On Aug. 4, 2018, a drone exploded over Avenida Bolívar in Caracas during a speech by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. A second drone crashed and exploded a few blocks away. Maduro was unharmed, but the first blast injured several Venezuelan soldiers. The drones were part of an alleged assassination attempt against the Venezuelan president. At the time, the attack was front-page news. Today, thousands of small drones are being used to attack soldiers and military equipment on both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian war — social media is replete with “killcam” footage of small drones flying into fleeing troops. It may be only a matter of time before this expertise is turned against civilians far from the battlefield and within the United States.
The U.S. military, law enforcement agencies, and civilians are unprepared to face the looming threat of weaponized drones at home and abroad. When the conflict in Ukraine inevitably ends, Russia and Ukraine will be forced to fully or partially demobilize, which will release thousands to tens of thousands of veterans back to civilian life with expertise in designing, building, and employing weaponized drones. History shows that most will return to civilian life. Some will seek opportunities to employ or peddle their combat experience in building, flying, or training others in their craft. This will unleash a wave of drone expertise that will give violent actors access to new means of carrying out attacks around the world. The United States and its allies should take decisive action to prepare authorities to defend against drone threats and to limit the spread of weaponized drone expertise or face inevitable terror at home.
The Next Threat
The risk of a wave of political and criminal violence precipitated by the spread of drone expertise from the demobilization of troops from the Russo-Ukrainian war is real. Weaponized drones provide access to lethal airpower with eroding barriers to entry. The conflict in Ukraine has supercharged the development and proliferation of various kinds of small drones, many of which are used in attack roles. Often, these targets are individual soldiers. Nowhere in history were drones as thoroughly integrated into combat arms as they are over the battlefields of Ukraine.
The proliferation of advanced military drone expertise is concerning for several reasons. Few Western militaries and even fewer law enforcement organizations possess experience with drones to effectively counter their use by violent actors — whether state-sponsored or otherwise. Drones in the Middle East have proved challenging even for the U.S. military. Even the suspected presence of malign drones can create public disturbances.
Adequately defending against weaponized drones taxes the most well-equipped combat force and requires a layered approach of multiple counter-drone systems. Weaponized drones can be modified from commercial systems or built with readily available parts. The diversity of operators and the widespread use of drones are significant indicators of their effectiveness and accessibility.
The rapid innovation cycle for unmanned systems in Ukraine and Russia has created a cadre of personnel and equipment several generations ahead of the rest of the world. Some Ukrainian and Russian drone manufacturers are incorporating automatic target recognition algorithms — part of the inevitable march towards ‘fire and forget’ systems — and fiber optic cable links immune from radio frequency jamming. Criminals, terrorists, and non-state actors have the most to gain from this expertise.
Worryingly, the first lines of defense for civilian law enforcement are jammers and geolocation of the ground control station. Some of these systems rely on drone manufacturers cooperating with law enforcement initiatives that bespoke or modified drones can easily overcome.
The March to Ubiquity
Even before the current conflict in Ukraine, weaponized drones had begun to proliferate around the world — appearing in attacks by cartels in Mexico, rebels in Myanmar, and terrorists across the Middle East. In 1994, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese doomsday cult, experimented with flying remote control helicopters to spread Sarin gas, and in the 2000s, terrorist groups became interested in flying model airplanes with improvised explosives into targets such as the G8 Summit, commercial airliners, and populated areas. In the 2010s, groups in the Middle East began incorporating drone surveillance and reconnaissance into their operations —spurred by the arrival of low-cost, easy-to-fly drones like the DJI Mavic, released in 2016. Weaponization quickly followed.
In early 2017, Iraqi security forces suffered a drone attack at the hands of the Islamic State, with a single drone dropping one munition. The attack likely wounded or killed one Iraqi soldier, but collectively at the time, the U.S. military largely downplayed the advancement.
In 2018, an Ecuadorian prison came under attack by bomb-dropping drones, and an unknown party attempted to assassinate the Venezuelan president. In Mexico, drug cartels began using drones to intimidate politicians and kill civilians, law enforcement, and military personnel. Drones have become commonly employed by jihadists in Africa. Hamas used them during its Oct. 7, 2023 attacks on Israel. More recently, Ukrainian special forces have allegedly used weaponized drones against Russian-aligned forces in Mali, Sudan, and Syria in cases of state-sanctioned spreading of drone expertise with ominous implications.
For their part, Russian forces are possibly already advising drone programs in China and North Korea. It is no accident that shortly after sending troops and materials to Russia, North Korea’s leader declared that suicide drones would go into mass production. Recently, a Chinese company announced they would start production of one million suicide drones for a contract with the People’s Liberation Army.
Demobilized drone talent and experience from the conflict in Ukraine will fuel an acceleration in the use and effectiveness of weaponized drones —distilling the potency of an already serious threat. Russian and Ukrainian drone operators now have years of experience in targeted assassinations, mechanized warfare, counter-air missions, infrastructure attacks, and sinking ships in port or at sea —skill sets that are attractive to criminals and terrorists.
The Domestic Threat
The United States and its allies should prepare for the inevitability of drone expertise being used in political and criminal violence. In 2020, more than 1.5 million drones were registered in the United States. However, drones weighing less than half a pound — such as most quadcopters — are exempt from registration, meaning the actual number of drones is likely much higher. Drones are ubiquitous in the United States — all that is missing for weaponization is criminal know-how and intent. Drones have already caused significant security breaches, like the 2015 incident when an unarmed quadcopter landed on the White House South Lawn.
Even without malicious intent, the proliferation of drones carries risk, as evidenced by drone-aircraft collisions like the recent case of a firefighting aircraft over Los Angeles. A drone flown into an aircraft engine could quickly bring down a commercial airliner.
In Mexico, the use of drones to attack law enforcement has become a frequent cartel tactic. In 2022, a cartel attacked law enforcement with a combined assault by crewed aircraft and drones. Government officials, police, rivals, and military personnel are all victims of cartel-flown drones. Ominously for the United States, cartel drones also watch the U.S. border and the movements of its law enforcement officers, and U.S. officials recorded over 1,000 border incursions per month by cartel drones last year.
Underscoring the importance of drones to cartel operations, a new rank was created within their organizations — the “dronero” or drone operator. Droneros possess advanced technical skills. One Mexican drug cartel even recruited a Mexican national guardsman who oversaw her agency’s drone program. Subsequent additions to the payroll may include veterans of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If Mexican law enforcement starts deploying drone countermeasures, the demand for more skilled drone operators will only increase.
Critical infrastructure is also an easy target for drones. Military bases and power station in the United States have rudimentary, if not absent, drone detection and defense. For example, a “hostile state” may be behind the recent drone intrusions into the restricted airspace above U.S. military bases in England and elsewhere. The intruding drones left base defenders befuddled, as they could not ascertain the operators’ location or jam their control datalinks despite being under real-time intelligent control. The problem grows more acute when discussing the thousands of non-military but equally important installations or locations across the United States.
Imagine what enterprising criminals, a terrorist cell, or state-supported saboteurs could accomplish with know-how from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Such fears are not unfounded. Russia is already linked to sabotage campaigns in Europe and is not above engaging in destabilizing activities. Their drone operators in Ukraine have already been accused of killing civilians for “target practice.”
Some U.S. experts express worries about China attempting to launch a “Pearl Harbor” type attack that could knock out the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis in the Indo-Pacific. While most fears center around China’s hypersonic, ballistic, and cyber weapons, drones have already demonstrated worrisome unfettered access to key installations and their sensitive weapon systems.
The Way Ahead
The United States and its allies should take mutually supporting actions to mitigate the coming threat from the proliferation of drone expertise. First, and most importantly, the United States should prioritize investments in counter-drone systems for the military as well as across federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as coordinated defense-in-depth is required. Counter-drone tactics cannot solely be the purview of the military, nor can they cover every critical area in the homeland. Congress already authorizes the Departments of Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security to mitigate the risk of weaponized drones. Still, expertise and resources should also be provided to state and local agencies.
Second, when the Russo-Ukrainian war inevitably ends, the United States and NATO allies should make a combination of efforts to partner with Ukrainian drone companies and attract drone talent to support their defense industries. As demobilized soldiers return home and look for new employment, Western defense companies and buyers need to be there —a move that would not only preempt veterans and idled industry from peddling their drone expertise to malicious actors but also harness much-needed expertise that will be critical in reversing Chinese domination of the consumer drone and parts markets. Western companies can learn from an industry that can build as many as four million drones next year. This effort would be similar in principle to Project Paperclip, which brought German rocket scientists to work in the U.S. defense industry after World War II, as well as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that in part sought to “offer assistance in finding gainful employment” to Soviet nuclear scientists.
If preparatory actions are not taken now, weaponized drones will catch the United States and European countries flat-footed within their borders.
Walker D. Mills is a U.S. Marine Corps infantry officer and MQ-9A Reaper pilot. He is the co-director of Project Maritime at the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a host of the Marine Pulse podcast for War on the Rocks.
Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is an FA-18 weapons systems officer currently assigned to Strike Fighter Wing Pacific. He is a host of War on the Rocks’ Sailor Pulse podcast and previously served as a fellow with the Halsey Alfa Advanced Research Group at the U.S. Naval War College.
Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is an FA-18 naval aviator currently assigned to U.S. Seventh Fleet. Previously, he advised in cooperative research and development agreements regarding weaponized drones and participated in Defense Innovation Unit unmanned system initiatives.
The views in this article are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
Image: National Police of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons
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