Donald Trump is likely the last president that will get a chance to stop Iran from building a nuclear arsenal. Will he succeed?
Tehran has been on the backfoot, having catastrophically misjudged the long-term repercussions of Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent response, but even a diminished Islamic Republic can harm U.S. interests and force it to commit significant resources to managing yet another crisis in the region. And while most of the recent focus on Iran has dwelt on its regional activities at the expense of the nuclear issue, historically, the opposite has been true — and it is only a matter of time before the nuclear problem dominates headlines again. The Trump administration has an opportunity and an obligation to reset the balance, managing the nuclear issue while not giving Iran space to reconstitute its regional proxy network that targeted U.S. and partner forces and limited their options for the last decade. Israel has shown that it is possible to take more risks in responding to Iranian provocations and attacks. The United States should do the same — utilizing the entirety of the toolkit at its disposal to prevent Iranian nuclear weaponization, proxy rearmament, and the descent of the region into further turmoil.
How We Got Here
This was always intended to be a year of significance for the Iranian nuclear program. Ten years after the Iran nuclear deal (formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was concluded, it was to mark the graduation of the Iranian nuclear issue with the sunsetting of major nuclear restrictions and sanctions. But the nuclear deal envisioned those ten years as a decade in which Iran’s nuclear program would be heavily circumscribed, with its research and development efforts harnessed and its ability to expand its nuclear infrastructure denied. Although some debated the wisdom of this logic, the ten years of core implementation was intended to be used as a foundation for other negotiations, perhaps even some that further dealt with the nuclear program itself, extending sunset timelines and further restricting certain Iranian nuclear activities.
2025 will remain a year of significance, but for far different reasons. Unshackled by Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal in May 2018 in hopes of a better deal, Iran restarted its centrifuge research and development programs and nuclear expansion. Upon entering office, the Biden administration — in which we served in different roles, including as members of the U.S. negotiating team with Iran on possibly returning the nuclear deal — focused its efforts on a mutual return to compliance with the deal, but Iran was ultimately uninterested in it. Iran’s nuclear progress has continued unabated since that time. The Biden administration’s refusal to consider anything other than the nuclear deal for the first two years of its time in office was followed by its failure to sustain pressure on the Iranians to restrain their nuclear work to any great degree. The result is that Iran is now one or two weeks away from having enough material for its first nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so, a 96 percent reduction in the breakout time created by the nuclear deal.
The other major concern was Iran’s proxy network. That is now in tatters. Israel’s operations have effectively degraded the capabilities of Tehran’s key proxy and conduit to the rest of its network of non-state allies, Hizballah, eviscerating its command structure and destroying much of its arsenal. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and Israel’s war against Hamas have also helped change the regional power balance against Tehran. Iran still has moves it can make, not least a nuclear breakout, and it may prioritize rebuilding its network of proxies to restore its strategic depth. But this will take time, and Iran’s strategic calculus is now more open to manipulation and influence than it has been since probably the end of the Iran-Iraq War in the late 1980s. The new administration has a brief window to set the tone for its relationship with Iran.
The Real Moment of Nuclear Crisis
The Trump administration has promised to intensify pressure against Iran. There is a very real chance that embarking on this course will prompt Iran to break through its remaining self-imposed nuclear constraints. The Biden administration’s approach to this threat was reportedly instead to seek mutual and informal de-escalation. But Trump cannot simply return to the same policy he put into place in 2018, just as the Biden administration couldn’t revive a 2015 deal. Hopefully, the Trump administration will embrace this new reality where Tehran is weaker regionally than any time in the past decade, but with a more advanced nuclear program than ever before. As positive as a collapse of the current Iranian government might be, it remains far less likely than one would hope, even as discontent within the Iranian population continues to exist and perhaps grow. Iran still has functional internal security services and the ability to impose its will. Fortunately, the United States can improve its position vis-à-vis Iran without pushing for regime change — a goal Trump doesn’t seem eager to pursue — by focusing on three points: preventing an Iranian nuclear breakout, containing Iran’s attempt at regional proxy restoration, and containing its proliferation of missiles and drones.
In doing so, the new administration has an opportunity to rectify the mistakes made by the previous two. This should start with clarity as to the objectives of the policy. In the first Trump administration, there appeared to be a disconnect between the president, who expressed a wish to reach a deal with Iran, and at least some in his cabinet and lower levels of his government, who sought to overthrow the regime through a maximum pressure campaign. The result of that policy was both confusion as to what would mark a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict with Iran and an overemphasis on what sanctions could achieve — at the expense of other tools. Trump’s approach to Iran further isolated the United States from its key allies in Europe (chiefly those part of the deal, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). For its part, the Biden administration overcorrected and made a return to the nuclear deal the focal point of U.S. policy toward Iran for far too long and at the expense of addressing other challenges with that regime. The results were that efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear progress effectively remained in limbo as the diplomatic channel revealed ineffective.
Trump is the president, so let us assume that his preferences will and ought to bear out within the administration. If he is serious about wanting to get a deal with Iran, there are options for him to pursue. These will not include the return of the nuclear deal, which has been rendered mostly moot by Iranian technical progress, especially on centrifuge research and development. Still, meaningful steps by Iran to reduce the concern that it will produce nuclear weapons are possible, including, and especially, granting access and monitoring rights to the International Atomic Energy Agency back to the level provided in the nuclear deal and in perpetuity. Other steps, such as reducing the size and enrichment level of its uranium stocks to create a little more time before a breakout could be staged, permitting verification that Iranian nuclear weaponization projects remain halted, and an agreement never to develop the plutonium path to nuclear weapons, would also provide some confidence as to Iranian intentions and limit the scope of the problem.
To get there, the United States should execute a strategy that makes clear the opportunity available to Iran and risks that its leaders will face through their continued nuclear expansion. On the diplomatic front, Trump can swiftly authorize direct talks with the Iranians to convey an offer for an immediate, risk-reduction focused arrangement to provide space for further talks. He can and should underscore that this is a time-limited opportunity, given both the impending expiration of the nuclear deal’s U.N. “snapback” arrangement and Iran’s technological progress. Simultaneously, he can order tougher enforcement of United Nations Security Council nonproliferation obligations, barring the transfer of Iranian nuclear-related goods and that of weapons to Iran’s proxies. He can further order diplomatic and — if necessary — military interdiction of cargoes destined for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. He should also work with regional partners in the Gulf to shore up mutual security commitments, including cooperation in the event that military action is needed against Iran’s nuclear program, which could and should include steps to counter Iranian proxy networks through irregular warfare activities such as information and cyber operations. None of these steps would necessarily involve or require immediate military action against Iran, but would indicate U.S. resolve to enforce the longstanding, bipartisan commitment to deny Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
For its part, sanctions pressure will require a serious conversation with China about their purchases of Iranian oil and their cooperation in reducing those purchases or restricting Iranian access to the resulting proceeds. China will not do this for free, and other Trump initiatives, such as the pending tariffs on the import of Chinese goods, will make Beijing reluctant to cooperate. If Trump is serious about an Iran deal, however, coming to an early mutual understanding with China is central. One way to incentivize China to get back on board is to underscore the precarious nature of energy supplies from the Middle East should Iran’s nuclear program continue unabated. The United States can shape this by augmenting its military threat to Iran’s nuclear program through an explicit commitment to expand the target set to include other regime assets, chiefly its oil infrastructure. China will well understand that attacks on Iranian oil infrastructure could prompt Iranian attacks on other countries, risking its oil supplies. This risk in combination with economic pressure could encourage China to cooperate.
A Rare Regional Opportunity
At the current juncture in the region, the United States is well-positioned to seize opportunities to limit Iran’s influence in the Middle East after years of growing Iranian presence and to degrade the capabilities of Iranian proxies who have targeted U.S. forces for years. These proxies no longer have the means to inflict massive damage on our allies and partners in Israel and elsewhere, and their actions have put them squarely at risk. U.S. forces and partners in the region benefit from this setback. But the Islamic Republic will no doubt seek to reconstitute its network of proxies as they are its greatest strategic asset. In the medium-term, the United States should be prepared to use its full toolkit, including force, to deal with Iranian proxies and especially to prevent their rearmament. In the short- to medium-term, proxy attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by the Houthis are likely to continue. The United States should clearly communicate to Iran that these are unacceptable and that its proliferation of missiles and related components render it liable for this threat to peaceful transit through this vital waterway. Interdiction missions as well as targeted strikes against Houthi and other proxy positions should be explicitly put on the table.
In fact, Iran’s proliferation of missiles and uncrewed systems is no longer limited to supplying its traditional non-state allies, whose lesser capabilities have historically made them reliant on Tehran. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Iran has become a key supplier of military capabilities, particularly uncrewed aerial systems, for Russian forces. Leveraging the whole suite of sanctions, export controls, and counterproliferation and interdiction tools, the United States should work in concert with allies and partners to deny Iran the ability to export its missiles and drones. The new administration would also be well-advised to continue the smart release of unclassified information to draw attention on Iran’s malign behavior and garner international support for U.S. efforts — while balancing intelligence requirements. The administration should also prioritize an Iranian commitment to no longer proliferate these items in a deal.
Necessary Quid Pro Quo
To get a deal of significance on the nuclear and proxy proliferation side, substantial sanctions relief would be necessary. An initial offer to Tehran could include significant economic and trade sanctions concessions, while retaining both an immediate “snapback,” as well as measures that would maintain pressure on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran will balk at such a demand, knowing that it could limit the value of such relief, but it can serve at least as a starting point for talks. Depending on the national security value of a deal to the United States (e.g., how far it constrains Iran’s nuclear program, its support for proxies, or missile and drone proliferation), sanctions relief could be improved and scalable, as could the length of term for a deal reached. Crucially, however, any deal with Iran will require compromises on sanctions. Promises to obtain uncompensated Iranian capitulation should be considered suspect, as they depend on herculean assumptions of what sanctions, military pressure, and diplomacy can achieve.
Trump Has Time, But Not Much
The time and space that was supposed to be provided by the nuclear deal no longer exist, but options remain to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. The Trump administration may have more scope to operate audaciously than its predecessor, afforded by unified government control in the United States and the weakened state of Iranian proxies abroad. It should take the chance now or should start preparing for the diminished policy space and heightened risk that a nuclear Iran would bring to the region and to the international community. The first Trump administration set us on this course — the second Trump administration can and should correct it.
Richard Nephew is a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously served in the U.S. government, including as deputy special envoy for Iran and director for Iran at the National Security Council.
Ariane Tabatabai served in a number of positions at the Departments of State and Defense, most recently as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for force education and training. She is the author of No Conquest, No Defeat – Iran’s National Security Strategy.
Image: khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons
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