandum of understanding, the project is meant to be composed of three elements: an eastern maritime corridor linking India and the Arabian Peninsula, a railway project designed to link all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, and a northern corridor connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Jordan and Israel. In addition to rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure, the corridor would incentivize the continued investment in undersea data cables and future energy projects such as green hydrogen pipelines and electricity interconnectors.
Each of the involved parties saw the corridor as a win-win scenario for its own reasons. For India, it offered a way to strengthen its role in global value chains and counter China’s growing influence. In Modi’s own words, “This corridor is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.” For the Gulf states, the project offered a way to execute a clear hedging strategy between the United States and China, support East-West trade routes that maintained their role as middle powers, and diversify their energy markets. For Europe, the corridor would buoy its economic security and establish critical energy links with the Gulf states. For the Biden administration, the project was seen as a logical counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an opportunity to facilitate greater interconnectivity and cooperation between key partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Trump administration might very well share the same view. For all the parties involved, establishing a land bridge across the Arabian Peninsula would reduce security risks for international shipping around the Horn of Africa as well as bottlenecking at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.
Just weeks after the G20 summit, enthusiasm about the corridor was replaced with realism. Hamas’ attack — and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza and Lebanon — derailed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and strained ties between Israel and the other Gulf states. Houthi attacks forced international shipping vessels to reroute away from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Hamas, the prospect of Israeli-Saudi peace was seen as a threat to the Palestinian national cause. But for Iran, Hamas’ primary sponsor, the real concern was that Israel’s continued integration in the region and participation in projects like the corridor would further constrain the Islamic republic. As part of a televised address on Oct. 4, 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told supporters that America and its allies were backing Israel so that it could become “a gateway for exporting energy from the region to the Western world while facilitating the import of goods and technology from the West to the region.” Encouraged by Tehran, Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping lanes, damaging global trade and contributing to Egypt’s economic woes. Seen as a way to bypass the region’s unstable corners, the war raised serious questions over how a transcontinental corridor can avoid the interference of a regional power like Iran.
Iran is not the only regional actor who expressed concern about being excluded from the economic corridor. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan famously responded to the corridor announcement by saying “there is no corridor without Turkey.” In the last year, Ankara has been championing the Development Road Project, a land-based trade corridor from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Turkey. Since the fall of Assad, multiple plans — including energy pipelines — connecting the Gulf to Turkey via Syria have been floated.
Like Iran and Turkey, Egypt fears that the corridor will draw business away from the Suez Canal, which serves as a crucial revenue source for a country with limited foreign investment opportunities and an increasingly unstable economy. While Egypt’s limitations were part of the reason why it was left on the outside of the corridor looking in, many participating states appreciate the importance of Egyptian economic stability — both for the region as well as the corridor’s future.
Jockeying for participation in such a transformative mega project is not limited to Middle Eastern actors. While the war in Gaza dampened European interest in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the EU’s Global Gateway is still operational and southern European states like France, Greece, and Italy have positioned themselves as potential landing points for the corridor.
Beyond the question of who will take part in the corridor’s main artery, other challenges remain. Member states have yet to articulate how the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects associated with the corridor will be financed. There are also serious doubts as to whether an intermodal transportation network that combines maritime shipping, railways, and highways will be more cost-efficient and sustainable than existing transportation routes. Though energy projects and digital highways are touted as complementary but equally important components to the corridor’s future, no feasibility studies have been conducted to date that test the viability of these plans (e.g. green hydrogen pipelines).
But as Biden’s speech hinted, the corridor is far from dead. Bilateral trade between India and the United Arab Emirates increased by 93 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2022, and the diversification of trade beyond oil is keeping pace. The United Arab Emirates is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. In February 2024, India and the United Arab Emirates signed a bilateral agreement designed to support the corridor’s establishment. The same month, U.S. transportation giant FedEx inaugurated a $350 million facility in Dubai. Regional investment in infrastructure has also continued. In September 2024, the United Arab Emirates signed a $2.3 billion railroad agreement with Jordan. Saudi investments in its railway network have increased to well over $4 billion as part of the government’s plans for Saudi Vision 2030. The same could be said for diplomatic activity between member states. Any observer of Indian diplomacy at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil would confirm that the geopolitical disturbances of the past year have done little to dissuade Modi from advancing a front and center, corridor-friendly agenda.
In summary, the interests that helped establish the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor remain as prevalent today as they did when the mega project was first announced. What remains to be seen is whether enough trust and common interest required to achieve such a sophisticated degree of economic interconnectivity exists between the principal actors. This is at least partially dependent on how the United States chooses to engage the region under Trump.
Bridging East and West by Stabilizing the Middle East
If the United States is to continue supporting the corridor’s development, it will need to find a balance between supporting the construction of a new regional security architecture, empowering member states, and ensuring that certain regulatory and taxation policies are upheld. Trump, who ran on an America First agenda and will be occupied with a myriad of global issues, may not have the bandwidth to engage meaningfully in the corridor. Still, there are concrete steps his administration can take that would uphold the U.S. commitment to its international partners while directly and indirectly benefiting the corridor’s future.
First, the administration should articulate its continued commitment to the corridor, allaying any concerns that the United States will renege on past promises under Trump. One way of demonstrating this is by appointing a special envoy to the initiative. This would mirror the decision in February 2024 by French President Emmanuel Macron, who tapped energy industry veteran Gerard Mestrallet for the position. Committing a senior U.S. representative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor would contribute to the project’s gradual institutionalization — a necessary step to create common policies on regulation, taxation, and customs procedures. The special envoy would engage diplomatically with member states as well as support American companies who wish to take part in the corridor’s development.
Trump should become an “empowerer-in-chief,” entrusting his cabinet appointments like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent to advance U.S. foreign policy interests without him needing to be in the room. It would be unsurprising if the corridor attracted the attention of Jared Kushner, a trusted voice during Trump’s first presidency.
That doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a role for Trump himself. Arguably his greatest strength is the warm personal relations he enjoys with many heads of state who are involved in the corridor. From India’s Modi to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Trump would find himself in good company at a future India-Middle East-Europe Corridor summit. But rather than steal the spotlight, Trump should practice lateral leadership, empowering international partners with a readiness for the United States to step in when the project needs a bit of a nudge.
At the same time, the Trump administration should encourage the construction of additional East-West corridors if they benefit America’s international partners and are both economically and strategically viable. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East only strengthen the case for diversifying and multiplying economic corridors. The eggs of the global trade shouldn’t all be placed in one basket.
The most instrumental way in which the Trump administration can support the corridor, along with other potential East-West corridors, is by addressing Middle Eastern instability. That means stewarding the distinct ceasefire agreements brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas and gradually turning them into more lasting political arrangements.
It may sound far-fetched today, nevertheless there are scenarios where elements of the corridor’s development are used to support Gaza’s rehabilitation. A revitalized Gaza port under international supervision, for example, would be a boon for Palestinians. The port could also serve as a supporting spur to Haifa Port — purchased by Indian-owned Adani Group in 2023 — where many of the corridor’s plans currently hinge. In short, by drawing inspiration from the corridor, the Trump administration could incentivize the parties to reach a durable resolution to the war that would create a window of opportunity to revisit normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia and attract additional foreign investment to the region.
A similar logic could be applied when dealing with new governments in Lebanon and Syria. If leveraged in the right way, participation in East-West corridors could be a major incentive for new political actors to respect U.S. interests, maintain their commitment to keeping the peace, and further reduce Iranian, Russia, and Chinese influence.
In addition to these steps, the United States should devise a more effective mechanism for constraining Houthi aggression. The corridor is not a replacement for the Suez Canal, and therefore the secure passage of maritime traffic around the Horn of Africa and Red Sea should remain a top priority for America and its allies.
Last but not least, the Trump administration will need to identify the correct formula for containing Iran and severing supply chains between Tehran and its proxies. Without some kind of arrangement between the United States and Iran, it is safe to suspect that the Islamic regime will try to undermine efforts to develop an East-West corridor that leaves it out in the cold.
This would be a stiff task for the most competent of U.S. administrations, regardless of whether it had an interest in supporting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’s fortunes. Considering some of the other pressing global issues that will draw Trump’s attention, such as a potential trade war with China and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is difficult to see how the Trump administration could achieve this feat alone. Perhaps that is the point. The corridor cannot succeed just by sheer American will. The project has so many diplomatic and commercial components that no single administration — or global actor — can take on such responsibility alone. Completing the corridor will require a coordinated effort over the course of decades. What the Trump administration can try to provide, however, is a commitment to empowering regional partners in a way that serves long-term U.S. national security and economic interests.
Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and serves as the Director of Undergraduate Studies at Notre Dame Jerusalem. He is completing his Ph.D. at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs. Follow him on X at @GabiAMitchell.
Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons
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