Okay, so what’s the elevator pitch? That was my first question to Gidi Grinstein, founder of the Reut Group, as we sat down in my office to discuss his latest diplomatic framework for post war Gaza. He leaned forward, ready to distill a plan built on months of conversations, negotiations, and calculations.
“Okay, so this is a set of 13 principles that bring together the key demands of all relevant stakeholders in Gaza’s transition – from a ceasefire agreement and hostage deal to the political horizon,” he said. “It connects the political side with the economic side.
At the core, there is a three- to five-year transition period – probably four years – to align with a second Trump administration. This period would see Gaza divided into Area A, about 80%, under Palestinian control and Area B, about 20%, along the perimeter under Israeli security.”
There it was, in a nutshell: security for Israel, governance for the Palestinians, and an international force to oversee stability and reconstruction. The absence of Area C in Gaza was a critical nuance.
Under the Oslo Accords, Area C in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) remains under complete Israeli control. Still, in this plan, all of Gaza remains Palestinian, with security coordination in Area B.
The legal void
“Today, Gaza exists in a legal void,” Grinstein said. “Israel withdrew in 2005, and Hamas later canceled the Oslo Accords. Now, Hamas is being removed, but there’s no framework for what replaces it. The key is importing the legal framework that exists in the West Bank into Gaza.”
This framework hinges on recognizing the Palestinian Authority as a “nascent state” – a political entity that will become a state once conditions are met, Grinstein said. It’s a concept familiar to Israelis, he said: “Israel in November 1947 was a nascent state. It became a state in May 1948.”
So, will this be enough for the Saudis in order to normalize relations with Israel? I asked.
“Perfect is not on the menu,” he said, laughing. “But the Saudis need a political horizon. What they get here is the world recognizing the PA as a nascent state, Israel committing to a process toward permanent status without formally agreeing to statehood, and a clear declaration that Israel has no territorial claims in Gaza.”
In other words, it is a balancing act: enough for Arab states to engage, enough for Israel to maintain security, and enough to transition Gaza away from Hamas rule.
Grinstein is an Israeli societal entrepreneur and founder of the Reut Group, a strategy and leadership think tank. He played a crucial role in the Israel-PLO negotiations from 1999 to 2001, serving as secretary and coordinator of the Israeli delegation. He was also instrumental in founding Taglit-Birthright Israel and has authored books on Israeli adaptability and peacemaking.
With an extensive background in strategic planning, including economic cooperation projects among Israel, the PA, and Jordan, Grinstein brings decades of diplomatic experience to the table.
The international force
The most significant operational aspect of the plan is the deployment of an international security force led by the UAE.
“The UAE, Saudis, and Egyptians will not enter Gaza unless invited by the Palestinians,” Grinstein said. “Not by Israel. Not by the Americans. Only by the Palestinians. That means a reformed PA must be recognized as the governing body in Area A.”
And who exactly will make up this force?
“The Emiratis have already said they are willing to lead,” he said. “Other countries may contribute – Europeans, Americans, NATO. Even Indonesia has expressed interest.”
But even with an international force, security in Gaza will ultimately have to rely on Palestinian forces.“Israel can’t run Gaza directly,” Grinstein said. “The cost in blood, money, and global standing would be unsustainable. The alternative – letting Gaza devolve into a failed state –also isn’t viable.”
Gaza’s reconstruction
One of the more radical proposals, which most Israelis would probably endorse, is the dismantling of UNRWA, the United Nations agency responsible for Palestinian refugees.
“Take Jabalya; it’s destroyed,” he said. “When it’s rebuilt, it shouldn’t be a refugee camp; it should be a permanent community.”
Under this plan, UNRWA’s responsibilities, funding, and role would be transferred to a new Gaza Reconstruction Authority, controlled by a reformed PA and designed to shift away from refugee perpetuation toward governance and stability.
What about the West Bank? While Gaza is the focal point of his paper, the West Bank remains an inescapable part of the discussion.
“This plan is consistent with the Trump peace plan,” Grinstein said. “Gaza and the West Bank are a single territorial unit under Oslo, and that principle remains intact.”
The PA’s role in both territories is key. But can Israel trust the PA after years of instability and weak governance? I asked.
“Perfect is not on the menu,” he said again. “But what’s the alternative? Either Gaza becomes Somalia, or Israel establishes direct control, which would mean billions in costs, international fallout, and unending casualties.”The alternative, he said, is managed transition.
Grinstein, an Oslo veteran, understands that this plan will be judged within the context of past failures. I grew up demonstrating against people like Grinstein, who promoted the Oslo Accords. Oslo was what gave the Palestinians guns; what allowed them to kill so many people I knew growing up. So, I asked him: What would Yitzhak Rabin think of his plan?
“Rabin wanted to encircle Israel in a ring of peace – Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon,” he said. “He knew Iran was emerging as Israel’s biggest threat. His urgency was real. If he were here today, he’d see Saudi normalization as a historic opportunity. He would pay the price – lip service to the vision of a Palestinian state – to secure Israel’s place in the region.”
Saudi normalization isn’t theoretical anymore. Israel is already part of a military alliance in CENTCOM. When Iran launched missiles, the US, France, the UK, and Jordan stepped in. When the Houthis disrupted Red Sea trade, Israeli and Western forces retaliated.
“IMEC – the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor – isn’t just an idea anymore; it’s reality,” Grinstein said. “Rabin would recognize that this regional security architecture is taking shape and lean into it.”Can this actually work? I finally asked.
Grinstein isn’t naive about the political realities.
“These 13 principles capture what’s called the ‘zone of possible agreement,’” he said. “No one gets exactly what they want, but everyone gets something they can live with.”
So, has Grinstein pitched it to Israeli officials?
“I’m not in the negotiating room,” he said. “My job is to get as many people as possible to understand the logic of these principles so that they become part of the conversation when decisions are made.”
Whether this plan will be adopted, one thing is sure: Israel cannot afford to leave Gaza in a vacuum. And as Grinstein put it bluntly: “Israel doesn’t have the capability to create a new legal framework for Gaza. The only way forward is to implement the interim agreement.”
This is the conversation Israel is about to have – whether it wants to or not. So, let’s keep these ideas coming.
Jesus Christ is King
