Will the Trump administration try to break the so-called “axis of upheaval”?
The Russo-Ukrainian War has catalyzed the consolidation of two sets of adversarial geopolitical alignments, however loose or imperfect they might be. On the one hand, a pan-Eurasian group of authoritarian or revisionist powers, comprising Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, has colluded in armed aggression and territorial conquest in Europe. As others have noted, Beijing, Pyongyang and Tehran have enabled Russia’s war machine and defense industrial base in a variety of ways both directly and indirectly. On the other hand, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific — including Australia, Japan, and South Korea — have rallied to support Ukraine and strengthened their institutional ties with NATO.
The image of two sets of adversarial alignments pitting continental and authoritarian powers against maritime democracies is a powerful one, and is very much in line with the Biden administration’s emphasis on revamping U.S. alliances and stressing the division between democracy and autocracy. However, uncertainty around the Trump administration’s commitment to furthering ties between U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific or alleged temptation to drive wedges between China, Russia and North Korea warrants grappling with some fundamental questions: How deep and broad are these adversarial geopolitical alignments? How far do they extend geographically? And to what extent can they be manipulated?
Not So Tight, Nor So Loose
International security scholars spend much time debating the differences between alliances, alignments, partnerships, non-aggression pacts, axes, blocs, etc. These and other concepts are typically distinguished based on their depth and breadth. Depth alludes to the nature of the parties’ commitment to assist each other in the case of an armed attack, their degree of institutionalization, and military integration (or lack thereof). Breadth alludes to whether the ties between two parties are confined to a particular domain, like security, or are broader in scope.
How do these two adversarial alignments score in terms of depth and breadth? Starting with the authoritarian powers, the existence of significant frictions within this group is rarely lost on anyone. Sino-Russian suspicions over Central Asia, the Arctic, and Mongolia are well known. So are China’s worries about the reputational costs that come with being associated with Russia or, for that matter, Russia’s obsession with eluding a junior partnership status, not least by strengthening its own ties with North Korea, India and Vietnam, all of which are problematic for Beijing. For their part, North Korea and Iran — well aware of Sino-Russian relations —constantly strive to maneuver between Beijing and Moscow to maximize their own leverage.
The authoritarian grouping is indeed characterized by a weak degree of security commitments, institutionalization, and military integration — certainly if compared with the U.S.-led alliance ecosystem. The fact that China and Russia are allergic to integrated military commands —a critical barometer of military integration and cohesion — and that they are not committed to or seem to be prepared to fight together is quite telling. Russia and North Korea — who recently signed a comprehensive strategic partnership — are probably an exception, in that they arguably present a higher degree of cohesion than any other relationship in the axis.
Indeed, one important feature associated with the revisionist powers is that the degree of cooperation between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran varies substantially across different pairs. Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli has spoken of a series of interlocking partnerships, which arguably better captures the disparity of links between these powers than the words ‘axis’ or ‘bloc’. With some caveats, one could even argue that Russia and China remain the main hubs for military and economic cooperation, respectively, within the revisionist camp.
The Sino-Russian relationship will likely continue to be characterized by a good dose of tensions and mistrust. But a key takeaway from the Ukraine war is that what unites them is greater than what divides them. Indeed, their shared interest in rolling back U.S. power is animating an alignment that appears to be getting deeper —as evidenced by the scale, scope, and frequency of exercises as well as meetings —and more comprehensive, encompassing energy, technology, diplomacy, trade, and monetary policy.
Arguably, the main competitive advantage the U.S.-led alliance ecosystem bears, specifically when compared to the Sino-Russian partnership, is actually its asymmetry. Scholarly research shows that asymmetric alliances tend to last longer and be more cohesive than symmetric ones, ultimately because the allies or partners aren’t constantly looking over each other’s shoulders. European and Indo-Pacific allies may worry about mitigating their dependence on the United States, but are all aware that there is no security outside the alliance with the United States. The same principle does not apply to the Sino-Russian partnership, even though their shared animosity towards the United States incentivizes them to prevent their frictions from disrupting their collaboration.
In practical terms, this means that the United States and its allies have a greater degree of integration and institutionalization and can go further in terms of not only extending mutual defense commitments to each other but also in sharing functional divisions of labor, operationally, capability development, and technological collaboration. Importantly, this logic extends beyond the realm of security. Moreover, the fact that this group has the United States as its main hub for security and economic cooperation underscores both the broader reach of the larger group’s relationship and results in greater cohesion too. In this regard, the specter of trade and economic frictions between the Trump administration and its allies could damage the cohesion of the U.S.-led alliance ecosystem.
Insofar as they all recognize the centrality of the United States to their security and way of life, the bond between America’s trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific allies is stronger than it may appear at first sight. They may indeed have different short-term priorities and even compete over the allocation of U.S. resources. But such differences are tactical in nature. Strategically, they all have a stake in the efficient management of U.S. power. As such, a U.S. focus on Asia and outcompeting China is actually in their collective interest — even that of Europeans. After all, that is where the main threat to America’s power base — and the broader economic and security ecosystem formed around it— comes from.
How Far?
The implications of these adversarial alignments surely go beyond the war in Ukraine. Dispersing U.S. resources far and wide is surely in the interests of the revisionist powers. For China, a protracted war in Europe offers an opportunity to hemorrhage U.S. resources and prevent a concentration of overwhelming American power into the decisive theater — the Indo-Pacific. Keeping the United States indefinitely mired in subsidiary theaters is certainly a key consideration for Beijing. A similar logic suggests China’s role promoting turmoil in the Middle East relative to its partners and their proxies. Indeed, a set of interlocking strategic partnerships with Russia, North Korea, and Iran allows China to “gain advantages and avoid disadvantages in chaos.” Russia is similarly aware of the importance of spreading U.S. resources far and wide, not least because it has recently experienced how overfocusing on one front (e.g. Ukraine) can lead to losses elsewhere (e.g. Syria).
When thinking about how far these geopolitical alignments may reach geographically, an interesting perspective might be that of role reversal: How would Russia or, for that matter, America’s European allies respond should a local conflict in the Indo-Pacific become internationalized as did the war in Ukraine?
Officials and experts have speculated about the new Russia-North Korea alliance being “forged in blood,” and Russia’s alleged commitment to fight side-by-side with North Korea in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. But caution may be warranted. First, direct military engagement in a hypothetical Korean contingency is a much higher bar for Russia than engaging in Ukraine is for North Korea. The United States is not directly involved in the latter, and would most probably be in the former. That means that the costs of engaging in Korea are much higher for Moscow than those of engaging in Ukraine are for Pyongyang. Moreover, a war in Asia that draws in the United States offers an opportunity for Russia in Europe, which means that expending too many Russian resources and energy in Northeast Asia could be a waste. That said, some form of support would probably be unavoidable. In addition to providing equipment, intelligence, and critical war materiel, Russia may also contribute by way of sabotaging South Korean defense industrial plants, which could be used to enable Europe’s own warfighting capabilities, and even provide a (modest) direct military contribution to the conflict.
A similar, “support but keep your powder dry” logic would probably apply in the event of a China-centric, first island chain contingency, although the pressure for Russia to intervene directly would arguably be lower than in a Korean Peninsula contingency. As convincingly argued by Oriana Skylar Mastro, while Russia is systematically assisting China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony in Asia through the provision of high-end military goods, there’s little evidence that these two powers are actually preparing to fight together.
When it comes to America’s European allies, as argued in a recent article with Toshi Yoshihara, five factors would probably determine the likelihood and degree of their engagement in a Taiwan conflict or any other first island chain contingency: context (i.e. whether a war in Asia breaks out in isolation or while there’s another war or credible threat of war in Europe?); length (is the war short or long and protracted); the nature of U.S. involvement (direct or indirect); geographical scope (confined to Taiwan’s offshore island or Strait or extends rapidly); and timing (is it in two years or in ten?). All in all, Europeans are more likely to engage – and make a difference – militarily if they are not focused elsewhere, if the conflict becomes protracted, if the United States intervenes directly, if the war escalates horizontally beyond the Taiwan Strait, and if the war breaks out in the 2030s (i.e. assuming that European defense spending continues on an upward trajectory).
Can They be Manipulated?
International security scholars are paying much attention these days to wedge strategies, namely a state’s efforts to prevent hostile alignments from forming or disperse those that have already formed.
Debates on whether the United States could or should attempt to drive a wedge between China and Russia — a popular topic amongst Cold War historians — have indeed resurfaced in recent years. To be fair, this discussion has evolved significantly and become much more nuanced and granular. The point is not about flipping Russia against China, but rather about incrementalism and damage control — minimizing the extent of Russia’s support to China in certain instances.
Some experts may argue that, even with that caveat, it is still naïve to think that the Sino-Russian relationship can be manipulated by the United States. That any conversation about driving wedges is actually likely to play into Russia’s hand, or for that matter China’s, and actually give them an opening to drive wedges both between America and Europe and between America’s trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific allies. That is a serious risk indeed. Yet, since the debate on driving wedges between China and Russia is unlikely to go away anytime soon, it is important to try to scope it. In that spirit, a few considerations might be in order.
First, it will be far easier to drive wedges between peripheral and core members of the authoritarian axis, i.e. between North Korea and China, Iran and China, or even North Korea and Russia, than between China and Russia.
Second, other actors are much better positioned to get a sense of what elements of the Sino-Russian relationship, if any, are potentially open to manipulation — however modest they may be. India stands out.
Third, clarity about the goals of any potential wedge strategy is of the essence. Concretely, the goal should not be to drive China and Russia apart but to pull Russia away from China. Russia is the direct target, because China is the ultimate competitor. Two implications stem from this reasoning. First, this idea of getting China to help get Russia to “behave” — whether in Europe or elsewhere — is naïve at best, and dangerous at worst. Second, any serious U.S. or broader attempt to peel Russia away from China carries high risks for Europeans, as it could entail some form of recognition or accommodation of Russian interests in Europe (or the Middle East).
Ideally, any wedging attempt should include coordination or at least be preceded by consultation among the United States and its European and Indo-Pacific allies. Otherwise the risk is that their own alignment will be pulled apart. The United States and its allies should therefore leverage their competitive advantage (i.e. a greater degree of cohesion and institutionalization) to have a permanent exchange of views on how to approach the Sino-Russian partnership. After all, decoupling and dispersing the resources of the U.S.-led ecosystem is in the collective interest of the revisionist axis.
Luis Simón, Ph.D., is director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute.
This commentary was developed thanks to the support of the Australian Government through the Bridging Allies initiative and the European Research Council (Grant Agreement No. 101045227).
Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons
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